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Ziebell v. Board of Trustees





APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. RICHARD L. CURRY, Judge, presiding.


Plaintiff, Edwin J. Ziebell, appeals from a trial court order dismissing his mandamus action in which he sought to compel the defendant Board to restore to him a retirement pension which it had lowered pursuant to the advice of the Illinois Department of Insurance. The issues raised on appeal are: (1) whether the dismissal should be affirmed because plaintiff failed to proceed under the Administrative Review Act; (2) whether the construction of the amended pension statute urged by plaintiff would have an unconstitutional effect; and (3) whether plaintiff's construction would cause the statute to have retrospective application without an express provision to that effect, in derogation of principles of statutory construction.

The parties stipulated to the facts prior to the hearing below. According to that stipulation the plaintiff served as a police officer of the Village of Forest Park from September 15, 1947, until his retirement on October 11, 1973, at the age of 47 years. At retirement plaintiff was Chief of Police and was paid a salary of $17,563.08 for the year immediately preceding October 11, 1973. At the time of his retirement, section 3-111 of the Illinois Pension Code provided in pertinent part:

"Any policeman who has creditable service of 20 years or more and has reached age 50 and who is no longer in the service as a policeman, shall be entitled to a yearly pension equal to 1/2 of the salary attached to the rank he held on such police force for 1 year immediately prior to his retirement, payable from the police pension fund of the municipality. The pension shall be increased by 1% of such salary for each additional year of such service over 20 years, to a maximum limit of 60% of such salary * * *" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 108 1/2, par. 3-111.)

By an amendment effective October 1, 1975, the 1% increment was increased to 2% for each additional year of service up to 30 years, and the maximum limit was increased to 75% of salary. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 108 1/2, par. 3-111.) The parties agreed that if the plaintiff had attained 50 years of age at the time of retirement the 1973 statute would have applied and his pension would have been $819.61 per month or $9,835.32 per year. However plaintiff attained age 50 and was entitled to receive a pension on December 17, 1975. The Board granted his application and applied the rate provided in the amended statute. Plaintiff was paid the greater amount until September 22, 1976, when the Department of Insurance informed the Board that the rate provided by the 1973 statute should have been used, as that was the statute in effect on the date of plaintiff's retirement. Accordingly, on September 22, 1976, the Board reduced plaintiff's pension from $10,889.16 annually, or $907.43 per month, to $9,835.32 annually, or $819.61 per month.

The parties also stipulated at trial that the issue before the court was:

"Should the petitioner's pension be calculated on the basis of the law governing the amount of pension due petitioner on the date of actual retirement or the law in effect on the date the petitioner attained the age required to obtain pension benefits."


• 1-3 Defendant contends that this court should affirm the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the action should have been brought as a complaint for administrative review under the Administrative Review Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 267.) Defendant first raised this contention in its answer to plaintiff's petition for mandamus. But as plaintiff notes, this contention was clearly abandoned when defendant agreed to a stipulation that the only issue before the trial court was whether the law at the time plaintiff retired or that in effect on the date he attained the requisite age governed the calculation of his pension. Where by such a stipulation the parties prescribe the issues to be tried, this constitutes a binding waiver or elimination of all issues not included in the stipulation. (Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1960), 19 Ill.2d 342, 167 N.E.2d 169.) The written arguments presented to the trial court by both parties related only to the stipulated issue. But in effect defendant now contends that the trial court erred in ruling on the merits rather than on failure to proceed under the Administrative Review Act. A party on appeal cannot predicate error on actions committed pursuant to his stipulation and acquiescence at trial. Bridges v. Neighbors (1975), 32 Ill. App.3d 704, 336 N.E.2d 233; see People ex rel. Walker v. O'Connor (1953), 351 Ill. App. 545, 115 N.E.2d 808.

Plaintiff also contends that the Administrative Review Act was inapplicable here because that act contemplates review of an administrative decision which affects the legal rights of a party and which terminates proceedings before the administrative agency. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 264.) Judicial review is to be restricted to the evidence adduced in the hearing process. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 274.) Plaintiff notes that on the record before us there is no evidence of any such administrative hearing and thus nothing upon which a court could base its review. (See People ex rel. Vestuto v. O'Connor (1953), 351 Ill. App. 539, 115 N.E.2d 810.) Nor is there any record of defendant having notified plaintiff of its decision, although the Administrative Review Act establishes that a party has 35 days from the time he was furnished with a copy of the decision in which to seek judicial review. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 267.) The fact that we are unable to determine whether there was any hearing or notification to plaintiff of a decision is the result of the determination of the parties below that no issue existed concerning the applicability of the Administrative Review Act. This supports our determination that defendant has waived the issue and may not raise it on appeal, for the stipulation entered into by defendant prevents our determination of the issue from the record developed at trial.


• 4 The amended statute at issue does not expressly indicate whether the increase in pension was applicable to those retiring prior to its enactment. In construing the statute we are guided by the presumption that the legislature did not intend to create an unconstitutional statute. (Wiseman v. Elward (1972), 5 Ill. App.3d 249, 283 N.E.2d 282.) And where a statute is subject to two constructions, one of which would render it unconstitutional, it is our duty to construe the act so as to uphold its constitutionality if it can reasonably be done. Laffoon v. Bell & Zoller Coal Co. (1976), 65 Ill.2d 437, 359 N.E.2d 125; Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Knight (1968), 40 Ill.2d 423, 240 N.E.2d 612.

• 5 When the statute was amended in 1975 to increase pension amounts, the financing section of the Pension Act was also amended to increase the amount of deductions from the salaries of policemen. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 108 1/2, par. 3-125(2).) This increase was specifically intended to pay for the increase in pension benefits. (79th Illinois General Assembly, 1975 Senate Debates, day #70, June 12, 1975.) Plaintiff, of course, was no longer subject to such deductions. Thus, under plaintiff's construction of the amended statute, the pension to which he would become entitled when he reached the age of 50 was increased without requiring any payments into the fund by him. But such a construction would render the statute unconstitutional as permitting the expenditure of public funds for private purposes. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, § 1(a); Porter v. Loehr (1928), 332 Ill. 353, 163 N.E. 689; Ill. Const. 1870, art. IV, §§ 19, 20.) In Porter the court struck down statutory amendments which increased the pensions of policemen who had already retired and were drawing pensions at lower rates. In doing so the court relied on the general constitutional principle that public funds may only be expended for public purposes and also relied on the express prohibition of article IV, section 19, of the 1870 Illinois Constitution, which stated:

"The General Assembly shall never grant or authorize extra compensation, fee or allowance to any public officer, agent, servant or contractor, after service ...

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