Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District; heard
in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County,
the Hon. Charles M. Wilson, Judge, presiding.
MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:
Defendant, Donald Panus, was convicted in a jury trial in the circuit court of Peoria County of the offense of burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 19-1(a)) and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 5 to 15 years. The appellate court reversed and ordered a new trial on the ground that the property taken was not sufficiently identified and that defendant was unduly prejudiced by its admission into evidence (62 Ill. App.3d 177). We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal.
In the latter part of October of 1974, Ronald Garmer placed his Sears Roto-Tiller in a shed approximately 75 yards behind his home at 9824 North Pioneer Parkway, Peoria. On or about April 13, 1975, Garmer went to the shed for the purpose of using the tiller and noticed some evidence of tampering with the shed. Upon entry, he found that the tiller was missing. He then notified the Peoria County sheriff's office. As a witness for the State, Garmer testified to these facts at trial, and he also stated that he had not given defendant or anyone permission to use the tiller.
Also testifying on behalf of the State was Ronald Herring, a friend of defendant's son. He related a conversation in which defendant allegedly admitted taking a tiller from Garmer's property. According to Herring, he, defendant, and defendant's son passed Garmer's home one day in an automobile and defendant said that he obtained a tiller from those premises. Herring also testified that he helped defendant in loading a tiller into a van owned by Robert Choate, who purchased the tiller from defendant for $50 in February of 1975.
Detective Michael McCoy also appeared as a witness for the State and testified that, after taking statements from Herring, he went to the home of Choate and recovered the tiller. Deputy Sheriff Robert Cone also briefly testified, stating that he was responsible for transporting the tiller from Choate's home to a storage area in the sheriff's office where it was kept under lock until trial.
Defendant does not dispute that the tiller introduced at trial is the tiller that he sold to Choate. His argument is that the State did not sufficiently prove that the tiller belonged to Garmer.
At trial, Garmer identified the tiller as his, pointing out that the paint had burned off the muffler, that the tiller was a Sears model, and that it was at the same depth setting as he used. He further stated that, having owned it for a year, he should recognize it. The State also had attempted to prove that the tiller was Garmer's by comparing the serial number on the machine with that written on Garmer's owner's manual, but there was some evidence that the number was written on the manual after the burglary and the recovery of the tiller. Notwithstanding this defect in the State's proof, the circuit court admitted the tiller into evidence on the basis of the identifying testimony of Garmer. The court ruled that Garmer's testimony was proper non-expert opinion testimony based on characteristics peculiar to the subject of identification, and that it was sufficient to identify the tiller.
After all the evidence was presented and closing arguments were made, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict of guilty. The circuit court entered judgment thereon and sentenced defendant to a term of imprisonment of 5 to 15 years.
The appellate court reversed and in so doing said, "It was incumbent upon the State to prove, along with the other elements of the crime of burglary, that the Sears roto tiller belonged to the owner of the burglarized shed, Ronald Garmer. * * * Without adequate proof of ownership of the roto tiller the State failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged." (62 Ill. App.3d 177, 181.) Because it felt that the State had not met its burden of proof, it reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. We disagree with this judgment and accordingly reverse.
The crime of burglary is defined in Illinois as follows:
"A person commits burglary when without authority he knowingly enters or without authority remains within a building, housetrailer, watercraft, aircraft, motor vehicle as defined in The Illinois Vehicle Code, railroad car, or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein a felony or theft." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 19-1(a).)
Proof that specifically identifiable property was taken from the burglarized premises is not an essential element of the offense (People v. Iannacco (1957), 11 Ill.2d 55, 59), as it may be in other cases (see, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, pars. 16-1(a) through (d) (theft)), and the State may prove its case without introducing any such evidence. Proof of ownership of property taken may be relevant for other purposes, however, for under our cases the recent unexplained possession of property stolen in a burglary may be relied upon by the trier of fact to infer guilt (People v. Taylor (1962), 25 Ill.2d 79, 81). Such possession is a relevant circumstance in determining, for example, whether it was defendant that entered the burglarized premises and whether he did so with intent to commit a theft therein. The determinative inquiry as to the question now before us is not, therefore, whether the State has proved an essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (see, e.g., People v. Johnson (1963), 28 Ill.2d 441, 442 (intent is an essential element of burglary and must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt)), but whether the stolen property was sufficiently identified and relevant to allow it to be placed before the trier of fact as circumstantial evidence of defendant's guilt.
Our examination of previous cases satisfies us that if stolen property is positively identified, as here by the victim, the trial judge may admit the evidence if, in his discretion, he determines that it is relevant. The failure to identify the property by way of its serial number is not fatal to the State's case. (People v. Miller (1930), 342 Ill. 244, 250.) Any such perceived weakness in identification could be emphasized by defendant in arguing that the victim lacked credibility or that his testimony should not be given any weight, but such an alleged defect is not a basis for excluding the evidence. (People v. McCasle (1966), 35 Ill.2d 552, ...