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People v. Secret

OPINION FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 1978.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, APPELLEE,

v.

CHARLES E. SECRET, APPELLANT.



Appeal from the Appellate court for the First District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. Fred G. Suria, Jr., Judge, presiding.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARD DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:

The defendant, Charles E. Secret, was indicted for aggravated kidnaping, rape, and deviate sexual assault, in violation of sections 10-2, 11-1, and 11-3, respectively, of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, pars. 10-2, 11-1, 11-3). After a trial by jury, in which he was represented by retained counsel, the defendant was acquitted on the kidnaping charge, but was convicted on the charges of rape and deviate sexual assault. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of not less than 7 and not more than 21 years on each charge. The appellate court affirmed, with one judge dissenting (54 Ill. App.3d 917), and we granted the defendant's petition for leave to appeal.

It is not questioned that the defendant had sexual relations with the complainant at the time charged in the indictment. The sole defense is that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the acts charged were done against the will of the complainant.

The offenses were charged to have taken place in the early hours of January 9, 1975, in an apartment occupied by the defendant in a building located in Chicago. The complainant testified that about 9 p.m. on the preceding day she had gone to a bar, which was located just across the street from the apartment building where the defendant lived, and only a short distance from the complainant's own residence. About an hour after her arrival she observed that the defendant was also in the bar.

The complainant had become acquainted with the defendant about a month and a half before, having met him at this same bar, which each of them frequented. On January 4, the complainant testified, as she was leaving the bar to return to her home, she met the defendant, who was just entering. He followed her outside and told her that he wished to talk to her, and she accompanied him to his apartment. Upon arrival at his apartment the defendant told her that he wished to have sexual intercourse with her, but upon learning that she was in her menstrual period he did not persist. The complainant's testimony did not show that the defendant used force or the threat of force to induce her to accompany him to his apartment, and no charge is made that he committed any criminal offense on this occasion.

Because of this encounter with the defendant, the complainant testified, she became apprehensive upon seeing him in the bar after her arrival there on January 8. Although he did not molest her or even converse with her, she testified he made her uneasy by staring at her steadily. She first attempted, unsuccessfully, to reach her husband by telephone, and then called a friend named Irene Cady at a bar where the latter was employed. Ms. Cady, who was called as a witness by the State, testified that the complainant had called her between 10:30 and 11 p.m. that evening, and had told her a man was "bothering" her. Ms. Cady advised the complainant to take a cab over to her place of employment. When the complainant said that she had no money with her, Ms. Cady offered to pay the cab fare. The complainant did not go to the other tavern, however, and Ms. Cady did not hear from her again.

The complainant testified that after talking to Ms. Cady, she then called a cab. She did not take this cab, however, because when it arrived, the driver appeared to be drunk. She left the lounge to hail another cab on the street. It was then about 1:30 or 2 a.m. As a cab pulled up and the complainant was about to enter it, the defendant came out of the lounge behind her, grabbed the collar of her coat and told the cab driver to leave. The complainant managed to break loose, and began running down the street, screaming. The defendant, who was 6 feet 5 inches tall, and who weighed 270 pounds, caught up with her, grabbed her, and hit her in the jaw, knocking her to the pavement, she testified. He told her that if she didn't shut up, he would throw her through the plate glass window of a store in front of which they were then standing. At that the complainant stopped screaming.

The defendant kept hold of the complainant, and pulled her along to the entrance to his apartment building. He dragged her up to his apartment, pushed her inside, and told her to undress. When she failed to do so, the defendant hit her in the head several more times, she said. He started to remove her clothes, tearing some of them in the process, and the complainant thereupon removed the rest of them herself. He compelled her to have intercourse with him, and, following that, to perform two sexually deviate acts. Some time later the complainant observed that the defendant had fallen asleep. She got dressed, left the apartment, and went directly to a police station located about one block away, where she reported the incident. The complainant was unable to specify how much time had elapsed between her arrival at the defendant's apartment and her departure from it, but the policewoman to whom she talked at the police station testified that the complainant arrived there at 7 a.m.

The policewoman testified that the complainant seemed very nervous and upset, that there were buttons missing from her blouse, and that her slacks were dirty. These articles of clothing were introduced in evidence at the trial. The account of the evening before given to the police by the complainant was substantially the same as her trial testimony summarized above.

The complainant directed police officers to the defendant's building, and remained outside while they went up to the defendant's apartment. They told him he was under arrest for rape, and advised him of his Miranda rights. When he asked who the complainant was and was told, the defendant said, "I got a little rough with her last night and she might be mad. " He also stated that the complainant was his girl friend, that after leaving the lounge they had had an argument in the course of which he had hit her, but that she had subsequently come to his apartment and had willingly had intercourse with him. He stated further that she had had intercourse with him on about five previous occasions.

That sexual intercourse with the complainant had taken place was corroborated by stipulated evidence of a medical examination made of the complainant later in the day. No other medical evidence was introduced. The defendant did not testify, and his witnesses gave no testimony materially bearing on the events of the night in question.

In arguing for reversal, the defendant, relying on People v. Faulisi (1962), 25 Ill.2d 457, 461, contends that in reviewing rape convictions, particularly those in which an act of intercourse is admitted but there is a question whether the complainant consented to it, the court must appraise the evidence with special care. The reason for such a rule, the defendant asserts, is the recognized difficulty in defending against a charge of rape. (See People v. Scott (1950), 407 Ill. 301, 304.) The defendant contends that the majority in the appellate court failed to observe this required standard of review.

To begin, we note that the defendant's formulation of the standard for review in rape cases calls for some qualification, for this court has also stressed that it is primarily the function of the trier of fact to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence. (See People v. DeFrates (1946), 395 Ill. 439, 445; People v. Perez (1952), 412 Ill. 425, 428.) Nor do we agree with the contention impliedly made by the defendant that no conviction for rape can be sustained unless the complainant's testimony is corroborated by other evidence. This court has held that where the complainant's testimony is clear and convincing, corroboration is not required. People v. DeFrates (1946), 395 Ill. 439, 445; cf. People v. Szybeko (1962), 24 Ill.2d 335, 339.

We need not determine, however, the extent to which the standard of review in convictions of rape may be different from that in convictions of other crimes, for we are satisfied that the complainant's testimony was corroborated here. It was corroborated by the condition of her clothing and by the defendant's admissions to the police. Her testimony was also corroborated, as that term is used in prosecutions for rape (see, e.g., People v. Damen (1963), 28 Ill.2d 464, 470, 472-73; People v. DeFrates (1946), 395 Ill. 439, 444), by her reporting the incident to the ...


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