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Barrett v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co.

decided: July 17, 1978.

DONALD R. BARRETT, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
GRAND TRUNK WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.



Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 74 C 2742 - Frank J. McGarr, Judge.

Before Pell and Tone, Circuit Judges, and Grant, Senior District Judge.*fn*

Author: Pell

Plaintiff-appellee Donald R. Barrett was employed by defendant-appellant Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company as a locomotive fireman on October 25, 1963. He worked in that position until May 6, 1964, when he was severed from Grand Trunk's employ pursuant to the provisions of the Award of Arbitration Board No. 282.*fn1 Under the terms of that award, firemen, such as Barrett, hired less than two years prior to the award's effective date ("C-2" firemen), could be separated from a carrier's payroll with a lump sum separation allowance, and have "all of their employment and seniority rights and relations terminated. . . ." On April 26, 1965, Barrett was again employed by Grand Trunk, as a switchman. He worked in that capacity until January 20, 1966, when he was inducted into the United States Marine Corps. On January 12, 1968, he was honorably discharged from the Marine Corps.

Thereafter, he sought reinstatement as a Grand Trunk employee, and received it, as a switchman, on March 8, 1968, with a switchman seniority date of April 26, 1965. This much, the parties agree, was clearly his due under the Military Selective Service Act, now codified at 38 U.S.C. § 2021 Et seq.*fn2 The Act provides, on conditions indisputably met here, that any person "who leaves a position . . . in the employ of any employer in order to perform (military) training and service" "shall . . . be restored by such employer . . . to such position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay." 38 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(2)(B)(i). Subsection (b)(2) adds the following:

It is hereby declared to be the sense of the Congress that any person who is restored to or employed in a position in accordance with (Inter alia, the language just quoted) should be so restored or re-employed in such manner as to give such person such status in the person's employment as the person would have enjoyed if such person had continued in such employment continuously from the time of such person's entering the Armed Forces until the time of such person's restoration to such employment, or reemployment.

Barrett claims that restoration to the job of switchman without loss of seniority was an inadequate satisfaction of his rights under the Act. He points out that in May 1966 Grand Trunk found itself in need of additional firemen. Apparently preferring to hire those with experience in the position to people without it, Grand Trunk canvassed many previously severed "C-2" firemen to determine their interest in becoming Grand Trunk firemen again. Only those "C-2" firemen predetermined to be unemployable or medically unfit, or who received unsatisfactory performance ratings when severed in 1964 (neither of which factors would have applied to Barrett),*fn3 or who were known to be in military service were not canvassed. Barrett thus asserts that but for his military service, he would have been canvassed and given the opportunity to become a fireman at that time, and that this opportunity should have been made available on his return from the Marines, with retroactive seniority.*fn4

Grand Trunk did not accede to Barrett's several requests for such treatment, and he became a fireman only on August 15, 1970, when his application for transfer, made pursuant to a generally posted vacancy announcement, was accepted. He brought this lawsuit to obtain his "proper" seniority date and back pay, and has been represented therein by the United States Attorney. 38 U.S.C. § 2022.

The district court granted Barrett's motion for "Partial Summary Judgment (On Issue of Liability)" on March 22, 1977. On March 25, the court issued an order Nunc pro tunc as of March 22, ordering Grand Trunk to adjust its records by giving Barrett the earlier seniority date he sought, and ordering both parties either to stipulate or to proceed with discovery on the question of the amount of back pay.

Grand Trunk has appealed, invoking (without traverse by Barrett) 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as a jurisdictional basis. Our obligation to satisfy ourselves about our jurisdiction in each case brought before us has required us to look beyond the parties' agreement on this point. Because a "final decision" within the meaning of § 1291 "is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment," Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S. Ct. 631, 633, 89 L. Ed. 911 (1945), the district court's order, which expressly leaves the question of back pay for future resolution, is not a final appealable order. See The Palmyra, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 502, 6 L. Ed. 376 (1825); Baetjer v. Garzot Fernandez, 329 F.2d 798 (1st Cir. 1964); Taylor v. Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New Rochelle, 288 F.2d 600, 602 (2d Cir. 1961), Cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940, 82 S. Ct. 382, 7 L. Ed. 2d 339; 9 Moore's Federal Practice P 110.11 at 138 (1975).

Apparently recognizing this fact, Grand Trunk moved the district court to certify the case to us as one involving a controlling question of law, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The motion was denied, as being "moot." We interpret this denial, cryptic as it is, as incorporating the district court's view that a basis for appeal was present without the certification. In this respect, we believe the court was correct, for the court's order expressly mandates that Grand Trunk act to correct Barrett's employment records, which, of course, was part of the substantive relief requested in the complaint. Accordingly, the order is an interlocutory one granting injunctive relief within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and the case is properly before us. See Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), Rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972)*fn5; International Products Corporation v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963); Zwack v. Kraus Bros. & Co., Inc., 237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956). Compare George v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 293 U.S. 377, 55 S. Ct. 229, 99 L. Ed. 439 (1934) (per curiam), With Switzerland Cheese Association, Inc. v. E. Horne's Market, Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 87 S. Ct. 193, 17 L. Ed. 2d 23 (1966).

We turn to the merits, cognizant of our duty liberally to construe the Act "for the benefit of those who left private life to serve their country in its hour of great need." Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285, 66 S. Ct. 1105, 1111, 90 L. Ed. 1230 (1946), quoted in Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 584, 97 S. Ct. 2002, 52 L. Ed. 2d 595 (1977). "He who was called to the colors (is) Not to be penalized on his return by reason of his absence from his civilian job." Fishgold, supra, 328 U.S. at 284, 66 S. Ct. at 1111 (emphasis added); Accord, McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 357 U.S. 265, 270, 78 S. Ct. 1222, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1305 (1958).

At oral argument in this court, counsel for Grand Trunk conceded what had not really been disputed in Grand Trunk's brief: that Barrett would have been given an opportunity to transfer to a fireman's position at the time of the May 1966 canvass of "C-2" firemen if he had not been in military service. This concession takes us a long way towards affirmance of the district court's order, for Congress, after all, has mandated that a person in Barrett's position must not only be rehired, but also accorded "such status . . . as (he) would have enjoyed if (he) had continued in such employment continuously." 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(2).

To counter the apparent import of this statutory language, Grand Trunk argues that the decision to canvass "C-2" firemen was an act of managerial discretion which had not occurred and was not foreseeable at the time Barrett entered the Marines, that Barrett could not have insisted on the transfer if he had stayed in Grand Trunk's employ and the opportunity had not been offered to him, and that this is accordingly not a case within the ambit of the Act. Principal reliance is on McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., supra.

Although McKinney appears in some ways to support Grand Trunk's position, we think the appearance is deceptive. Just as an employee who serves in the military is not to be disadvantaged because of his absence, the Act was not intended to operate to favor the veteran "as against his fellows." Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 526, 69 S. Ct. 1287, 93 L. Ed. 1513 (1949); Accord, Fishgold, supra, 328 U.S. at 286, 66 S. Ct. 1105. Section 2021(b)(2) guarantees to the veteran only the status he "Would have enjoyed." (Emphasis added.) Determining what would have been is, by its very nature, a difficult task. Often we cannot know with any reasonable confidence. Thus to respect the principle that the veteran is not to be either disadvantaged or favored necessarily means there can be no "perfect reproduction" of what "Might have been his" if he had not ...


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