Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard
in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County,
the Hon. Daniel A. Covelli, Judge, presiding.
MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:
Plaintiffs, Roger J. Fitzgerald, Joanne Fitzgerald, Charles Searcy and Deama Searcy, appealed from the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County entered in favor of defendant, Chicago Title and Trust Company, upon allowance of its motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. The appellate court reversed (46 Ill. App.3d 526), and we allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. Plaintiffs, suing "individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated," alleged in their complaint that plaintiffs Fitzgerald, as the sellers of real estate, and plaintiffs Searcy, as purchasers of real estate, had through their agents, respectively South Chicago Savings Bank and Chicago City Bank and Trust Company, ordered preliminary reports of title and mortgage insurance policies from defendant; that in violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 121 1/2, par. 261 et seq.) defendant had submitted to the financial institutions invoices reflecting "customary seller's charges" and "customary buyer's charges" and did not disclose that defendant "paid or otherwise granted" to the financial institutions "a rebate, discount or allowance of ten percent (10%) with respect to such charges and for which said plaintiffs were not reimbursed"; that plaintiffs represent a class of persons who either sold or purchased real estate in transactions wherein defendant made the same type of allowances and rebates without disclosing those payments on the face of its invoices, or by any other means; that defendant's conduct constituted a deceptive trade practice under the provisions of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act; and that plaintiffs are entitled to damages, an injunction and other relief. The circuit court allowed defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint "with prejudice." Holding that under section 2 of the Act plaintiffs' complaint stated a cause of action, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for further proceedings.
The Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act in pertinent part provides:
(f) The terms `trade' and `commerce' mean the advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 121 1/2, par. 261(f).)
"Sec. 2. Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact, with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact, or the use or employment of any practice described in Section 2 of the `Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act', approved August 5, 1965, in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful whether any person has in fact been mislead, deceived or damaged thereby. In construing this section consideration shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts> relating to Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 121 1/2, par. 262.)
"Sec. 10a. (a) Any person who suffers damage as a result of a violation of Section 2 of this Act committed by any other person may bring an action against such person. The court, in its discretion may award actual damages or any other relief which the court deems proper." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 121 1/2, par. 270a.
The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act in pertinent part provides:
"Sec. 2. A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his business, vocation or occupation, he:
(12) engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 121 1/2, par. 312(12).
Defendant contends first that the appellate court misconstrued the statutory directive that "In construing this section [section 2] consideration shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts> relating to Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 121 1/2, par. 262). It argues that "The amended Consumer Fraud Act directs Illinois courts> to consider `interpretations relating to section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act,' not to interpret section 5(a)." It argues further that the appellate court nevertheless interpreted section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and in so doing erroneously concluded that "the bare allegation of a violation of a Federal antitrust statute, viz.: Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act was sufficient to state a cause of action." It argues further, "The Robinson-Patman Act, together with other Federal antitrust laws, did not become the law of Illinois through the `Back Door' of the Amended Consumer Fraud Act." Defendant argues too that since the initial adoption of the Illinois Antitrust Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 60-1 et seq.), when the General Assembly has determined that additional competitive prohibitions are warranted, "it has done so clearly and directly by amendments to the Illinois Antitrust Act. Thus, in 1969 it adopted Public Act 76-208, which amended Section 3 by adding the present subsection (4) of the Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, sec. 60-3(4) (1975), a counterpart to Section 3 of the Clayton Act." Defendant also contends that by its enactment of the amendments effected by Public Act 76-208 the General Assembly rejected legislation similar to section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
We do not agree. From our examination of its opinion we conclude that the appellate court recognized and correctly followed the rule elucidated in People v. Crawford Distributing Co. (1972), 53 Ill.2d 332, that Federal authorities be considered where there is a lack of Illinois precedent but did not, as contended by defendant, construe section 2 of the Act to mean that every violation of section 2(c) of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976)) was an unfair or deceptive practice. Furthermore, we find no authority to support defendant's argument that the General Assembly expressly or by implication rejected legislation similar to section 2(c) of the Clayton Act.
We consider next defendant's contention that under the appellate court's interpretation, section 2 of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act is rendered so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to be violative of "substantive due process of law." It argues that in Freeman v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (7th Cir. 1974), 505 F.2d 527, the court of appeals held that section 2(c) of the Clayton Act does not apply to intangibles; that in Janes v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association (1974), 57 Ill.2d 398, it was held that no common law action arose out of the payment of the same type of rebate as is alleged here; and that absent some prior interpretation of the statute holding that the ...