APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Union County; the Hon. PAUL
D. REESE, Judge, presiding.
MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE EBERSPACHER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:
This is an appeal by the defendant, Harry Verble, from an order of specific performance on an oral contract for the sale of real estate in favor of the plaintiff, Nettie Ashline, entered in the circuit court for Union County, Illinois.
Defendant was the owner of a tract of real estate in Union County, Illinois, described by metes and bounds and consisting of approximately 6 1/2 acres. This parcel had been purchased by him pursuant to a written contract for deed, specifically describing the tract, from a third party. That contract, containing the legal description of the tract owned by defendant, was introduced into evidence in the trial court by plaintiff. The evidence was that defendant owned no other real property in that area.
On March 22, 1972, plaintiff paid to defendant $450 and defendant delivered a writing to plaintiff which read as follows:
"Received of Nettie Ashline $450.00 for 3 1/2 ac Partial Payment on Ground the March 22 1972. Contract to be drawed up Later.
Subsequently, the plaintiff made additional payments to the defendant and it is uncontested that, on at least one occasion, the defendant, in response to the plaintiff's query, "do I owe you anything on this property?" replied, "No, Nettie, you have it more and paid for."
The facts show conclusively, in addition, that the plaintiff resided on the easterly portion of this real estate from March 1972 and, over several years, made a number of improvements to that portion of it. These improvements included grading and clearing the tract, moving a mobile home thereon and installing underpinning and a concrete block foundation of sorts, digging a water well, installing a septic system, driveway, lightposts, trees and a fence. The defendant resided on the westerly portion of this tract for the entire period of time plaintiff was making these improvements, and at no time did he voice any objection, although he admitted knowledge of most of them and actually helped install some.
Ultimately, the plaintiff requested that the defendant deliver to her a deed to the easterly portion of the real estate, the defendant refused, and the plaintiff brought the instant action for specific performance of the oral contract. The defendant alleged that specific performance should be denied on the grounds that no enforceable contract existed by reason of the fact that the real estate, which was the subject matter of the oral contract, was not sufficiently identified.
1 At the outset we note that the defendant does not here argue the Statute of Frauds as a bar to this oral contract, nor could he properly do so. It is well settled in Illinois that when the vendee under an oral contract for the sale of land is in possession of the land, has given consideration, and has made valuable improvements on the land, the oral contract is taken out from under the Statute of Frauds' requirement of a writing. (Manias v. Yeck (1957), 11 Ill.2d 512, 144 N.E.2d 333.) In addition, consonant with the hoary common-law doctrine that every parcel of real estate is unique, we note that there is no dispute between the parties that, should the law and equities lie with the plaintiff, specific performance and not money damages nor other relief is the proper remedy.
2 There is no disagreement among the parties, or under the law, that to be valid an oral agreement lying without the Statute of Frauds must still meet the same requirements as a written contract (Thomas v. Pope (1942), 380 Ill. 206, 43 N.E.2d 1004), including the requirements that the subject matter be sufficiently identified. We turn, therefore, to the corollary inquiries: what description of the disputed real estate exists in this cause; and, is that description legally sufficient under the laws of Illinois to require the enforcement of the instant oral contract for the sale of real estate.
3 When an uncertainty as to the description of the land exists, the rule that the intention of the parties will determine the effect of a deed applies equally to the description of the property, and extrinsic evidence may be used to determine the parties' intentions. (Brenneman v. Dillon (1920), 296 Ill. 140, 129 N.E. 564.) Or, to state the rule somewhat differently, an instrument will not be rendered ineffective for uncertainty of the premises to which it relates if by the aid of extrinsic evidence it can be made certain and the property located. In re Frayser's Estate (1948), 401 Ill. 364, 82 N.E.2d 633.
4 It has been held that to satisfy the requirement of certainty in a real estate contract, "that is certain which can be made certain." (Guyer v. Warren (1898), 175 Ill. 328, 51 N.E. 580.) And, with regard to certainty, it is not necessary in contracts for the sale of real estate that the land should be so described as to admit of no doubt as to what it is. Callaghan v. Miller (1959), 17 Ill.2d 595, 162 N.E.2d 422; Hendrick v. Donovan (1911), 248 Ill. 479, 94 N.E. 144.
The facts as they appear in this cause, as we have noted, show a description of the full tract originally owned by defendant. Likewise, the facts clearly show the intention of the parties was to transfer 3 1/2 acres of the defendant's tract. On the facts as presented in the trial court, it would be the purest sophistry to suggest that the tract here to be conveyed was anything other than the eastern three and one-half acres of the defendant's original tract. As to the exact location of the property line dividing that portion of the defendant's ...