APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Sangamon County; the Hon.
BYRON E. KOCH, Judge, presiding.
MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE GREEN DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:
Plaintiffs, the city of Springfield and the Illinois Municipal League, appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Sangamon County entering a declaratory judgment upon one count of plaintiffs' amended complaint adverse to plaintiffs' contentions and dismissing the balance of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
Sections 8-11-1 and 8-11-5 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 24, pars. 8-11-1 and 8-11-5) authorize municipalities to impose a municipal retailers' occupation tax and a municipal service occupation tax. The Department of Revenue collects those taxes for the municipalities and retains a percentage of the taxes as a service charge to cover administrative costs. The legislation in question, Public Act 78-1255, amended those sections to reduce the service charge from 4% to 2% of the taxes collected.
The bill passed by the General Assembly did not provide for an effective date. The Department of Revenue maintained that the bill did not become effective until July 1, 1975, and continued to retain a 4% service charge for taxes collected. Plaintiffs, the city of Springfield and the Illinois Municipal League, filed suit in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County. Count I of their amended complaint requested a declaratory judgment that Public Act 78-1255 became effective on December 5, 1974, and counts II through IV asked that the court order defendants to refund the excess service charge. After hearing arguments of counsel upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court entered judgment declaring the effective date of Public Act 78-1255 to be July 1, 1975, and dismissing counts II through IV for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiffs appeal.
Public Act 78-1255 was introduced in the Senate as Senate Bill 265. On May 29, 1974, the Senate concurred in the House amendment and the bill was sent to the Governor. He vetoed the bill on July 26, 1974, and returned it to the General Assembly. On November 21, 1974, the Senate overrode the veto by the required three-fifths vote, and the House did the same on December 5, 1974.
Article IV, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 states:
"The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform effective date for laws passed prior to July 1 of a calendar year. The General Assembly may provide for a different effective date in any law passed prior to July 1. A bill passed after June 30 shall not become effective prior to July 1 of the next calendar year unless the General Assembly by the vote of three-fifths of the members elected to each house provides for an earlier effective date."
Pursuant to that mandate, the General Assembly enacted "An Act in relation to the effective date of laws" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 131, par. 21 et seq.). Section 1(a) of that act provides:
(a) "A bill passed prior to July 1 of a calendar year that does not provide for an effective date in the terms of the bill shall become effective on October 1 of that year if October 1 is the same as or subsequent to the date the bill becomes a law; provided that if October 1 is prior to the date the bill becomes a law then the date the bill becomes a law shall be the effective date."
The date of passage, then, determines whether a bill containing no effective date becomes effective on July 1 of the following year or at some earlier date. Plaintiffs contend that Senate Bill 265 "passed" on May 29, 1974, the date the bill passed both houses for the first time. According to this argument, the bill passed prior to July 1 so the effective date would be December 5, 1974, the date the bill became law. Defendant concedes that if the bill passed prior to July 1, the effective date would be December 5, 1974. However, defendant contends that the bill did not pass until both houses voted to override the Governor's veto. Since that occurred after June 30, defendant maintains that the bill could not become effective until July 1 of the following year.
In Board of Education v. Morgan (1925), 316 Ill. 143, 147 N.E. 34, the supreme court was asked to determine the effective date of an act passed by the General Assembly on June 19, 1923, and approved by the Governor on July 2, 1923. At that time, section 13 of article IV of the Illinois Constitution of 1870 outlined the procedures to be followed by the legislature after a bill was introduced. It also included the following provision concerning the effective date of laws: "And no act of the General Assembly shall take effect until the first day of July next after its passage * * *." (Ill. Const. 1870, art. IV, sec. 13.) The court held that the term "passage" referred to the legislative action outlined in section 13 and did not include approval of the bill by the Governor. Therefore, the bill was passed prior to July 1 and could become effective when signed by the Governor rather than on July 1 of the next year.
• 1 In a recent case, the supreme court stated that it would continue to follow the definition stated in Morgan.
"Read as a whole, the opinion in Morgan defines the time when a bill is passed as the time of the last legislative act necessary so that the bill would become law upon its acceptance by the Governor without further action by the legislature. We continue to adhere to this definition." (People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett (1972), 50 Ill.2d 242, 247, 278 N.E.2d 84, 87.
In the Illinois Constitution of 1970, sections 8, 9(a) and 10 of article IV would govern a situation similar to that in Morgan where the Governor approved a bill after its initial passage by the legislature. The instant case, however, involved a different set of circumstances. Here, the Governor vetoed the bill and the General Assembly voted to override that veto pursuant to section 9(c) of article IV. Section 9(c) uses the term "passes" to describe the action of the legislature in voting to override the ...