Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

People v. Graham





APPEAL from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County; the Hon. HAROLD O. FARMER, Judge, presiding.


This is an appeal by petitioner, Kenneth Graham, from an order of the circuit court of St. Clair County dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing.

Graham was found guilty of the offense of theft (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 16-1(a)(1)) following a jury trial in the circuit court of St. Clair County. The court thereafter sentenced him to the Illinois Department of Corrections for a period of not less than three nor more than nine years. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his conviction. People v. Graham (1975), 27 Ill. App.3d 408, 327 N.E.2d 261.

During the pendency of his direct appeal, petitioner Graham began a collateral attack upon his conviction by filing pro se a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The trial court subsequently appointed counsel to represent him, and Graham abandoned his writ and filed a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 122-1 et seq.). The State made a motion to dismiss the petition for the reason that it failed to state a cause of action under the Act. The trial court entered an order on February 19, 1975, denying the petition without an evidentiary hearing, and the petitioner brought this appeal.

Petitioner Graham concedes that all of the allegations other than those in paragraph four of his petition were either waived because of his failure to raise them on direct appeal or adversely decided by our opinion in that appeal.

Paragraph four of the petition reads as follows:

"4. That in violation of due process various law enforcement and governmental officials placed undue pressure on the defendant to remain silent concerning sensitive matters and he would be "taken care of" resulting in the defendant not calling certain witnesses vital to his defense; that further the witness, Raymond Preston, perjured himself under pressure of various governmental officials and police personnel as part of a conspiracy to silence the defendant."

An affidavit was attached to the petition to support the allegations made therein; that was the affidavit of petitioner Graham. It stated in relevant part:

"* * * I further state that prior to and at the time of trial I was advised by a police officer of the Southwestern Illinois Crime Commission to keep my mouth shut and everything would be fine. It was on this promise that I was denied the right to subpoena 16 different persons, most of them police officers who were aware that at the time I made the initial contact with Raymond Preston, the State's chief and only witness against me at the trial I was working for and doing undercover work for the Southwestern Illinois Crime Commission on an arson investigation; further I state that Raymond Herr has knowledge of this matter as well as a man named Jerry who was working for Mr. Herr, a boss named William Beauld, and Clifton Raney who also knew the type of work I was doing at the time I contacted Raymond Preston; this arson investigation concerned Clark's Tavern at 23 and Lincoln Streets in East St. Louis, Illinois; * * *."

Petitioner Graham contends that paragraph four of his petition raised constitutional issues which required an evidentiary hearing. We agree.

• 1-3 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act is intended to provide State prisoners with an effective post-trial procedure through which courts> can determine whether or not substantial constitutional rights have been violated. (People v. Crislip, 20 Ill. App.3d 175, 312 N.E.2d 830.) It is our opinion that both claims made in paragraph four are cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. It is well settled that a charge that the State obtained a conviction by knowing use of perjured testimony is a constitutional question within the purview of the Act. (People v. Gendron, 41 Ill.2d 518, 244 N.E.2d 149; People v. LeCompte, 38 Ill. App.3d 513, 347 N.E.2d 797.) We believe that petitioner's claim that he was induced by law enforcement officers to refrain from putting on witnesses, whose testimony might have impeached the credibility of State's witness Preston, by means of promises that if he did so refrain they would "take care of" him is also cognizable under the Act. The right of a defendant to offer the testimony of witnesses, in plain terms the right to present a defense, is a fundamental element of due process of law. (Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019, 87 S.Ct. 1920; Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 34 L.Ed.2d 330, 93 S.Ct. 351.) It has been held that a defendant in a criminal prosecution has a privilege to call any witness he desires (People v. Cokes, 106 Ill. App.2d 139, 245 N.E.2d 507) and that the right to summon witnesses is fundamental to our legal system (People v. Watson, 36 Ill.2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645. See also Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, § 8). Although the denial of this constitutional right would be more easily recognizable if it were achieved by the State's Attorney or the court, we believe that the right may also be violated by the actions of law enforcement officials.

The question remaining is whether petitioner Graham's pleadings were sufficient to require a hearing.

• 4, 5 The function of the pleadings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is to determine whether petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. (People v. Airmers, 34 Ill.2d 222, 215 N.E.2d 225; People v. Derengowski, 44 Ill.2d 476, 256 N.E.2d 455.) Generally, where, as here, the claims are based on evidence outside the record, an evidentiary hearing should be had (People v. Crislip) since such claims are not intended by the Act to be adjudicated on the pleadings (People v. Airmers). However, in order to require a hearing, the post-conviction petition must make a substantial showing that petitioner's constitutional rights have been violated. (People v. Patterson, 35 Ill. App.3d 1, 340 N.E.2d 546.) The burden is on the petitioner to set forth the violations and support the allegations by affidavits, records, or other evidence containing specific facts. (People v. Jones, 36 Ill. App.3d 315, 343 N.E.2d 525.) Mere conclusory allegations that constitutional rights have been violated are insufficient to entitle petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. (People v. Edwards, 49 Ill.2d 522, 276 N.E.2d 308.) The petition or accompanying affidavits must identify with reasonable certainty the sources, character and availability of the alleged evidence supporting the petitioner's allegations. People v. Ashley, 34 Ill.2d 402, 216 N.E.2d 126; People v. Curtis, 48 Ill.2d 25, 268 N.E.2d 29.

The State argues that the trial court properly dismissed the petition because it consisted only of conclusionary allegations and failed to adequately indicate the availability or ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.