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People v. Clark

OPINION FILED MARCH 4, 1977.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

GERALD CLARK, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.



APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Alexander County; the Hon. PEYTON KUNCE, Judge, presiding.

MR. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:

Defendant Gerald Clark was found guilty by a jury of armed robbery and a lesser included felony theft in the circuit court of Alexander County. The court entered judgment only on the armed robbery and imposed a sentence of 8 to 20 years in the penitentiary. Defendant presents three issues for review: (1) Whether his arrest in Missouri and the subsequent search of his truck was lawful under the theory of "hot pursuit"; (2) whether the court erred in ordering defendant's sentence to run consecutively to an anticipated, but as yet unimposed, term of imprisonment in Oklahoma; and (3) whether the sentence must be vacated and the cause remanded because the judgment order is too vague to effect a consecutive term of imprisonment.

At approximately 3:06 p.m. on May 23, 1975, the dispatcher of the Cairo Police Department received a telephone call from an employee of Rye's Jewelry Store in Cairo concerning an armed robbery that had just occurred. Accompanied by two other police officers, Cairo Detective Steve Thomas proceeded downtown toward the store. Detective Thomas radioed Kentucky Police and asked them to seal off the bridge leading from Illinois to Kentucky. While still enroute to the scene, the officers were notified that the robbery suspects had left the area via a one-way street leading to the main highway in a white International pickup truck. The suspects were described as a juvenile, a white male, and a male dressed as a female.

After receiving this later report, Cairo authorities contacted their Missouri counterparts in Poplar Bluff, Missouri, which is over 10 miles from the Illinois border. After being informed that no Missouri trooper was in the immediate area, the Cairo policemen proceeded south over the bridge into Missouri in pursuit of the suspects. Seven miles into Missouri the suspect vehicle was sighted and stopped by the Cairo Police. Defendant and two other men were taken into custody at about 3:23 p.m.

During the arrest of the suspects, Cairo Police seized several items, including a gun identified as the robbery weapon, and a blue metal box taken from the jewelry store. This box contained a $300 diamond ring, a $35 watch and a $350 coin collection. These items were identified as property taken from the jewelry store at gunpoint. Defendant's motion to quash the arrest and to suppress all evidence seized incidental to the arrest was denied by the trial court on the ground that the arrest and seizure of the evidence was lawful under the doctrine of "hot pursuit."

The evidence at trial established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant, while dressed in women's clothing and armed with a gun, robbed the jewelry store.

Defendant contends that the court erred in refusing to quash the arrest and suppress the evidence obtained as a result thereof. In particular, he asserts that the circumstances of the arrest fail to evidence "hot pursuit" as a matter of law.

• 1 In Illinois the police powers that may be exercised by municipalities are statutorily outlined in the following language:

"The territory which is embraced within the corporate limits of adjoining municipalities within any county in this State shall be a police district." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 24, par. 7-4-7.

"The police of any municipality in such a police district may go into any part of the district to suppress a riot, to preserve the peace, and to protect the lives, rights, and property of citizens. For these purposes the mayor of any municipality in the district, and the chiefs of police therein, shall use the police forces under their control anywhere in the district." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 24, par. 7-4-8.)

In addition, section 107-5(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides that "[a]n arrest may be made anywhere within the jurisdiction of this State." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 107-5(c).) Furthermore, it has been held that an arrest WARRANT ISSUED BY AN iLLINOIS COURT OF PROPER JURISDICTION MAY BE executed by an Illinois police officer anywhere in the State. People v. Carnivale, 61 Ill.2d 57, 329 N.E.2d 193.

• 2, 3 But the foregoing statutes and case law do not abrogate the general common law rule that municipal peace officers have no authority to make a warrantless arrest outside the political entity in which they hold office. (See People v. Carnivale.) The sole exception to this rule arises when the officer is engaged in "hot" or "fresh pursuit." (Krug v. Ward, 77 Ill. 603; Taylor v. City of Berwyn, 297 Ill. App. 417, 17 N.E.2d 1007.) "Fresh pursuit" is defined by statute in Illinois as the "immediate pursuit of a person who is endeavoring to avoid arrest." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 107-4(a)(3).

Since there is authority for the proposition that the validity of an arrest without a warrant for State offenses is determined by the law of the State in which the arrest occurred, and since the arrest in this case took place in the State of Missouri, we think it is necessary to review the applicable laws of that State to determine if a different rule should apply. (See State v. Tillman, 208 Kan. 954, 494 P.2d 1178 (1972); State v. Morris, 522 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. App. 1975); Keeny v. Swenson, 458 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1972).) The doctrine of "fresh pursuit" in Missouri is governed by the Uniform Fresh Pursuit Law. The applicable Missouri statute gives "[a]ny member of a duly organized state, county, or municipal peace unit of another state of the United States * * * the same authority to arrest * * * [as any law enforcement official of Missouri]." (Mo. Ann. Stat. § 544.155 (Vernon 1951).) The term "fresh pursuit" as used in the statute "shall not necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay * * *" and "includes fresh pursuit as defined by the common law * * *." Mo. Ann. Stat. § 544.155 (Vernon 1951).

Thus, it is apparent that under both Illinois and Missouri law the arrest in this case can be sustained only if it fits within the definition of "fresh pursuit." Of course, whether defendant's arrest was valid under the doctrine of fresh pursuit ...


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