Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Keystone Steel & Wire v. Dept. of Labor





APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. EDWARD E. HAUGENS, Judge, presiding.


In an administrative review proceeding; the Circuit Court of Peoria County denied unemployment compensation benefits to eight employees of Keystone Steel and Wire, thereby reversing the decision of the Illinois Department of Labor. The employees-claimants and the Department appeal from the circuit court order.

Because of lack of work, Keystone found it necessary to lay off some employees temporarily, and the positions held by claimants were among those for which work was not available. As required by the collective bargaining agreement between Keystone and the employees union, claimants were offered lower paying jobs as laborers because they had sufficient seniority to "bump" employees with lesser seniority. Claimants refused the jobs as laborers and filed claims for unemployment compensation.

A deputy for the Illinois Department of Labor determined that each of the eight employees was eligible for unemployment compensation. Upon appeal, a reference for the Illinois Department of Labor affirmed that all but one of these employees were eligible. Upon a second appeal, to the Board of Review, all eight were held eligible. In a third appeal under the Administrative Review Act, the Circuit Court of Peoria County reversed the Board of Review and this appeal was taken.

According to the evidence introduced at the hearings, before the layoff the claimants had received wages ranging from $175 weekly to $260 weekly, depending on their respective positions. Four men had piece-rate jobs in the shipping department; two were bundlers; one was a Hi-Lift truck operator; and one was a rod hauler. Each man was offered a job as a laborer at $123 weekly and each refused the job because of the difference in the rate of pay. All of these claimants had worked as laborers in the past. Under the provisions of the union contract, when the employer was "unable to offer work to an employee in his normal regular pay bracket," the employee had three alternatives: (1) he could accept the best paying job available; (2) he could take a leave of absence until a job at his regular pay became available; or (3) he could lay off. Because of the seniority system, employees changed jobs "from day to day," and moving up and down or "bumping" was normal practice at Keystone. The eight claimants were all recalled to their regular jobs after a layoff lasting from one to five weeks. Accepting employment as laborers would have reduced their wages by amounts ranging from 30% to 47% of their previous earnings.

The Board of Review, in each case, found that claimants "voluntarily left work because of the difference in the rate of pay" between their previous jobs and that of laborer, and that they "left work voluntarily with good cause." In one case the Board ruled that the claimant Jerry L. Whitworth was eligible for benefits. In the other seven cases, the Board ruled that the claimants were not disqualified from eligibility for leaving work voluntarily without good cause under section 601A of the Unemployment Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, § 431(A)), but directed the deputy to investigate the claimants' availability for work during the period in question.

The circuit court, in an administrative review proceeding, found that there was no dispute as to the facts, and ruled that all the employees were ineligible for benefits because, "As a matter of law, each and every claimant in this cause left work voluntarily without good cause."

Both the Department of Labor and the claimants have joined in this appeal from the circuit court ruling, and, in addition, we have allowed an amicus curiae brief to be filed on behalf of the Illinois State Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations and its officers.

Keystone contends that these claimants were ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits because they voluntarily left work without good cause contrary to section 601 of the Unemployment Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, § 431), and because they failed, without good cause, to accept suitable work offered by Keystone as proscribed by section 603 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, § 433). Section 603 of the Unemployment Compensation Act also provides:

"In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, consideration shall be given to the degree of risk involved to his health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, his experience and prior earnings, his length of unemployment and prospects for securing local work in his customary occupation, and the distance of the available work from his residence."

On behalf of the claimants, it is argued that they left work involuntarily when they were laid off their normal jobs, and that they had good cause for refusing the offered employment as laborers because of the substantial reduction in pay. Keystone insists that the claimants were not laid off but, under the terms of the seniority plan, were offered alternative work which they refused without good cause. This semantic disagreement was resolved when the Board of Review expressly found that each claimant voluntarily left work with good cause. Clearly the record supports a finding that the claimants left work voluntarily. The determinative issue then is whether a substantial reduction in pay amounted to "good cause" for leaving when offered jobs as laborers.

First, we reject Keystone's contention that the seniority system incorporated in the union contract places these claimants in a different position than employees who do not have seniority rights to lower paying jobs. The contract requires the employer to offer alternative work to employees who are not needed in their regular jobs, but it does not require the employee to accept the offered work. The Unemployment Compensation Act specifically provides that any agreement to waive, release or commute rights under the Act is void. It is the statute which controls eligibility for benefits, not the contract. (Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Board of Review (1973), 122 N.J. Super. 366, 300 A.2d 572; Green v. Republic Steel Corp. (1975), 37 N.Y.2d 554, 338 N.E.2d 594, 376 N.Y.S.2d 75.) Consequently the claimants' right to unemployment compensation should be viewed as though Keystone had voluntarily offered them jobs as laborers.

No Illinois case has previously considered whether a reduction in pay constitutes "good cause" for leaving work. After reviewing the decisions of other jurisdictions, we believe that, according to the weight of authority, a substantial reduction in wages can be "good cause" for leaving employment, depending upon the attendant circumstances. Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Board of Review; Shay v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (1967), 424 Pa. 287, 227 A.2d 174; Bunny's Waffle Shop, Inc. v. California Employment Com. (1944), 24 Cal.2d 735, 151 P.2d 224; Pacific Mills v. Director of Division of Employment Security (1948), 322 Mass. 345, 77 N.E.2d 413; Dubkowski v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act (1963), 150 Conn. 278, 188 A.2d 658; 76 Em. Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation § 62 (1975); 81 C.J.S. Social Security & Public Welfare § 170 (1953).

In a substantially similar New Jersey case, where an employee with seniority refused to accept a low-skilled job which paid 25% less than his previous job as a machinist, the court upheld an administrative finding that he left work voluntarily with good cause. The court distinguished those cases where the downgrading was not severe and the loss of pay not large, and held that the 25% reduction in pay was substantial, and constituted good cause for ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.