APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County; the Hon.
JOHN C. LAYNG, Judge, presiding.
MR. JUSTICE GUILD DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:
The defendant, Richard Whiteaker, and two co-defendants, Arthur Rieffer and Jesse Long, were indicted for the offense of rape, aggravated kidnapping and armed robbery. Defendant Whiteaker pled guilty to all three charges; there were no plea negotiations; at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing the defendant was sentenced to three concurrent terms of 8-20 years in the State Penitentiary.
The defendant Whiteaker, together with Rieffer and Long, approached a motor vehicle parked on a rural road in Winnebago County in the early morning hours of June 4, 1973. The vehicle was occupied by a man and a woman. At gunpoint they took $60 cash from the driver of the car and divided the same among them. They then locked the victim in the trunk of his car and, at gunpoint, forced the female occupant of the vehicle into their automobile. They then drove off with her and each of the three men forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. The following day the defendant was arrested and was identified in a lineup. He then signed a written confession admitting all three offenses. His confession was admitted into evidence without objection at the time of the entry of the plea of guilty.
The defendant alleges six grounds for reversal. They are as follows:
1. that the trial court did not sufficiently admonish the defendant of the nature of the charges under Supreme Court Rule 402(a)(1);
2. that defendant's plea of guilty to aggravated kidnapping was not intelligent or voluntary where he was not informed of the availability of the defense of intoxication and whether there exists a factual basis for the plea of guilty to aggravated kidnapping;
3. that the conviction of aggravated kidnapping should be vacated as convictions for aggravated kidnapping and rape are multiple convictions arising out of a single transaction;
4. whether the trial court considered improper evidence of juvenile arrests which did not result in an adjudication of delinquency as well as adult arrests not reduced to conviction at the time defendant was sentenced;
5. that the sentence is excessive, and
6. whether the trial court considered matters outside the evidence in sentencing the defendant.
• 1 In support of his first contention that he was not sufficiently advised as to the nature of the charge, defendant has cited People v. Ingeneri (1972), 7 Ill. App.3d 809, 288 N.E.2d 550; People v. Billops (1974), 16 Ill. App.2d 892, 307 N.E.2d 206; and People v. Hawkins (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 863, 309 N.E.2d 60. Likewise the defendant has cited People v. Krantz (1973), 12 Ill. App.3d 38, 297 N.E.2d 386. The latter case was overruled by the supreme court in People v. Krantz (1974), 58 Ill.2d 187, 317 N.E.2d 559. While it is true that the Supreme Court's opinion in Krantz has been modified by People v. Wills (1975), 61 Ill.2d 105, the modification therein found in Wills relates to the parole time and not to the factual basis for the plea or the nature of the charge. The supreme court in Krantz, in substance, overruled the other cases above cited by the defendant. As we have previously stated in People v. Diaz (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 280, 304 N.E.2d 103, 106, that, while it would have been better practice for the judge to have informed the defendant personally we, nonetheless, found that, under Supreme Court Rule 402, that the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge was established. In the case before us, moreover, the defendant had signed the confession as to all three offenses, and the court advised him of the nature of the charge by reading the indictment. We find nothing in the indictment that cannot be clearly understood with relation to aggravated kidnapping, rape or armed robbery. Likewise, prior to the entry of the plea of guilty the State's Attorney, in detail, advised the court of what the nature of the charge was relating to all three offenses.
In People v. Krantz, the supreme court stated the question therein to be "* * * whether the trial court adequately informed Krantz and insured his understanding of the nature of the charge pending against him before accepting his plea of guilty." (58 Ill.2d 187, 191.) The court went on to state at page 192:
"We note first the rule requires there need be only substantial, not literal, compliance with its provisions. (People v. Mendoza, 48 Ill.2d 371, 373-74.)
The court also stated the entire record may be considered in determining whether there was an understanding by the accused of the nature of the charge. Specifically, "[t]he recital by the assistant State's Attorney of the anticipated persecutive evidence made clear what criminal conduct of Krantz the People expected to prove." We therefore follow the ruling of the supreme court in this regard and find that the defendant here knowingly entered a plea of guilty after ...