Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

People v. Hines

MAY 26, 1975.




APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Jackson County; the Hon. DOROTHY W. SPOMER, Judge, presiding.


After a jury trial in the circuit court of Jackson County the defendant was convicted of the offenses of murder and solicitation to commit murder. The court imposed a sentence of not less than 25 nor more than 45 years' imprisonment for the crime of murder. No sentence was imposed for the offense of solicitation. The defendant was represented by retained counsel.

The defendant's initial contention on appeal is that he was denied his right to a trial by an impartial jury. The contention is based upon the allegation that the jurors had been exposed to pretrial publicity about the case and therefore were not likely to be fair and impartial.

• 1 It is well settled that a defendant may not raise on appeal a question which was not properly presented to the trial court. (People v. Curry, 56 Ill.2d 162, 306 N.E.2d 292.) In the instant case defense counsel did not file a motion for a change of venue. Nor did he challenge for cause any of the jurors who were selected to hear the case or suggest in any way that the defendant could not receive a fair trial from an impartial jury. Thus, the issue presently raised by the defendant has not been properly preserved for appeal. Nevertheless, we will briefly consider the merits of the defendant's contention. The defendant argues that since several of the prospective jurors stated during voir dire that they had heard or read something about the defendant's case, the court should have asked detailed questions to determine whether the prospective jurors could be truly impartial. Only 30 prospective jurors were examined on voir dire before 12 jurors and one alternate were chosen to hear the case. Of those 30 prospective jurors only 4 testified that they had heard or read of the case and had formed an opinion which would prevent them from being impartial. Those four prospective jurors were dismissed. Of the 12 jurors selected to hear the case, 9 stated that they had read something about the case, and 2 others stated that they had heard about the case. All 12 jurors, however, testified that they had formed no opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. None of the jurors testified as to the nature of what they had read about the case, and no newspaper articles about the case were introduced into evidence. There is nothing in the record, therefore, which suggests that the newspaper articles were anything but unbiased factual accounts of the status of the defendant's case. Nor did any of the jurors state how many newspaper articles they had read about the case. Several jurors stated that they had read or heard very little about the case, and none of the jurors indicated that they had heard or read about the case in great detail. It is also significant that defense counsel used only 8 of his 10 preemptory challenges during voir dire. He challenged only three prospective jurors for cause, and each challenge was granted.

• 2 The record in the instant case does not establish that there was any publicity about the defendant's case which was likely to prejudice the defendant. Even if we assume that such publicity existed, however, it is well established that the proof of potentially harmful publicity within a community does not alone establish proof of community prejudice as each case must be judged on its own facts. (People v. Torres, 54 Ill.2d 384, 297 N.E.2d 142.) If a defendant alleged that community prejudice exists to such an extent that he cannot receive a fair trial, he has the burden to prove that the prejudice does actually exist and that there is a reasonable apprehension that he cannot receive a fair trial. (People v. Aprile, 15 Ill. App.3d 327, 304 N.E.2d 169.) The examination of jurors on voir dire is generally the most valuable method of determining whether pretrial publicity has so prejudiced the defendant that he could not receive a fair trial. (People v. Torres.) Voir dire examination in the instant case did not reveal community prejudice against the defendant. To the contrary, the voir dire examination suggests that the defendant was tried by an impartial jury which had not formed an opinion prior to trial as to his guilt or innocence. Further, the failure to challenge for cause any of the jurors who were sworn to try the case is strong evidence that counsel was convinced that the jurors were not biased and had not formed opinions as to the defendant's guilt. (Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 8 L.Ed.2d 98, 82 S.Ct. 955; People v. Torres.) For the foregoing reasons, we find that the defendant was not denied his right to a trial by an impartial jury.

The defendant also contends that the trial court erred in restricting defense cross-examination of several State witnesses. The defendant refers to 12 instances in which the court sustained State objections to defense counsel's questions to State witnesses during cross-examination. Defense counsel did not tender an offer of proof with respect to any of those questions. Nor did he make specific arguments that the State's objections to the questions should be overruled.

• 3 In order to preserve for review a question of whether evidence was erroneously excluded at trial, an offer of proof as to what the testimony would be is necessary. (People v. Burris, 49 Ill.2d 98, 273 N.E.2d 605; People v. Noblin, 15 Ill. App.3d 1060, 305 N.E.2d 658.) The exception to that rule is that an offer of proof need not be tendered to preserve the issue for review if the question asked by counsel shows the purpose and materiality of the evidence, is in proper form and clearly admits of an answer relative to the issues. (People v. Moretti, 6 Ill.2d 494, 129 N.E.2d 709; People v. Eilers, 18 Ill. App.3d 213, 309 N.E.2d 627.) Our review of the record discloses that the exception to the general rule is not applicable in the instant case. We therefore hold that the issue concerning the cross-examination of State witnesses has not been properly preserved for review.

The defendant also contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence certain testimony concerning the defendant's participation in a crime unrelated to the offense charged. Rudy Weberling, a witness called by the State, testified that he and another man had been solicited by the defendant to commit a certain armed robbery. Weberling testified that the defendant provided a sawed-off shotgun to be used in the armed robbery, that the defendant provided transportation to the general area of the robbery on the date of the crime and that the defendant met Weberling after the armed robbery was committed and took a portion of the money that was taken in the robbery. Defense counsel failed to object immediately to Weberling's testimony, but he eventually objected that testimony concerning the armed robbery should not be admitted. The objection was overruled.

• 4 The defendant alleges on appeal that the admission of Weberling's testimony constitutes reversible error. He relies on the general rule that evidence of the defendant's participation in crimes other than the offense charged is inadmissible. (People v. Manzella, 56 Ill.2d 187, 306 N.E.2d 16.) An exception to that rule is that evidence which tends to prove motive, intent, identity, accident or absence of mistake is admissible even though it may also involve proof of a separate offense. (People v. Dewey, 42 Ill.2d 148, 246 N.E.2d 232.) We find that Weberling's testimony in the instant case concerning the prior armed robbery was admissible in that it tended to prove the defendant's motive for the offense charged. The defendant was charged in the instant case with the murder of one Paul Rains and with solicitation to commit murder in that he offered to pay an individual to kill Rains. The State attempted to prove the defendant's motive for these offenses through the testimony of Weberling and one John Bauchens. Each witness testified that the defendant offered to pay him $2000 to kill Rains. Both Weberling and Bauchens further testified that the defendant wanted Rains killed because the defendant feared that Rains was going to inform the police of the defendant's criminal activities. In light of that testimony, we find that the evidence concerning the defendant's participation in the prior armed robbery was admissible because it tended to show that the defendant was indeed involved in other criminal activities. Thus the evidence was relevant to the issue of motive and was therefore admissible.

The defendant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting two hearsay statements into evidence over objection. The alleged errors occurred during the direct examination of John Bauchens. Bauchens testified that he was asked by the defendant to kill Rains, that he refused the defendant's offer but that he did contact one Charles Robinson on behalf of the defendant to ask whether Robinson would kill Rains. The prosecutor asked Bauchens why he thought that Robinson would be interested in accepting the defendant's offer. When Bauchens responded that he had spoken to Robinson and that Robinson had stated that he hated policemen, defense counsel objected to the testimony on hearsay grounds. The court overruled the objection. Bauchens then testified that Robinson had told him of an incident in which Robinson had taken the car keys from two State policemen and then forced the policemen to strip. The defendant now contends that the testimony concerning the incident was inadmissible hearsay.

• 5 The hearsay rule prohibits the introduction into evidence of an out of court statement which is offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein. (People v. Carpenter, 28 Ill.2d 116, 190 N.E.2d 738.) The hearsay rule does not encompass extra-judicial statements which are not offered for the purpose of proving the truth of the matters asserted in the statement. (People v. Richardson, 21 Ill. App.3d 859, 316 N.E.2d 37.) We find that Bauchens' testimony concerning what Robinson had stated about the incident with the policemen was not inadmissible hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of Robinson's statement. Whether Robinson was telling the truth when he related the incident to Bauchens is of no relevance. Bauchens' testimony was offered to prove that Bauchens had some basis to believe that Robinson was the type of individual who might be interested in the defendant's offer to kill Rains. The testimony was of some relevance because it tended to explain why Bauchens approached Robinson on behalf of the defendant.

• 6 The defendant also contends that there was a second violation of the hearsay rule during Bauchens' testimony. The prosecution asked Bauchens several questions about Bauchens' meeting with Robinson. Bauchens responded to one of those questions by stating that Robinson asked Bauchens how he, Bauchens, would kill Rains if he had accepted the defendant's offer. Defense counsel then objected that the testimony constituted hearsay. The objection was overruled. Bauchens then repeated that Robinson had asked how he, Bauchens, would kill Rains. Bauchens testified that he replied to Robinson by stating that he, Bauchens, did not know how he would do the killing.

The defendant argues that the testimony about this conversation between Bauchens and Robinson was inadmissible. The only thing which was asserted during the conversation was that Bauchens did not know how he would kill Rains if he were going to do so. There was no direct assertion made in Robinson's question to Bauchens. Bauchens' testimony about the conversation obviously was not introduced to prove that Bauchens did not know how he would kill a person. The testimony was introduced to show that an agreement had been reached between Robinson, the person who allegedly performed the actual killing of Rains, and Bauchens, the emissary for the defendant. Thus, the testimony was not hearsay.

The defendant's next contention is that the trial court erred in refusing to give two jury instructions tendered by the defense counsel. The first such Instruction No. 11 was identical to IPI — Criminal No. 3.02. The first paragraph of the tendered instruction included a definition of circumstantial evidence and an admonition that circumstantial evidence may be ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.