The opinion of the court was delivered by: Bauer, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on the motions of
defendants Luigi Michael DiFonzo and Pasquale Charles Marzano
for the Court to discharge them from custody and to suppress
The defendants in this action were named in an indictment
presented before this Court on November 7, 1974 accusing them
of stealing an estimated 4.3 million dollars from the
headquarters of the Purolator Company located here in Chicago.
Defendants DiFonzo and Marzano were arrested in Miami, Florida
on October 31, 1974, by agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. They were immediately placed under arrest upon
disembarking from an airplane which had just arrived from
Grand Cayman Island in the British West Indies.
In support of their motion defendants charge that: "[t]he
Government's illegal, forcible abduction of defendants from
the British West Indies deprived defendants of their rights to
due process of law, and therefore this Court must divest
itself of personal jurisdiction over each of them, and
discharge them." On January 24, 1975, this Court held an
evidentiary hearing directed at determining the nature of
defendants' arrest. In addition counsel for defendants and the
Government have filed extensive briefs on this issue.
There appears to be no serious dispute as to the facts
surrounding the defendants' return to the United States. In no
way did the United States Government illegally or forcibly
abduct the defendants from the British West Indies. In fact,
the evidence is manifestly clear the the Federal Bureau of
Investigation played little or no part in the return of the
defendants to the United States. A review of the evidence
indicates that the defendants' return to the United States
resulted principally from the efforts of one Grand Cayman
police officer, Detective Superintendent Derrick Tricker.
On the morning of October 31, Supt. Tricker asked the
defendants to board a plane bound for Miami. He had previously
taken defendants into custody for various infractions of Grand
Cayman law. At no time did the defendants resist boarding the
flight for Miami. On no occasion did agents of the F.B.I.
actively involve themselves in the process whereby the
defendants returned to the United States.*fn* Even if the
F.B.I. agents had wanted to arrest, illegally kidnap, or
forcibly abduct the defendants, it was clear that Supt.
Tricker would not permit such actions since the American
agents were without any form of authority or jurisdiction on
the Island. Indeed, as Supt. Tricker made imminently clear by
his testimony, he was the one responsible for defendants'
return to the United States, not the F.B.I. agents. The agents
throughout the time in question were mere observers.
JURISDICTION IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE METHOD IN WHICH THE
DEFENDANTS WERE BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT.
It has been asserted by the defendants that this Court has
not acquired jurisdiction over them because their return to
the United States violated due process and a British-American
extradition treaty. Yet it is well settled that the factors
surrounding the presence of a defendant in a jurisdiction are
generally irrelevant in a criminal prosecution. Ker v.
Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886).
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541
(1952); United States ex rel. Calhoun v. Twomey, 454 F.2d 326
(7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Rodriquez y Paz,
435 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1970); In Re Chan Kam-Shu, 477 F.2d 333 (5th
Cir. 1973); Hobson v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 561 (10th Cir.1964);
Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948). The
Supreme Court of the United States established this rule in
1886 and has not yet departed from it.
In Ker v. Illinois, supra, 119 U.S. at 440, 7 S.Ct. at 227,
the Supreme Court stated:
"We do not intend to say that there may not be
proceedings previous to the trial, in regard to
which the prisoner could invoke in some manner
the provisions of this clause of the
constitution, but, for mere irregularities in the
manner in which he may be brought into the
custody of the law, we do not think he is
entitled to say that he should not be tried at
all for the crime with which he is charged in a
The Seventh Circuit, in United States ex rel. Calhoun v.
Twomey, supra, 454 F.2d at 326, commenting on Ker and Frisbie,
"But we are aware of no decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States which rejects the
teaching of these cases that absent some other
factor which has resulted in a forfeiture of
jurisdiction, the method by which a person is
returned to a State does not affect that State's
jurisdiction over him. Once a person is within
the jurisdiction of a State and held under valid