MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter was tried to the Court without a jury. For the
reasons set forth below, judgment for the defendants will be
entered and the amended complaint will be dismissed. This opinion
shall constitute the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law as provided by Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).
This is an action*fn1 for declaratory and injunctive relief.
Jurisdiction is based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the
subject matter, and venue is appropriate.
The plaintiffs, the Confederation of Police (COP)*fn2 and
several of its officers, allege that the City of Chicago*fn3 and
its Mayor, Richard J. Daley (Daley) and the Superintendent of
Police*fn4 have denied the patrolmen of the City of Chicago
their constitutional rights to an effective means to redress
their grievances in connection with their employment by failing
to establish and promulgate a grievance procedure and a form of
collective bargaining for patrolmen within the Police Department.
Plaintiffs further allege that certain of the defendants have
discriminated against the policemen by maintaining a procedure
for collective bargaining with labor organizations representing
employees of the City of Chicago as regards hours, wages and
working conditions, and refusing to maintain the same with sworn
personnel of the Chicago Police Department who are members of
COP, thereby denying plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws.
Several basic facts are not in dispute. COP has continually
sought a uniform and objective procedure by which the sworn
personnel of the Police Department may seek redress of grievances
in connection with their hours, wages and working conditions*fn5
of their own choosing. This has been denied to them. There has
been no formal*fn6 system or procedure by which sworn personnel
of the Chicago Police Department may seek redress of grievances
in connection with their hours, wages and working conditions,
except in cases of discharges or suspensions in excess of thirty
(30) days, which are referred by statute to the Police Board of
the City of Chicago.*fn7 Additionally, the City of Chicago has
maintained a practice whereby it pays the prevailing rate which
craft union members are paid in the private sector.*fn8
Plaintiffs presented only two instances in which the defendants
have allegedly granted collective bargaining rights to municipal
employees. The first concerns the non-academic employees of the
Chicago Board of Education (Board). It is undisputed that these
employees have these rights. It should be noted, however, that
the Board is a separate corporate entity, distinct from the City
of Chicago, and has its own management and budget. See
Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 122, §§ 34-2, 34-16, 34-17. The fact that the
Mayor appoints Board members does not make it an agent of the
City, since after their appointment they are independent
officers. Also, the fact that the Civil Service Commission
administers examinations does not involve the City, since the
Commission does not establish the job qualifications or
categories, but merely provides an objective testing and grading
system. Thus, this evidence is not sufficient to show that the
defendants have acted in a discriminatory manner.
The only other evidence submitted in regard to the
establishment of a uniform and objective procedure for grievances
for other city workers was the testimony of Thomas Beagley, that
a grievance procedure was negotiated with Mr. Ralph Newman,
President of the Library Board, and other members of the Board,
with the Library workers and their union representatives from
about March 13, 1967 to December 11 and 12 of 1967, when the
procedure was formalized. There was no testimony that the Mayor
or the City Council established the grievance procedure for the
library workers and Board. In fact, Beagley testified "that as
best I can recall, the Mayor asked if there wasn't some way that
we could resolve the differences between the union and the
library which at that time were rather serious." Beagley then
testified that the Mayor made a phone call and suggested that he
(Beagley) go over to the library and see two library officers and
attempt to reach an agreement. He later testified that his
discussions with the Mayor went to the point of the union's right
to represent members of the union who were employees
of the Library. He did not see any need to discuss with the Mayor
what a grievance procedure was and the Mayor never asked what a
grievance procedure was. This discussion with the Mayor arose
because a strike had been called against the Chicago Public
The Library is controlled by an independent Library Board. See
Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 81, §§ 117(2), (3) and (9) (1974). However,
this does not place the Library in the same position as the Board
of Education, nor is it as independent, as its budget is
controlled and determined by the City and the City exercises more
control over its management. This is similar to the status of the
In order to clarify the issue before the Court, it is necessary
to understand what rights police officers have in regard to the
conditions of their employment. It should first be noted that
this case does not involve one's termination from a job or the
right to have a job. It involves the conditions of one's job.
Thus, this case is unlike, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). It should also be
noted that as public employees, police officers do not come under
the protection of the National Labor Relations Act. See
29 U.S.C. § 152(2); Bateman v. South Carolina State Ports Authority,
298 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (D.S.C. 1969).
The First Amendment rights of association, assembly and free
speech allow public employees to join unions. See id. at 1003;
Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068, 1075 (W.D.N.C.
1969). An employee cannot be fired merely for joining a union.
See AFSCME v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969); Atkins v.
City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969); see also
Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Education, 15 Ill. App.3d 224,
304 N.E.2d 516 (1973); Local 858 of AF of T v. School Dist.
No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D.Colo. 1970). Public
employees do not have a full panoply of rights, however. They
have no constitutional right to strike and may be subject to
anti-strike provisions. See, e.g., Bennett v. Gravelle,
451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1971); Board of Education of Community Unit School
District v. Redding, 32 Ill.2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965); but
see County of Peoria v. Benedict, 47 Ill.2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141
(1970); City of Pana v. Crowe, 13 Ill. App.3d 90, 299 N.E.2d 770
(1973). Certain other rights may be curtailed due to one's status
as a public employee. See, e.g., Crabinger v. Conlisk,
320 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D.Ill. 1970), aff'd, 455 F.2d 490 (7th Cir.
1972); COP v. Conlisk, 489 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 956, 94 S.Ct. 1971, 40 L.Ed.2d 307 (1974);
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 88 S.Ct. 1913, 20 L.Ed.2d
1082 (1968); cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 94 S.Ct. 1633,
40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974).
The question here is whether police have a constitutional right
to a grievance procedure or to make collective bargaining
mandatory. As a matter of Constitutional law, this Court agrees
with the other courts which have held that no such right exists.
See Lontine v. Van Cleave, 483 F.2d 966, 968 (10th Cir. 1973);
Newport News Fire Fighters Ass'n Local 794 v. City of Newport
News, 339 F. Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.Va. 1972); Atkins v. City of
Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068, 1077 (W.D.N.C. 1969); Cook County
Police Ass'n v. City of Harvey, 8 Ill. App.3d 147, 289 N.E.2d 226
(1972). As was stated in Atkins, supra 296 F. Supp. at 1077:
"There is nothing in the United States Constitution
which entitles one to have a contract with another
who does not want it. It is but a step further to
hold that the state may lawfully
forbid such contracts with its instrumentalities. The
solution, if there be one, from the viewpoint of the
firemen, is that labor unions may someday persuade
state government of the asserted value of collective
bargaining agreements, but this is a political matter
and does not yield to judicial solution."
While certain rights have been granted to public employees in