Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Klehm v. M. Suson & Associates

SEPTEMBER 25, 1974.

CARL KLEHM, D/B/A CHARLES KLEHM AND SON NURSERY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

M. SUSON & ASSOCIATES, INC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.



APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. CHARLES P. HORAN, Judge, presiding.

MR. JUSTICE BURMAN DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Rehearing denied October 24, 1974.

This is an appeal by the defendants from an order of the circuit court granting plaintiff's petition to reinstate his lawsuit after it had been dismissed for want of prosecution.

The plaintiff filed an action in the law division of the circuit court on August 30, 1967. In his complaint he alleged that there was due from M. Suson & Associates, Inc., for labor, materials and services furnished, the amount of $14,131.76. Morrie Suson answered on October 13, 1967, stating that because of plaintiff's failure to perform and because of defective materials shipped to him by plaintiff he sustained damages exceeding the amount of the plaintiff's claim.

Various pre-trial procedures were thereafter conducted while the suit was pending in the law division. On November 24, 1967, a notice was served by the plaintiff for the purpose of taking the deposition of Morrie Suson. On March 19, 1968, a motion was made by the plaintiff reciting that Suson had failed to appear on several dates for deposition and requesting that the defendant's answer be stricken and that a default judgment be entered against the defendant for that reason. An order was entered the same day requiring Suson to appear for deposition on April 18, 1968. On August 7, 1968, in response to the plaintiff's motion that the defendant file a bill of particulars to clarify its answer, the court ordered that the plaintiff file an amended complaint and the defendant an amended answer. An order was entered June 10, 1970, granting leave to the plaintiff to add Morrie Suson as a party defendant. A summons was issued for Suson on June 12, 1970. The amended complaint was filed by the plaintiff on July 16, 1970, and the defendants' answer to the amended complaint followed on July 20, 1970.

On August 31, 1970, the chief judge of the circuit court of Cook County ordered that all cases presently pending in the law division of the circuit court having an ad damnum of $15,000 or less be transferred to the municipal division of the court. The cause was thereafter dismissed for want of prosecution on December 10, 1970. On April 2, 1973, 2 years and 4 months later, the plaintiff served notice that he would appear on April 10, 1973, to present a petition to vacate the order of dismissal pursuant to section 72 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110, par. 72). The motion to vacate alleged that the plaintiff received no notice of the transfer of the case by the chief judge from the law division to the municipal division. It further alleged that a partner in the law firm handling the case for the plaintiff and who was charged with the responsibility of following the status of the case had withdrawn from the firm, and that the petitioner was unaware that the case had been dismissed until April 1, 1973. Pursuant to plaintiff's petition, the order of dismissal was vacated and the cause was reinstated and set for hearing on April 16, 1973.

On the above date, an order was entered granting the law firm of Gordon, Reicin, West & Rosenblum leave to file its appearance as associate counsel for the defendants. A petition was then filed by that firm on May 3, 1973, to vacate the order of April 10 reinstating the cause for trial. The petition alleged that the plaintiff's petition of April 10 relied on section 72 of the Civil Practice Act, and that the petition was not argued on its merits, and that if it were it could not be sustained because the plaintiff failed to provide affidavits or to otherwise show due diligence in prosecuting his claim as required by section 72. It further alleged that the plaintiff was not entitled as a matter of law to have the case reinstated because the April 10 petition was filed more than two years after the entry of the order of December 10, 1970, dismissing the cause, in contravention of section 72(3) which sets 2 years as the maximum time period for section 72 relief. On May 3, 1973, Judge Charles P. Horan, the same judge who had entered the original order dismissing the case for want of prosecution, and who had later reinstated it on April 10, 1973, denied the defendants' petition seeking to vacate the order reinstating the cause for trial.

The defendants reassert on appeal that the April 10, 1973 order reinstating the cause for trial is void as a matter of law since the plaintiff applied for relief under section 72 after the statutory period for such relief had expired. Subsection (3) of section 72 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110, par. 72(3)) recites:

"The petition must be filed not later than 2 years after the entry of the order, judgment or decree. Time during which the person seeking relief is under legal disability or duress or the ground for relief is fraudulently concealed shall be excluded in computing the period of 2 years."

It is further reasserted that section 72 relief should have been denied because the plaintiff failed to allege and affirmatively show due diligence in prosecuting and following his claim.

• 1-4 We first note that a petition under section 72 to vacate a dismissal of a cause is always addressed to the equitable powers of the court and only where there is an abuse of discretion will the reviewing court interfere. (Stackler v. Village of Skokie, 53 Ill. App.2d 417, 203 N.E.2d 183.) In Ellman v. De Ruiter, 412 Ill. 285, 106 N.E.2d 350, the supreme court announced the broad rule applicable to section 72 petitions as follows:

"[I]t is our belief that the motion may, under our present practice, be addressed to the equitable powers of the court, when the exercise of such power is necessary to prevent injustice." 412 Ill. at 292, 106 N.E.2d at 353-54.

And although we agree with the defendants that the two year statute of limitations on section 72 petitions has been considered mandatory by the Illinois courts (Mathews v. Atlas Liquors, Inc., 132 Ill. App.2d 608, 270 N.E.2d 453), this time limitation does not apply to void orders. (Weiner v. Checker Taxi Co., 124 Ill. App.2d 401, 260 N.E.2d 439. Section 72 itself provides, in subsection (7):

"Nothing contained in this section affects any existing right to relief from a void order, judgment or decree, or to employ any ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.