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United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, E. D

July 1, 1974


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Austin, District Judge.


This matter comes before me now on Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(b)(6).

On November 1, 1972, Plaintiff James Barksdale, represented by Defendant Attorney Barry Frazin, was convicted of rape and deviate sexual conduct in the Cook County Circuit Court before Defendant Judge Daniel J. Ryan. Earlier in that year, on May 1, 1972, Defendant Ryan released Plaintiff's bail money to a third party or organization that, Plaintiff contends, had no right or authority to receive the funds.*fn1 Barksdale thereafter perfected a timely appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court where he raises constitutional objections to the manner of his arrest, trial, and conviction and argues that Judge Ryan's distribution of the bail money was arbitrary and improper. That appeal has not yet been resolved.

Confined at the Illinois State Penitentiary, Stateville Branch, Plaintiff brings this action to attack the legality of his conviction.*fn2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1343, 2201, 2202; 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985(3). Stripped to its barest essentials, then, this lawsuit seeks habeas corpus relief without complying with the exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine of the federal habeas corpus statutes. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq. See, generally, Sokol, Federal Habeas Corpus § 22 (1969). Under the principles of Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), this procedure is impermissible and these allegations must be dismissed.

In Preiser, the United States Supreme Court held that, where a prisoner challenges the legal adequacy of his confinement, he must bring his action under the relevant habeas corpus statute and may not utilize the federal civil rights acts to bypass the procedural requirements of habeas corpus law.*fn3 In short, Plaintiff must exhaust his state judicial remedies before receiving habeas consideration from this Court. As a matter of federal-state comity, the Illinois state court system must be allowed to review its own alleged constitutional errors before this Court may properly exercise its jurisdiction. For an excellent discussion of the comity issue, see Preiser, supra at 490-94, 93 S.Ct. 1827.

After dismissing Plaintiff's habeas-related claims, his bail allegations remain for decision. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12, Defendant Ryan's motion to dismiss these charges is treated as a motion for summary judgment and is granted.

Although the parties disagree on one or two factual grounds, only one material question exists as to this claim: whether Judge Ryan acted "within his judicial function" when he ordered Plaintiff's bail money to be given to an "unauthorized" person or organization. Skolnick v. Campbell, 454 F.2d 531, 533 (7th Cir. 1971); Jacobson v. Schaefer, 441 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1971). In all affidavits on file, it is undisputed that Ryan's order of release was issued in his official capacity as a Cook County Circuit Judge and that, regardless of his intentions or motivations, his action was not "clearly illegal" under Illinois law. Jacobson, supra at 129; Luttrell v. Douglas, 220 F. Supp. 278 (N.D.Ill. 1963). See, generally, 38 Ill.Rev.Stat. § 1-1 et seq. Since he did not act "in the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter," Judge Ryan cannot be liable for damages herein by reason of his judicial immunity. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 351, 350-54, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871); Piersen v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). Bershad v. Wood, 290 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1961), is closely analogous to this case. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. den. 339 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 803, 94 L.Ed. 1363 (1950); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964). See also Note, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 829, 833-38 (1957).

Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted as to all issues seeking habeas corpus relief. Summary judgment is entered in favor of Defendant Ryan on the issue of the bail money distribution.

Case dismissed.

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