The opinion of the court was delivered by: Marshall, District Judge.
Before me is the motion of plaintiff United States of
America in cause No. 73 C 2080, joined in by all
plaintiffs*fn1 in causes Nos. 70 C 2220 and 73 C 1252, to
consolidate these cases for all purposes, pursuant to Rule
42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.*fn2
Plaintiffs argue that these cases present (1) common
questions of law as to whether the practices engaged in by the
defendants*fn3 are unlawful and in violation of rights
secured by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq., the Fifth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and sections 1981
and 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983
and (2) common factual questions of whether the defendants
discriminate against Black and Spanish surnamed persons in the
hiring, promotion, assignment and other treatment, terms and
conditions of employment of police officers.
The complaint in United States v. City of Chicago et al., 73
C 2080, alleges inter alia that the City and the other named
defendants discriminate against Blacks and Spanish surnamed
persons with respect to employment opportunities and conditions
of employment of the Chicago Police Department through various
practices in recruiting, hiring, promotion, assignments and
discipline of police officers.*fn4 The complaint further
alleges that the defendants pursue policies and practices of
sex discrimination against women regarding employment
opportunities and conditions of employment within the Police
Department. As to all claims, violations of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981
and 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment are alleged.
The Camacho complaint,*fn5 73 C 1252, alleges inter alia
that the defendants discriminate against Blacks and Spanish
surnamed persons in the recruiting and hiring of police
officers through height and weight requirements, written
examinations, medical examinations and background
investigations. Violations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and
1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment are alleged.
The Robinson complaint,*fn6 70 C 2220, alleges in Count I
that Robinson and members of the Afro-American Patrolmen's
League have been subjected to unequal standards, punishment and
treatment for the purposes of harassment in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution. Count 2 alleges that League
members, including Robinson, have been discriminated against on
racial grounds by defendants' practices regarding the hiring,
assignment, discipline and promotion of police officers in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983, the Fifth, Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
Damages and equitable relief are sought for the alleged
The United States and Camacho suits charge the defendants
with discrimination in the recruiting and hiring of Black and
Spanish surnamed applicants for the Chicago Police Department.
In these circumstances we can assume that the United States and
Camacho allegations will be proven, if at all, through evidence
demonstrating the disproportionate racial impact of
qualifications, tests and other procedures utilized by
defendants in hiring police officers. The respective complaints
charge violations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as
amended March 24, 1972, the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1981
and 1983. The relief sought in both cases is
Count 2 of the Robinson complaint alleges discriminatory
practices in promotion, discipline and assignment as does the
United States case. Again, we can assume that the statistical
and testimonial evidence concerning the alleged discrimination
will be common to Robinson and United States. Violations of
42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment are alleged.
Moreover, the relief sought is similar.
The absence of Title VII allegations from the
Robinson complaint is not fatal to consolidation. The
substantive requirements and burden of proof under Title VII
and § 1981 are the same. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971); Chance v. Board of
Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972);
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1972). Thus
consolidation will not result in lengthening trial time or
confusion of the issues.
The evidence supporting Count 1 and discriminatory
assignment and discipline claims of Count 2 of the
Robinson complaint can readily be heard with the United States
allegations of discriminatory discipline, assignments and sex
The fact that each of these three cases are not at the same
stage of discovery is not fatal to consolidation. First,
discovery has been initiated in all three cases. Discovery
began in Robinson in 1971 and has proceeded from that time.
Discovery in United States is proceeding with due dispatch.
Camacho's discovery posture is the most uncertain, but the
plaintiffs therein represent that they will be prepared to
proceed with the motion for preliminary injunction.
Furthermore, the discovery in United States duplicates most of
the discovery that would be available on the Camacho claims.
Consolidation will effect appreciable savings of time and
expense without any apparent prejudice to the defendants.
Accordingly, plaintiffs' joint motion to consolidate is
It Is Ordered that United States v. City of Chicago et al.,
73 C 2080, Camacho v. City of Chicago et al., 73 C 1252, and
Robinson v. Conlisk, 70 C 2220, be consolidated for all
purposes. At the hearing on the motions for preliminary
injunctions, the court will be prepared to consider all issues
of racial or sex discrimination relating to recruiting,
hiring, promotion, assignment and discipline, reserving to the
parties which of those issues will be presented at that
hearing. It is further ordered that the trial on the merits ...