The opinion of the court was delivered by: Austin, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION and JUDGMENT ORDER
This is a three-count action brought by Plaintiff Lanel
Williams, an inmate at the Stateville Branch of the Illinois
State Penitentiary, to rectify alleged civil rights
violations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1343.
Count I asserts that the in-prison disciplinary hearing
procedures employed at the Stateville Penitentiary violate the
minimum due process standards mandated by recent Supreme Court
and Seventh Circuit decisions. In Count II, Plaintiff maintains
that he was unconstitutionally denied access to writing
materials with which to communicate with his attorney and the
Illinois and federal courts. Count III alleges that Defendants
failed to provide Williams with underwear and that such failure
was an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, in
a supplemental pleading, Plaintiff contends that he was further
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment by Defendants'
refusal to provide him with adequate space for physical
exercise following a recent surgery. Damages are sought only in
Count II; the other claims request injunctive and declaratory
This matter comes before me now on Defendants' alternate
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment and Plaintiff's
cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Since Plaintiff is
represented by counsel, the less stringent pleading standards
of Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d
652 (1972), are inapplicable here.
I. DUE PROCESS AND PRISON DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS
Plaintiff's claim presents serious questions concerning the
minimum rights that must be accorded to inmates at in-prison
disciplinary hearings. See United States ex rel. Miller v.
Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973). See also Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d
484 (1972). Specifically, this action seeks to clarify those
aspects of the Miller decision that concern notice and other
disciplinary procedures as well as the right to counsel at
these proceedings.*fn* The parties have submitted the
following undisputed facts on cross-motions for summary
Plaintiff was present at the Penitentiary's B-house during
the disturbances that occurred there on September 6, 1973. As
a result of his alleged participation in the "B-house riot,"
Williams was officially reported for various infractions of
prison rules and regulations. In two separate reports dated
September 7, 1973, he was charged with major involvement in
the riot, unauthorized absence from his cell and work
assignment, possession of a dangerous weapon, issuing orders
to other inmates over the cell house public address system,
assisting in the preparation of a prisoner grievance petition,
and threatening the lives of hostages.
When he appeared before the Committee, Williams denied all
the allegations. The Committee considered his denial and found
against him, ordering him to fifteen days in isolation and
referring him to the Institutional Assignment Committee (IAC)
for indefinite administrative segregation.
Plaintiff was brought before the IAC on October 23, 1973,
without advance notice of the exact time and date of the
hearing. Again, Williams was not informed of the regulations
alleged violated and he was not advised that he could be
represented by counsel.
The IAC reviewed the evidence before it, including Williams'
continued denial of wrongdoing, and found that his presence in
the general prison population was a source of danger to the
safety and security of the Stateville employees and inmates.
As a result, Plaintiff was assigned to indefinite
Administrative Segregation, where he is presently confined.
On these facts, Plaintiff claims that his due process
guarantees under United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey,
supra, have been violated. See also Gagnon, supra; Morrissey,
supra. First, Williams alleges that his version of the disputed
facts could only be effectively and fairly presented by a
trained advocate, particularly since any exculpating statement
could be used against him in a criminal prosecution. Moreover,
he contends that he was given inadequate and untimely notice of
the hearings. ...