APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. FRANK
J. WILSON, Judge, presiding.
MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:
After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of rape and armed robbery and sentenced to a term of 20 to 60 years for rape and 10 to 30 years for armed robbery, the sentences to run concurrently.
On appeal defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial by the introduction into evidence of testimony that defendant committed unrelated rapes and other misconduct, that he was deprived of due process when the prosecution filed a false answer to defendant's discovery motion, that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing, and that his sentence was excessive.
At trial, Leona Franklin, the complaining witness, testified that at approximately 2:15 P.M., on February 3, 1971, she was at home, when she saw a man, later identified as defendant, with a scarf covering his face, standing in the doorway of her living room, holding a knife to her daughter's throat. After threatening to kill the child, he grabbed Mrs. Franklin by the neck and then held the knife to her neck. He then forced her into the kitchen. He took twelve or thirteen dollars from her. He tied the hands of each and, after blindfolding, her, he forced her into the bedroom where he raped her. During intercourse, the blindfold slipped off, allowing her to see defendant, who had removed the scarf covering his face. Defendant said, "You saw my face, turn over, I'm going to tie you back up again." A two minute struggle ensued, during which she observed defendant's face from a distance of eight to ten inches. The bedroom drapes were open, and light was coming into the room through the window which was at the head of the bed. She escaped to the kitchen where she again observed defendant, this time from approximately ten feet while he was getting dressed. She called the police and gave them a description.
On February 19, 1971, she recognized defendant as she walked by him on the street. When she asked a passerby to call the police, defendant ran away. He had a scar on the left side of his face. On June 4, 1971, she noticed a squad car parked in front of her house and observed defendant sitting in the back seat. She said, "That is him"; whereupon, defendant jumped out and ran. Later that day she went to the police station and identified defendant in a lineup. Subsequently, she saw defendant twice at her back yard fence, and on each occasion he made faces at her, rolled his eyes and started laughing.
Charles Brown, a police officer, testified that on June 4, 1971, he and his partner were working on a "rape crime pattern" and pursuant to a description they arrested defendant. While transporting the defendant to the police station, he decided to stop at the home of "one of the victims" to notify her to come to the station to view a lineup.
Defendant testified that he was never in the complaining witness' house and that he could not recall his whereabouts on February 3, 1971. On cross-examination, he denied telling the police that he worked at Switchcraft on February 3, 1971.
Officer Brown, recalled in rebuttal, testified he was present while defendant was being questioned and he heard him say that he was at work at Switchcraft on February 3, 1971. He prepared a police report but did not include any reference to defendant's statement that he was at work at the time of the alleged offense.
A stipulation was entered that if Dr. Weinberg were called to testify, he would testify that an examination of the complaining witness on February 3, 1971, disclosed large amounts of spermatozoa.
Prior to trial, both the prosecution and the defense filed motions for discovery. Defendant's motion requested the production of any written or oral statements made by him. The prosecution answered that defendant had made no statements.
Defendant's first contention on appeal is that prejudicial evidence was admitted at trial which implied that he was connected with other crimes.
He argues that Officer Brown's testimony that he was working on a rape crime pattern, and that after the arrest he stopped at the home of one of the victims, was evidence admitted under the guise of showing an arrest which implied that defendant allegedly committed a number of rapes. It is his contention that such testimony was sufficiently prejudicial to constitute reversible error. Defendant further points out that the subject of the rape crime pattern was first brought out during the motions to suppress the identification and to quash the arrest so that the State knew Officer Brown would reply that "we were working on a rape crime pattern" when asked, "At that time did you have any specific assignment that you were working on?"
The State contends that this testimony, taken as a whole, had a high probative value tending to show the arrest of defendant pursuant to an accurate description furnished by the complaining witness and that the crime pattern statement in no way implicates ...