is no constitutional right to treatment for those committed.
The Court overrules the defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
While the Court is of the opinion that the Sexually Dangerous
Persons Act, Ill.Revised Statutes ch. 38, § 105-1.01 et seq.,
is a constitutionally valid act, its administration leaves much
to be desired. The Court is primarily interested in a
determination of what treatment is actually provided for
defendants' commitment under this Act. From a reading of the
briefs it appears very little treatment, if any, has been
furnished to this defendant during his period of commitment.
Discovery is ordered with a view to determining what
programs, if any, are established to provide the treatment
called for in the statute. The Court suggests that the
Director of Corrections be deposed, or in lieu thereof and by
agreement of the parties, the Director of Corrections shall
advise the Court of policies now pursued and facilities
available for treatment of offenders committed under the Act,
with copies to be sent to the attorney for plaintiff, the
State's Attorney General, as well as to the Court. The action
is continued for a status report thirty days henceforth, on
November 5, 1973, at which time depositions and/or reports
shall be filed.
The Court also notes its agreement with the recent decision
of Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D.Ala. 1972) insofar
as that case recognizes a constitutional right to treatment
for civilly committed mental patients. That case reasoned that
such patients have a constitutional right to adequate
treatment because confining a person on the altruistic theory
that he must receive treatment and then failing to provide it
violates due process. And although the Supreme Court has not
ruled on this issue directly, it stated explicitly in Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435
(1972), that the state must either justify continued
confinement by therapeutic progress, or release the patient.
In Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 514, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 31
L.Ed.2d 394 (1972), the Supreme Court called an indefinitely
committed sex offender's claim that he was receiving no
treatment a "substantial constitutional claim."
As in Wyatt, the Court thinks it will be beneficial to
reserve final decree, and seeks rather to obtain information
through discovery and reports in an effort to make progress
toward resolving the societal problems presented for our
consideration herein. The prayer for Habeas Corpus Relief is
continued until November 5, 1973.
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