The opinion of the court was delivered by: Marovitz, District Judge.
The plaintiff, Frank Stachulak, is currently in the custody
of the Illinois Director of Corrections at the Psychiatric
Division of the Illinois State Penitentiary, Menard, pursuant
to a finding by the Circuit Court of Cook County that he is a
sexually dangerous person under Ill.Rev.Stats. chap. 38, §
105-1. Defendants are the state officials responsible for the
care and custody of plaintiff Stachulak. Plaintiff seeks relief
both under the Federal Civil Rights Act and the Federal Habeas
Corpus Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 28 U.S.C. § 2254
respectively, claiming that his constitutional rights have been
violated in the following manner: (1) the failure of the
statute to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt before
depriving plaintiff of his liberty violated his rights under
the Due Process Clause; (2) the language of the Act is too
broad and vague to guarantee Due Process and Equal Protection;
(3) plaintiff is treated worse than criminal defendants and
those committed under the mental health laws in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause; and (4) the failure to provide
treatment for one committed under civil standards for a "mental
disorder" violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the case for failure to
state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.
Defendants contend that this action is an application for a
writ of habeas corpus in which state remedies have not been
exhausted, that the constitutionality of the Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act has already been adjudicated in the
state and federal courts in a manner dispositive of these
issues, and that there
is no constitutional right to treatment for those committed.
The Court overrules the defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
While the Court is of the opinion that the Sexually Dangerous
Persons Act, Ill.Revised Statutes ch. 38, § 105-1.01 et seq.,
is a constitutionally valid act, its administration leaves much
to be desired. The Court is primarily interested in a
determination of what treatment is actually provided for
defendants' commitment under this Act. From a reading of the
briefs it appears very little treatment, if any, has been
furnished to this defendant during his period of commitment.
Discovery is ordered with a view to determining what
programs, if any, are established to provide the treatment
called for in the statute. The Court suggests that the
Director of Corrections be deposed, or in lieu thereof and by
agreement of the parties, the Director of Corrections shall
advise the Court of policies now pursued and facilities
available for treatment of offenders committed under the Act,
with copies to be sent to the attorney for plaintiff, the
State's Attorney General, as well as to the Court. The action
is continued for a status report thirty days henceforth, on
November 5, 1973, at which time depositions and/or reports
shall be filed.
The Court also notes its agreement with the recent decision
of Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D.Ala. 1972) insofar
as that case recognizes a constitutional right to treatment
for civilly committed mental patients. That case reasoned that
such patients have a constitutional right to adequate
treatment because confining a person on the altruistic theory
that he must receive treatment and then failing to provide it
violates due process. And although the Supreme Court has not
ruled on this issue directly, it stated explicitly in Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435
(1972), that the state must either justify continued
confinement by therapeutic progress, or release the patient.
In Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 514, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 31
L.Ed.2d 394 (1972), the Supreme Court called an indefinitely
committed sex offender's claim that he was receiving no
treatment a "substantial constitutional claim."
As in Wyatt, the Court thinks it will be beneficial to
reserve final decree, and seeks rather to obtain information
through discovery and reports in an effort to make progress
toward resolving the societal problems presented for our
consideration herein. The prayer for Habeas Corpus Relief is
continued until November 5, 1973.
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