21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). Here the description was not
impermissibly vague, since the discretion of the officers
conducting the search was sufficiently limited.
The general rule is that only those items described in the
search warrant may be seized. However, numerous exceptions
have developed. In United States v. Zeidman, 444 F.2d 1051
(7th Cir. 1971) the search warrant described one weapon.
Another weapon — a semiautomatic pistol with detachable
holster-shoulder stock — was seized and that seizure was upheld
on the ground that the weapon was a short barreled rifle and
there was probable cause to believe that it was held in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5841, which required that such weapons
be registered. See also 26 U.S.C. § 5861 which makes illegal
the receipt or possession of an unregistered firearm. That case
would provide authority for upholding the seizure of any
weapons involved here which should have been registered
pursuant to § 5841.
Furthermore, when the initial search is reasonable, it is
permissible to seize evidence not described in the warrant,
but which has a nexus with the crime under investigation.
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
306-307, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); United States
v. Kane, 450 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 934, 92 S.Ct. 954, 30 L.Ed.2d 810 (1972); United States v.
Mahler, 442 F.2d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 993, 92 S.Ct. 541, 30 L.Ed.2d 545 (1971). Here, one of the
crimes under investigation was illegal dealing in firearms.
The additional guns seized have a nexus in that they would
constitute evidence of inventory for the purpose of carrying
out the crime.
In light of the foregoing, the motion to suppress and return
the seized goods is denied.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to provide defendant
with information regarding the alleged crime sufficient to
avoid surprise at trial and to enable him to plead the
conviction or acquittal in bar of another prosecution. United
States v. Haskins, 345 F.2d 111, 114 (6th Cir. 1965).
Count I alleges that from on or about November 30, 1972
until on or about December 18, 1972, defendant did knowingly
and unlawfully engage in the business of dealing in firearms.
Numerous sales or offers to sell may be encompassed in a
charge of engaging in the business of dealing in guns. Were
defendant not informed of the period of time in which the
government contends defendant was so engaged, considerable
surprise might result at trial and defendant might have
difficulty pleading the result here in bar of other charges of
gun dealing. However, the alleged violation is claimed to have
occurred in the short period of some nineteen days.
Defendant's request for information on particular transactions
and dates thereof is therefore denied. The defendant's request
for disclosure of what items the government will contend were
"firearms" is likewise denied since this constitutes
Similarly in Count II, where defendant is charged with
engaging in business as a firearms dealer without having paid
the occupation tax required by 26 U.S.C. § 5801, defendant's
motion for disclosure of the acts that constituted engaging in
business and the dates thereof is denied.
It is so ordered.
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