APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. NATHAN
M. COHEN, Judge, presiding.
MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE DIERINGER DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:
This appeal was transferred to this court by the Supreme Court. The petitioner, Mack Pittman, appeals from an order of the Circuit Court of Cook County dismissing his post-conviction petition.
The petitioner was indicted for the crime of murder. On May 18, 1965, Pittman pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the trial court to a term of not less than 15 years nor more than 30 years in the Illinois State Penitentiary.
In March, 1966, pursuant to the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, Ch. 38, sec. 122), the petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition in which he alleged a substantial denial of his constitutional rights by the trial court. The petitioner alleges in the post-conviction petition that his plea of guilty was given only after coercion, collusion and intimidation. A further allegation by the petitioner is that he was represented by incompetent counsel at the trial level. No affidavits in support of either of these allegations were attached to the post-conviction petition.
Following appointment of counsel for the petitioner, the trial court held a hearing at which the State moved to dismiss the petition filed by Pittman for failure to raise any constitutional questions within the purview of the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, and for failure to substantiate any of the claims presented in the petition. The trial court sustained the State's motion to dismiss the petition. This appeal arises from that dismissal.
The first issue the petitioner presents for review is whether the trial court denied the petitioner due process of law by allowing him to plead guilty before concluding a proper hearing to determine whether his plea was voluntary and intelligently made. The petitioner contends the hearing at which his guilty plea was accepted by the trial court was insufficient for the court to determine the plea was both voluntary and intelligently made. The basis for the petitioner's contention is his assertion that the trial court failed to ask a single question in assuring itself the petitioner had full understanding of what his plea meant and realized its full consequences.
• 1 We do not accept the petitioner's contention that he was denied due process of law as valid. To satisfy an intelligent and voluntary waiver to one's constitutional right to due process of law, a court must use the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has full understanding of what the plea connotes and its full consequences. Such function is discharged when the court leaves a record adequate for any review that may later be sought. (Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238.) Turning to the record, we find the trial court held the following colloquy prior to accepting the petitioner's plea of guilty:
"Clerk: The People of the State of Illinois versus Mack Pittman. Mr. Wexler [Attorney for the Defendant]: Your Honor, I have conferred with the defendant, Mack Pittman, in Indictment 65-734, and he informs me that he wishes to withdraw his plea of not guilty heretofore entered and enter a plea of guilty at this time.
The Court: Is that correct, Mr. Pittman?
Mr. Wexler: And you do that of your own free will, sir?
Mr. Wexler: And you have discussed the facts in the matter with reference to your case fully with ...