APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Kane County; the Hon. JOHN A.
KRAUSE, Judge, presiding.
Rehearing denied November 24, 1971.
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Kane County the defendant, Thomas McCabe, was found guilty of the unlawful sale of marijuana in violation of the Criminal Code of Illinois. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 22-3.) Pursuant to the provisions for mandatory minimum penalties for the unlawful sale of a narcotic drug (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 22-40) the defendant, who had no prior convictions, was sentenced to the penitentiary for a period of ten years to ten years and a day. On this appeal he raises these grounds for reversal: (1) the classification of marijuana in the Narcotic Drug Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 22-1 et seq.), with mandatory minimum statutory penalties for a first conviction, deprives the defendant of due process and equal protection of the law in violation of the constitution of Illinois and the constitution of the United States; (2) the Narcotic Drug Act's mandatory minimum ten-year sentence and its prohibition of probation or the suspension of sentence upon a first conviction for the sale of even a trifling amount of marijuana to an adult constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the constitution of Illinois (Const. of 1870, art. II, sec. 11) and the constitution of the United States (U.S. Const., amend. VIII); (3) the defendant was deprived of equal protection of the law in that no meaningful post-trial hearing in mitigation was held; (4) the trial court erred in numerous evidentiary rulings; (5) the closing argument of the prosecutor was improperly prejudicial to the defendant; (6) the trial court erred in instructing the jury; and (7) the mandatory minimum penalty provision of the Narcotic Drug Act unconstitutionally interferes with the prerogative and the duty of the judiciary to impose sentence as the exercise of sound discretion may direct.
To begin it will be helpful to exclude some of the potential questions the defendant does not raise regarding the classification of marijuana. It is not denied, for example, that the State has authority under its general police power to prohibit the sale, use, or possession of marijuana. Nor does the defendant contend that the State must limit its exercise of that power to the regulation, as opposed to the prohibition, of the drug. Finally, the defendant does not claim that the State, having chosen to proscribe the use, possession, and sale of marijuana, must similarly act in the cases of substances such as alcohol, tobacco and caffeine, whose use may be harmful.
The equal-protection argument which is raised is narrow and limited. It simply is that the present placing or classifying of marijuana under the Narcotic Drug Act rather than classifying it under the Drug Abuse Control Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 111 1/2, par. 801 et seq.) with the "stimulant or depressant" drugs is constitutionally invalid as an improper classification, considering the present state of knowledge concerning the comparative natures and effects of the drugs named in the two statutes. Unlike the Narcotic Drug Act, which provides for a mandatory ten-year minimum sentence upon a first conviction for the sale of marijuana, the Drug Abuse Control Act provides, upon a first conviction for the sale of drugs named in it, a maximum jail term of but one year and probation is not prohibited. The defendant says that there is no rational basis for distinguishing a first sale of marijuana from the first sale of a stimulant or depressant drug under the Drug Abuse Control Act and that the gross disparity between the penalties violates his rights under the equal-protection clause.
In determining whether a statutory classification violates the equal-protection clause, we must begin with the presumption that the classification is valid and must impose the burden of showing invalidity on the party challenging the classification. (City of Rockford v. Grayned, 46 Ill.2d 492; Thillens, Inc. v. Morey, 11 Ill.2d 579, 591; People ex rel. Vermilion County Conservation District v. Lenover, 43 Ill.2d 209, 219.) The equal-protection clause does not deny the States the power to classify in the exercise of their police power and it recognizes the existence of a broad latitude and discretion in classifying. (Begich v. Industrial Com. 42 Ill.2d 32, 36.) If any state of facts may reasonably be conceived which would justify the classification, it must be upheld (see Begich v. Industrial Com. 42 Ill.2d 32). The right of judicial questioning of a classification under the equal-protection clause is thus limited. As this court put it in Thillens, Inc. v. Morey, 11 Ill.2d 579, 593, "Whether the enactment is wise or unwise; whether it is based on sound economic theory; whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, and whether the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the honest conflict of serious opinion does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance." But it is required that there be a reasonable basis for distinguishing the class to which the law is applicable from the class to which it is not. (People ex rel. County of Du Page v. Smith, 21 Ill.2d 572, 578.) Appropriate respect should be given to the fact of a legislative classification, but there is a judicial obligation to insure that the power to classify has not been exercised arbitrarily and, if it has been, the legislation cannot be justified under the label of "classification." (Begich v. Industrial Com. 42 Ill.2d 32, 36.) It was observed recently: "[A] state may not, under the guise of classification, arbitrarily discriminate against one and in favor of another similarily situated." Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 49 Ill.2d 137, 148.
Measuring by these criteria we must determine whether any rational basis exists to justify the substantially greater penalties imposed for a first conviction for the sale of marijuana than for a first conviction for the sale of a drug named in the Drug Abuse Control Act. This consideration will require an assessment of the relevant scientific, medical and social data found, including the voluminous materials assembled by the parties here, which are pertinent to support and to defeat the classification. We are aware that any compilation and examination of materials cannot comprehend all studies that have been made. We know, too, that knowledge in this whole area is not nearly complete. We proceed not to determine scientific questions, but to judge whether the data presently available provides a reasonable basis for the described classification of marijuana. (Cf. Precision Connecting Rod Service v. Industrial Com., 40 Ill.2d 277, 281.) The consideration of this data, of course, will not extend to the wisdom or unwisdom of the legislative classification. We confine our examination to the question whether the challenged classification can be supported on any rational basis.
Knowledge of the characteristics and effects of the drug commonly called marijuana, which is obtained from the leaves of the female hemp plant, cannabis sativa, has developed rapidly in the last decade. Studies by Presidential commissions, whose memberships have included psychiatrists, pharmacologists, sociologists and law enforcement officials as well as intensified research in the medical and scientific communities have contributed to this advancement. The consensus is that although marijuana has been commonly associated with the opiates, such as morphine and heroin, there are important differences between the so-called abuse characteristics of the two. Heroin and morphine are true narcotic analgesics in the sense that their use produces a marked indifference to pain. In addition, when injected intravenously a warm flushing of the skin and intense pleasurable sensations in the lower abdomen will result. Repeated usage of these drugs in a comparatively short time will result in the development of a tolerance, that is, a state which requires a gradually increasing dosage to permit the drug to attain the effect desired. Both a psychological and compelling physical dependence result from the use of "hard narcotics." The physical dependence develops in intensity with continued use and requires the continued administration of the drug to avoid withdrawal symptoms. It appears that the subjective action of the morphine-type drugs also involve changes in mood, an inability to concentrate and the development of apathy. Physical degeneration occurs, arising from drug preoccupation, personal neglect, malnutrition and susceptibility to infections. Overdosage can cause death through excessive respiratory depression.
Early withdrawal symptoms include lacrimation, nasal discharge, yawning and perspiration. Later, dilated pupils, loss of appetite, gooseflesh (thus, the expression "cold turkey"), restlessness and increased irritability and tremor will appear. At its peak intensity, the syndrome includes high irritability, insomnia, violent yawning, severe sneezing and lacrimation. Nausea and vomiting are common, as are intestinal spasms and diarrhea. Increased heart beat and elevated blood pressure, as well as muscular spasms, abdominal cramps and pains in the bones and muscles of the back are common. Death due to cardiovascular collapse can result from withdrawal. These symptons are caused by the drug-induced alterations at the cellular level, most prominently in the central nervous system. Most authorities consider that the drug addict's frequent involvement in criminal activity results from his acute need for the drug rather than because of the action of the drug itself. The term addiction refers to the physical, rather than a psychological dependence on the drug.
Cocaine, which is placed with marijuana and the opiates in the Narcotic Drug Act, is a powerful stimulant, whereas the morphine-type drugs have a depressing action. Too, cocaine is further unlike the opiates in that it does not have effects of tolerance or physical dependence and abstention does not cause acute withdrawal symptoms. However, because of its potent nature, it induces intense physical and mental excitation and a marked reduction in normal inhibitions which often results in aggressive and even violent behavior. Intense hallucinations and paranoid delusions are common and, because of this, cocaine users frequently attempt to dilute the experience with a depressant such as heroin or morphine.
The properties and consequences of the use of marijuana differ from those attending the use of opiates or cocaine. The acute physical symptoms of marijuana use typically induced are an increase in pulse rate, a slight elevation in blood pressure, conjunctival vascular congestion, a rise in blood sugar, urinary frequency, dryness of the mouth and throat. Nausea, vomiting and occasional diarrhea have been observed, as has the inability to coordinate voluntary muscular movements. There is usually a marked increase in appetite. Deaths due to overdose apparently have not been reported.
The mental or subjective effects of the administration of this drug are variable and depend on the interaction of several factors including the physical and pharmacological properties of the particular marijuana used, the amount of dosage, and more importantly, what has been called the character structure of the user (including his experience with the drug, his attitude and expectations), and the social setting or environment in which the drug is used. The most common reaction is the development of a euphoric state of altered consciousness in which ideas seem disconnected, uncontrollable and freely flowing. Time perception is distorted with minutes seeming like hours. Spatial conception may also be disturbed. Vivid hallucinations, usually, but not always, pleasant, can occur with increased dosage. There may be marked alterations of mood, usually manifested by an extreme feeling of well being which is often accompanied by uncontrollable laughter. Later a more somber or depressed mood will appear. The drug's influence can cause anxiety, confusion or disorientation, and with larger doses temporary psychotic episodes have been observed in predisposed individuals. Inhibitions are reduced but violent or otherwise aggressive behavior seem to be rare.
Almost all authorities agree that marijuana is not a narcotic or addictive in the sense that the terms are precisely used. Unlike the opiate drugs, it does not produce a physical dependence, and upon abstention there are no withdrawal symptoms. A tolerance to the drug does not develop. Marijuana use does, however, lead to a mild psychological dependence. The short-hand descriptive phrase most often applied to the drug is "mild hallucinogen," although this refers to only one of its many effects.
The depressant and stimulant drugs within the Drug Abuse Control Act include the barbiturates (depressants), the amphetamines (stimulants), and the hallucinogens. The drugs psilocybin, peyote, mescaline and what is commonly called LSD are examples of the hallucinogens. Frequent use of the barbiturates at high dosage levels leads invariably to the development of physical dependence, tolerance and severe withdrawal symptoms, similar to those associated with heroin use. The effects of barbiturate intoxication resemble those of alcoholic intoxication. There is a general sluggishness, difficulty in concentrating and thinking, speech impairment, memory lapse, faulty judgment and exaggeration of basic personality traits. Irritability and quarrelsomeness are common. Hostile and paranoid ideas as well as suicidal tendencies can occur. Barbiturates are said to be the most frequently used chemical in suicides in the United States. Accidental death from an overdose also can occur. There is a clear association between ...