dispute the sort of mediation contemplated by the Act.
6. Since the union's failure to engage in the negotiations
required by Section 2 First of the Act continued throughout the
status quo period prescribed by Section 5 of the Act (45 U.S.C. § 155)
after the National Mediation Board surrendered its
jurisdiction, there has not been as to this dispute the sort of
negotiations contemplated by the Act during that status quo
7. Therefore, the union has not exhausted the required major
disputes procedures of the Railway Labor Act and will not be free
to resort to self-help with respect to this dispute until it has
negotiated with the carrier in the fashion prescribed by Section
2 First of the Act both during mediation sessions conducted under
the auspices of the National Mediation Board and for such further
status quo periods as are provided by Sections 5 and 10 of the
Act (45 U.S.C. § 155, 160).
8. An injunction against any strike by the union over the crew
consist dispute with the carrier should issue as the only
practical, effective means of enforcing the duty to exert every
reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements. Such an
injunction is not barred by Sections 4 or 8 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C. § 104, 108).
9. Such injunction should issue until further order of the
Court in order to give the defendant union an opportunity to
negotiate and bargain in good faith.
10. The Court has no statutory authority to remand the
controversy to the Mediation Board. That would be a useless
gesture, for the Mediation Board has no statutory authority to
order good faith bargaining or to determine whether either or
both parties have bargained in good faith pursuant to Section Two
(2) First of the Railway Labor Act. Only this Court has such
11. The parties are duty bound and required as a condition
precedent to negotiate and bargain in good faith with each other
in order to reach an agreement and a settlement of the
controversy over crew consist both before and after the
controversy has been submitted for mediation and to continue to
do so after mediation services have been terminated. Since the
Court has found that neither of the parties have done so up until
this time, then neither may resort to self-help until that is
12. Inasmuch as the parties have not bargained and negotiated
as required by the Supreme Court in its opinion in this case,
this Court has the authority to and it is duty bound, because of
certain irreparable damage to the public, to grant an injunction
against a strike by the defendant union, even though the
plaintiff does not come into the Court with clean hands.
13. The clean hands equity doctrine would apply here except for
the grave and irreparable damages that the public, composed of
innocent bystanders, would suffer.
14. The Court has jurisdiction and it is the Court's duty to
order and direct the parties herein to negotiate and engage in
collective bargaining conferences in an attempt to reach an
agreement concerning the controversy in question.
15. When and if the defendant shows good faith in negotiation
and bargaining, whether the plaintiff does so or not, this Court
will be by law required to vacate any order of injunction and
permit the defendant to resort to self-help, that is to
peacefully withdraw its members from employment by the plaintiff,
or in more prosaic language to strike against the plaintiff.
This, however, should not be done until notice has been given to
the plaintiff and to the public. It will be the duty of this
Court to fix a proper period of notice to be given to the
plaintiff and to the public in the event of the vacating of the
Court's order granting an injunction against a strike.
This cause comes on upon remand from the Supreme Court of the
United States and the Court having now carried out
said mandate and having this day made findings of fact and
conclusions of law herein does simultaneously herewith enter its
decree in the following manner.
It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged, and decreed that:
1. The defendant union, throughout its negotiations with the
plaintiff carrier respecting the so-called crew consist dispute
arising out of the defendant's notices of July, 1965 and the
plaintiff's notices of December, 1965, did not comply with the
requirements of Section Two (2) First of the Railway Labor Act
(45 U.S.C. § 152 First).
2. Because of this breach by the defendant union of its
obligations under Section Two (2) First of the Railway Labor Act,
there has not been the type of mediation required by Section Five
(5) of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 155) nor the type of
good faith negotiations required by Section Two (2) First during
the status quo period prescribed by Section Five (5) following
the termination of mediation.
3. The defendant union is, therefore, not free to exercise
self-help with respect to the dispute arising out of the parties
notices until the procedures required by Section Two (2) First of
the Railway Labor Act have been carried out.
4. Until this Court has held a hearing and has found that the
procedures required by Section Two (2) First of the Railway Labor
Act have been carried out, the defendant union, its divisions,
locals, officers, agents, employees, members, and all persons
acting in concert with them, are hereby enjoined from authorizing
or engaging in any strike against or picketing of the plaintiff
carrier in connection with the aforesaid crew consist dispute.
5. The parties hereto shall forthwith begin negotiating and
bargaining conferences in an attempt to reach an agreement over
the crew consist controversy that exists between them.
6. Hearing on whether the parties or either of them have
complied with the provisions of Section Two (2) First of the
Railway Labor Act is hereby set for September 24, 1971 at 2 P.M.
7. The matter of costs is reserved for later determination.
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