Plaintiffs next contend that they are denied procedural due
process by not being permitted to review the basic system in any
court, but only before the Secretary of Transportation. 45 U.S.C. § 522.
Judicial review of final agency action will not be
foreclosed unless there is a persuasive reason to believe that
Congress so intended. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 140, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). The explicit
words of the statute, 45 U.S.C. § 522, that the basic system
"shall not be reviewable in any court", are clearly sufficient to
indicate that Congress intended no judicial review. See State of
New Jersey v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1958), aff'd
per curiam, Bergen County v. United States, 359 U.S. 27, 79 S.Ct.
607, 3 L.Ed.2d 625 (1959). Under the circumstances, no Fifth
Amendment procedural due process claim has been made out.
Plaintiffs' final constitutional argument, advanced primarily
at the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction, is
that the Act works an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority, citing Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935), and Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935).
They apparently challenge the power given to Amtrak pursuant to
45 U.S.C. § 546(a), whereby rates can be set and lines can be
discontinued or extended (if outside the basic system) without
the constraints set by the Interstate Commerce Act.
The Schechter and Panama cases have been severely limited to
their own facts. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 249, 67
S.Ct. 1552, 91 L.Ed. 2030 (1947). Delegation of legislative power
is now permitted if that power is sufficiently circumscribed by
appropriate statutory standards or safeguards. See, e.g., Arizona
v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 583, 83 S.Ct. 1468, 10 L.Ed.2d 542
A careful reading of the Act demonstrates that sufficient
standards and safeguards have been set out by Congress. For
instance, under § 308, 45 U.S.C. § 548, Amtrak is required to
submit to the President and Congress detailed annual reports of
its operations, activities, and accomplishments. In addition, it
is made subject to the same safety regulations and labor laws as
other common carriers. 45 U.S.C. § 546(b). Also, rail passenger
service in excess of the basic system, if implemented, must be
"consistent with prudent management." 45 U.S.C. § 563(a).
Finally, if Amtrak should not act consistently with the policies
of the Act, the United States Attorney General is authorized to
go into federal district court to obtain equitable relief.
45 U.S.C. § 547. Under all the circumstances of this case, Congress
has set sufficient statutory standards and safeguards upon the
power delegated to Amtrak. There has thus been no
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
Plaintiffs' only non-constitutional challenge is that Amtrak
has violated the "prudent management" standard of § 403(a) by not
providing intercity rail passenger service between Chicago and
West Quincy. However, plaintiffs have answered their own argument
in the course of Count I of the complaint. There it is alleged
that the Illinois legislature is considering the funding of lines
in excess of the basic system. The Act permits any state to
petition Amtrak to provide service beyond that provided by the
basic system in return for the state's promise to pay a
reasonable portion of any losses suffered. 45 U.S.C. § 563(b). In
no case is a state to pay less than two-thirds of any loss.
45 U.S.C. § 563(c).
Nowhere in Count I is it specifically alleged that Amtrak
violated § 403(a). Instead, it is alleged that Amtrak's
accountants reached the conclusion that trains Nos. 5 and 6 were
not profitable, and that in any case, Amtrak had decided, because
of a lack of funds, to provide
no service outside the basic plan unless it was funded by the
states pursuant to § 403(b)(c). This is not the same as an
allegation that Amtrak had displayed a lack of "prudent
management". If anything, it is indicative of the exercise of
prudent management. Construing Count I most favorably to
plaintiffs, it does no more than chronicle the proper avenue of
relief under the Act, which is not this court, but rather the
state legislature. The appropriation of funds to underwrite
two-thirds of any loss suffered by trains Nos. 5 and 6, proffered
to Amtrak pursuant to § 403(b), will accomplish the same result
plaintiffs seek in this lawsuit.
Because of the disposition of the motions to dismiss, this
court does not reach the question of whether M.F. Radrizzi, the
Illinois Legislative Director of the United Transportation Union,
should be given leave to intervene as a party plaintiff.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss the
complaint is granted, F.R.Civ.P. rule 12(b)(6), and the cause is