APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. EDWARD
J. EGAN, Judge, presiding.
MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE LEIGHTON DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:
Rehearing denied June 22, 1971.
This appeal is from a judgment entered in an administrative review proceeding. *fn1 Plaintiffs were two associations of horsemen and one individual who sued on behalf of Illinois licensed race horse owners. Defendants were the Illinois Racing Board, the Jockeys' Guild, its officers and a number of corporate promoters of horse races in Illinois. The controversy concerns Rule 131 of the Illinois Racing Board. On plaintiffs' complaint, the trial judge held that the rule was a nullity.
Defendants argue that this ruling was erroneous. They present two issues.
1. Whether section 37a7 of the Illinois Horse Racing Act prohibits adoption by the Illinois Racing Board of a rule which sets minimum fees a licensee race horse owner must pay a non-contract jockey.
2. Whether adoption of Rule 131 by the Illinois Racing Board deprives the plaintiffs of rights guaranteed by state and federal constitutions.
The parties are in agreement concerning the facts. On April 21, 1970, with notice to all interested parties, and at the request of the Jockeys' Guild, the Illinois Racing Board held a hearing to determine whether Rule 131 should be amended to increase the minimum mount fees a race horse owner must pay a non-contract jockey, that is, one who does not have a special employment agreement with the owner. *fn2 After hearing the parties, the Board appointed a committee to consider the request of the Guild. The committee met, with notice to interested parties. On June 9, 1970 the committee recommended to the Board that Rule 131 be amended. The recommendation was adopted and the rule was amended. *fn3
Winning Second Third Losing Gross Amount Mount Mount Mount Mount
$ 400 and Under $27 $18 $16 $15 500 30 20 17 15 600 36 22 17 15 700- 900 10% of Win Purse 25 22 19 1,000-1,400 10% of Win Purse 30 25 20 1,500-1,900 10% of Win Purse 35 30 25 2,000-3,400 10% of Win Purse 45 35 30 3,500-4,900 10% of Win Purse 50 40 30 5,000 and Up 10% of Win Purse 55 45 35 (Amended June 9, 1970)
Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking administrative review of the Board's action. Count I of the amended complaint alleged that Rule 131 was illegal because it was contrary to section 37a7 of the Illinois Horse Racing Act which provides, in part, that "[t]he Board shall have no right or power to determine who shall be officers, directors or employees of any licensee, or the salaries thereof, * * *" *fn4 In the other three counts, plaintiffs alleged that the rule violated their freedom of contract and denied them equal protection of the laws in violation of state and federal constitutions.
Defendants appeared and filed an answer consisting of the record before the Board. The trial judge, after overruling motions to dismiss, reviewed the proceedings and in a memorandum decision, found "[t]he Horse Racing Act, * * * provides that the Board shall have no right to determine the salaries of employees. I hold that jockeys are employees. * * * [T]hat the Board does not have the power to fix any compensation in the absence of any agreement between the parties; [and that] Rule 131 is a nullity." The decision of the Board was reversed and all defendants were enjoined from enforcing Rule 131. On motion made after the appeal was docketed, we stayed the judgment to await resolution of the issues presented for review.
The first, whether section 37a7 of the Illinois Horse Racing Act prohibits adoption by the Board of a minimum mount fee rule, involves construction of a statute. Plaintiffs rest their contention on a clause of a sentence: "The Board shall have no right or power to determine who shall be officers, directors or employees of any licensee, or the salaries thereof, * * *." The rest of the sentence provides, "[e]xcept that the Board may, by rule, require that all or any officials or employees in charge of or whose duties relate to the actual running of races be approved by the Board." (Emphasis supplied.)
• 1, 2 In construing this statutory language, the primary object is ascertainment of legislative intent, a fact to be gathered from the entire act, not from one section, sentence or clause. (People ex rel. Smail v. Board of Education, 343 Ill. App. 362, 99 N.E.2d 385.) We must examine the language employed, the evil which the legislature sought to remedy and the objective it sought to accomplish. (People v. Laporte, 28 Ill. App.2d 139, 11 N.E.2d 95; Mills v. County of Winnebago, 104 Ill. App.2d 366, 244 N.E.2d 65.) The words, phrases and sentences of a statute are to be understood as used, with due regard to the statutory context as a whole. And in expounding one part of a statute, resort must be had to every other part. 82 C.J.S. Statutes, § 348.
Therefore, applying these rules of construction, we must ascertain the legislative intent when the Illinois Horse Racing Act was amended in 1941. We find that the legislature intended to create an Illinois Racing Board whose "[j]urisdiction, supervision, powers and duties * * * shall extend * * * to every person, association, corporation or trust which holds or conducts any meeting within the State of Illinois, whereat horse racing is permitted for any stake, purse or reward. * * * The Board shall have full power to prescribe rules, regulations and conditions under which all horse races shall be conducted in the State of Illinois * * * and reasonable rules and regulations regulating participants in horse racing meetings, providing for the prevention of practices detrimental to the public interest and the best interests of racing, * * *." Under the provisions of Section 37 c-2, "[t]he Board may issue licenses to horse owners, * * *" Thus, under the Act, a licensed race horse owner is a licensee. As provided in the exception to the clause on which plaintiffs rely, the Board, by adoption of a reasonable rule, can exercise its jurisdiction and determine the salaries of "[a]ll or any ...