due process. However, the fact that the notification of pregnancy
did not comply with § 1622.30(c)(3) sufficiently disposes of
this contention, for petitioner's failure to satisfy the
threshold requirement of the regulation divested the Board of
discretion and left nothing, in fact, for it to consider. There
was, therefore, no reason for it to meet.
Petitioner's next contention is that one of the Board members
resides outside of the area within the Board's jurisdiction, and
that therefore no valid quorum was present when he was classified
1-A. That part of the regulation in question requiring that Board
members live within the jurisdiction "if at all practicable"
(32 C.F.R. § 1604.52(c)) is not mandatory, however, and failure to
comply is not subject to collateral attack. Czepil v. Hershey,
425 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1970.)*fn3
Petitioner also claims that his 1-A classification was without
basis in fact because the Board had received evidence of a
medical disorder which rendered him unacceptable for service
under Army Regulations. However, the record reveals that he was
examined on April 15, 1968, after receipt of the above evidence
and before the 1-A classification issued. There was therefore a
basis in fact for the classification, and consequently further
judicial review is precluded. Estep v. United States,
327 U.S. 114, 66 S.Ct. 423, 90 L.Ed. 567 (1946); United States ex rel.
Luster v. McBee, supra.
Furthermore, the record reveals that petitioner did not appeal
his 1-A classification within 30 days, although he was notified
of his right to so appeal. Absent unusual circumstances, not
alleged or disclosed here, such failure to exhaust administrative
remedies precludes collateral review of the propriety of such
classification. See United States v. Smogor, 411 F.2d 501 (7th
Cir. 1969); Skinner v. United States, 215 F.2d 767 (9th Cir.),
cert den. 348 U.S. 981, 75 S.Ct. 572, 99 L.Ed. 763.
Finally, it is alleged that the Board never met to order
petitioner to report for induction. Even if true, however, the
induction order was nonetheless valid for after the Board has
made a 1-A classification, the actual order for induction is
merely ministerial and may be sent at the direction of the clerk.
United States v. Smogor, 415 F.2d 296, 298 (7th Cir. 1969). Segal
v. United States, 423 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. March 10, 1970).
More than 16 months have elapsed since petitioner was first
ordered to report for induction. During this interval he has
besieged the Board with a series of claims designed to prevent
and delay his induction. On each occasion when a new claim was
presented, the Board delayed or postponed its prior issued order
while it examined petitioner's request. These dilatory tactics
necessitated no less than seven orders to report for induction.
Upon a careful review of the entire file, I find that the Board
extended to petitioner every right to which he was entitled. The
Board took no summary or arbitrary action in making any of its
rulings. Any further delay in this case would completely
frustrate the objectives of the Selective Service Act.
Petitioner has shown no right to relief here, and his petition
for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed.