counts 3 and 4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
With regard to counts 1 and 2, it is beyond dispute that no
cause of action for damages lies against the City of Chicago,
a municipal corporation, under the civil rights statute,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1986.*fn1 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
191, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); United States ex rel.
Lee v. State of Illinois, 343 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1965); Fisher
v. City of New York, 312 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1963); Vechiola v.
City of Chicago, 244 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ill. 1965); Spiesel v.
City of New York, 239 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The
legislative history of these provisions was extensively
reviewed in Monroe v. Pape, supra, the Court concluding that
"[t]he response of the Congress to the proposal to make
municipalities liable * * * was so antagonistic that we cannot
believe that the word `person' was used in this particular Act
to include them." (p. 191 of 365 U.S., p. 486 of 81 S.Ct.)
As to the individual named defendants, the complaint alleges
that they were charged with the control and supervision of the
John Doe officers and knew, or should have known, of the
"wrongs" committed by them. Further, it charges that these
named defendants, with intentional or negligent disregard of
plaintiff's constitutional rights, committed one or more of a
number of acts or omissions. These include failure to
adequately supervise and restrain these policemen, permitting
their use of lethal weapons and excessive force, and failure
to give adequate warning to plaintiff Sanberg.
The doctrine of respondeat superior has no place under the
civil rights statutes, for "[p]ersonal involvement is
contemplated." Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220, 223 (D.Colo.
1966). Premised on personal culpability, these statutes are
aimed at those who subject others to a deprivation of their
constitutional rights, rather than at the state or city which
employs them or the official with ultimate authority over them
in the governmental hierarchy.
Of course, supervisory personnel may be liable in damages if
they personally participate in or direct the infliction of
injury. Plaintiff does not charge, however, that the named
defendants struck the blows, nor does he allege that they
ordered the attack on plaintiff.*fn2 And the courts have
uniformly held that police supervisory personnel are not
liable for damages to one injured by police misconduct absent
direct personal participation.*fn3 Jordan v. Kelly,
223 F. Supp. 731 (W.D.Mo. 1963); Pritchard v. Downie, 216 F. Supp. 621,
627 (E.D.Ark. 1963); Runnels v. Parker, 263 F. Supp. 271
(C.D. Calif. 1967); Patrum. v. Martin, 292 F. Supp. 370
(W.D.Ky. 1968); Mack v. Lewis, 298 F. Supp. 1351 (S.D.Ga.
1969). The established rule was stated in
Jordan v. Kelly, supra, 223 F. Supp. at 737:
"Even though he (the police chief) may be charged
with the duty of selecting the members of the
force, he is not responsible for their acts
unless he has directed such acts to be done, or
has personally cooperated in the offense, for
each police officer, is, like himself, a public
Furthermore, although the rules of pleading in federal
courts are to be liberally construed, they do not authorize
complaints framed in merely conclusory and general terms.*fn4
Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864, 867 (N.D.Ill. 1967). The
thrust of the charges against these named defendants is that
they are liable for plaintiff's injuries because of alleged
gross failures to properly train, restrain and supervise the
activities of the offending policemen. These allegations fail
to state the personal, specific and factual involvement in the
complained of attack necessary to impose liability.
Under these circumstances no useful purpose will be served
by requiring these named defendants to respond to a complaint
which wholly fails to involve them, either personally or in
their official capacity, with any deprivation on their part of
the plaintiff's civil rights. The order entered today will
include the dismissal of these named defendants from Counts 1
and 2 on the basis that these counts fail to state a cause of
action against them.
The plaintiff will be given 30 days to amend the complaint
by identifying the John Doe defendant.*fn5 If such amendment
is not filed within 30 days, the complaint will be dismissed.