Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Criminal
Division; the Hon. HERBERT R. FRIEDLUND, Judge, presiding. Order
reversed and cause remanded with directions.
MR. JUSTICE LYONS DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.
This is an appeal by the People, in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a) (Ill Rev Stats (1967), c 110A, § 604(a)), from an order of the trial court granting the motion of the defendant for discharge pursuant to the speedy trial provisions of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure. See Ill Rev Stats (1965), c 38, § 103-5(a) and (d). The common-law record and transcript of proceedings indicate the following chronology of events.
JANUARY 25, 1966 defendant was arrested with another man for murder and was never admitted to bail.
FEBRUARY 21, 1966 defendant was indicted jointly with the other man for murder.
FEBRUARY 28, 1966 defendant was arraigned. He declared his indigency; the public defender was appointed to represent him; a plea of not guilty was entered; and the case was assigned by the chief judge to another judge for trial. On this same day, the trial judge granted the motion of the defendant for a list of witnesses to any statements made by the defendant, said list to be furnished the defendant by the State within 10 days. By order of court, the cause was continued to March 15, 1966, with subpoenas.
MARCH 15, 1966 by order of court, the cause was continued to March 31, 1966, without subpoenas.
MARCH 31, 1966 defendant Jenkins made this statement at the beginning of the hearing: "I am ready for trial. I would appreciate it if you would appoint me another defender." The trial judge, after granting the motion of the co-defendant for a severance, appointed private counsel for the defendant Jenkins in place of the Public Defender, and, by order of court, the cause was continued to April 20, 1966, with subpoenas.
APRIL 20, 1966 the defendant appeared in court without counsel and the cause was continued, by order of court, to May 10, 1966, with subpoenas. On April 21, 1966, private counsel filed his written appearance for the defendant.
MAY 10, 1966 on motion of counsel for the defendant, the trial court ordered that the Behavior Clinic of the Circuit Court of Cook County conduct a psychiatric examination of the defendant and report to the court on or before May 31, 1966, regarding the defendant's competency and sanity. The cause was continued, by order of court, to May 31, 1966, with subpoenas.
MAY 31, 1966 report of the Behavior Clinic showing defendant to be competent was filed and the cause was continued, by order of court, to June 22, 1966, with subpoenas.
JUNE 20, 1966 court granted the motion of the defendant to advance the cause from June 22, 1966, to the present date and after a complete hearing, the court granted the motion of the defendant for discharge pursuant to the speedy trial (120 days) provisions of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure and entered its order to that effect thereby discharging the defendant from custody. The People appeal from this order.
It is settled law in Illinois that the State may appeal from an order discharging the defendant from custody due to the failure of the State to accord him a speedy trial in accordance with the 120-day standard found in Ill Rev Stats (1965), c 38, § 103-5(a). The courts have stated that the granting of such an order of discharge is in substance and effect a dismissal of the indictment, an order from which the State may appeal. See People v. Petropoulos, 34 Ill.2d 179, 214 N.E.2d 765 (1966). The right of the State to appeal in such a case as the instant one has now been codified in Ill Rev Stats (1967), c 110A, § 604(a).
The right of every accused to receive a speedy public trial is guaranteed by art II, § 9 of the Illinois Constitution and is given concreteness and specificity by our legislature in Ill Rev Stats (1965), c 38, § 103-5(a) and (d), which provide as follows:
(a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, ...