(Graf); F-4, pp. 27-8; Gov't. Ex. F-6, pp. 27-8).
28. The resolutions setting attendance zone boundaries of
October 5, 1964, and September 6, 1966, placed in the
attendance zone for the Roosevelt School the area referred to
in paragraphs 23 and 24 and 25 above, which is located closer
to the Coolidge than to the Roosevelt School. (Gov't. Ex. F-4,
pp. 27-28; F-6, pp. 27-28; P-3, P-4, T-1, T-2, and T-3). Also
placed in the attendance zone for the Roosevelt School was
other territory east of Phoenix, located closer to the
Coolidge School than the Roosevelt School, which is referred
to in paragraph 16 above, concerning school bus
transportation. (Gov't. Ex. F-4, pp. 27-8; F-6, pp. 27-8).
Only white children reside in each of these areas. At the time
of the adoption of each resolution, the enrollment of the
Roosevelt School was all white and that of the Coolidge School
and (after its construction) the Kennedy School, almost
entirely Negro (See (5) and (6) above).
29. Beginning in about 1956 and continuing through and
including the 1967-68 school year, under the attendance zone
boundaries in effect in District 151, some white children
living in the area immediately east of Phoenix, within walking
distance of the Coolidge and Kennedy Schools, were bussed to
the Roosevelt School. These children included the three
children of Jasper Tromp who attended school at various times
during the period specified and children living on 153rd
Street (also known as 157th Street) in South Holland between
State Street (also known as Indiana Avenue) and Ninth Avenue.
(Gov't. Ex. Q-6; Tr. 204-212 (Kingsland); Tr. 723, 727
(Tromp); Ex. E-5, pp. 5, 12, 15, 16; E-6, pp. 6, 13, 16, 18;
E-7, pp. 5, 16, 18; E-8, pp. 3, 6, 7; E-9, pp. 5, 6, 7, 9, 10,
12, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21; T-1; T-2; and T-3.
30. In February, 1967, a team of five educators recommended
institution of an upper grade center for the District and
proposed use of an existing facility for that purpose. (Tr.
755). All members of the Board agreed on the desirability of
an upper grade center from an educational point of view. (Tr.
780-781). In early 1968, the Board considered four proposals
for reorganizing the structure of District 151. Plan A would
retain the status quo. (Tr. 1114). Plan B would establish an
upper grade center at Roosevelt which would absorb all eighth
grade students and some seventh graders. (Tr. 759 and Gov't.
Ex. L-3). The plan which was educationally the most sound and
was favored by the Superintendent (Tr. 768-771) was Plan C,
which would use Coolidge School as an upper grade center for
all seventh and eighth grade students in the District and
would result in placing pupils presently attending Coolidge in
grades 3 through 6 in the other five schools in the District,
so that they would represent between 12 and 31 percent of
student enrollment at each of those other schools. (Tr. 760,
768, 775, 972, 981.) The Board, reflecting community sentiment
hostile to the desegregation which would result from Plan C
(Tr. 536, 785, 798-800), rejected this proposal. Plan D, which
was first adopted on February 5, 1968, and abandoned on
February 19, involved only some shifting of students to avoid
overcrowding at Eisenhower School. (Tr. 761).
31. The purpose and effect of the student assignment and
structural reorganization policies and practices stated in
paragraphs 20 through 30 was to segregate the students of
District 151 on the basis of race and color.
32. As a result of the actions of the defendants specified
in paragraphs 15 through 30, public school students in
District 151 have been segregated on account of race. As a
result of these actions, the Coolidge and Kennedy Schools have
been established and are identifiable as "Negro" schools,
because of the racial composition of their student bodies, and
the Roosevelt, Madison, Eisenhower and Taft Schools have,
because of the racial composition of their student bodies,
become established and identifiable as "white" schools.
33. The defendants and their predecessors have engaged in
in the operation of School District 151 of Cook County,
34. The defendants have failed to take affirmative steps to
overcome the effects of past racial discrimination in the
operation of School District 151 of Cook County, Illinois.
(Gov't. Ex. J-1, pp. 2-3; M-1; Tr. 965-68, 969-971 (Watts)).
35. Failure to order desegregation of the faculty and to
revise student assignment policies in District 151 at this
time will result in the continuation of existing practices to
the irreparable injury of Negro and white students residing in
the District and will irreparably harm the interest of the
United States in securing equal protection of the laws through
the orderly desegregation of public education.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has jurisdiction of the parties and the
subject matter of this action under Section 407 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1345.
2. The requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Title IV of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 apply equally to all public school systems without
regard to whether State or local law authorizes racial
discrimination. Taylor v. Board of Education of City School
Dist. of City of New Rochelle, 191 F. Supp. 181, 182-183
(S.D.N.Y. 1961), affirmed, 294 F.2d 36 (C.A. 2, 1961) cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 940, 82 S.Ct. 382, 7 L.Ed.2d 339 (1961);
Clemons v. Board of Education of Hillsboro, Ohio,
228 F.2d 853, 859 (C.A. 6, 1956).
3. Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IV of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 this Court has jurisdiction to hear
and decide all issues concerning alleged racial discrimination
in public education in School District 151, including policies
with respect to the assignment of students, the allocation of
faculty and staff, the location and construction of schools,
the transportation of pupils and the educational structure.
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education,
372 F.2d 836 (C.A. 5, 1966), affirmed en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (C.A. 5,
1967), cert. denied Board of Education of City of Bessemer v.
United States, 389 U.S. 840, 88 S.Ct. 77, 19 L.Ed.2d 104
(1967); Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458
(M.D.Ala., 1967), affirmed Wallace v. United States,
389 U.S. 215, 88 S.Ct. 415, 19 L.Ed.2d 422 (1967).
4. Recruitment and assignment of public school teachers on
a racial basis so as to establish schools that are racially
identifiable by the composition of their faculties deprives
students of the right to be free of racial discrimination in
the operation of the public schools in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198, 86 S.Ct.
358, 15 L.Ed.2d 265 (1965); Bradley v. School Board of City of
Richmond, Va., 382 U.S. 103, 86 S.Ct. 224, 15 L.Ed.2d 187
5. The contemporaneous existence, within one system, of some
schools whose faculties and student bodies are almost
exclusively white and other schools whose faculties and
student bodies are almost exclusively Negro creates a
presumption of discriminatory faculty assignments which
requires the school authorities to demonstrate the
constitutionality of their procedures. Chambers v.
Hendersonville City Board of Education, 364 F.2d 189, 192
(C.A. 4, 1966); State of Alabama v. United States, 5 Cir.,
304 F.2d 583, 586 (1962).
6. The policy and practice of the defendants and their
predecessors of assigning Negro and white faculty members, on
the basis of race, to schools attended predominantly by
students of the same race violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
Kelley v. Altheimer Arkansas Public School District No. 22,
378 F.2d 483, 498-499 (C.A. 8, 1967).
7. Defendants are under a constitutional obligation
forthwith to take affirmative remedial action to desegregate
racially the faculties and staff of schools in District 151.
Dowell v. School
Board of Oklahoma City Public Schools, 244 F. Supp. 971
(W.D.Okla., 1965), affirmed, 375 F.2d 158 (C.A. 10, 1967),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931, 87 S.Ct. 2054, 18 L.Ed.2d 993
(1967); Clark v. Board of Education of Little Rock School
District, 369 F.2d 661 (C.A. 8, 1961).
8. Defendants are constitutionally obliged to allocate
members of the faculty and staff so that no school is racially
identifiable. That objective will be achieved when the racial
composition of the faculty and staff at each school reflect
proportionately the racial composition of the entire faculty
and staff. Dowell v. School Board, supra; Coppedge v. Franklin
County Board of Education, 273 F. Supp. 289, 300-301 (E.D.N.C.
1967), affirmed, 394 F.2d 410 (C.A. 4, decided April 8, 1968).
9. The responsibility for faculty and staff desegregation is
that of the defendants, not the teachers, and the achievement
of the constitutionally required objective may not be made
contingent upon the willingness of teachers voluntarily to
transfer from their present schools. If necessary, teachers
shall be assigned or reassigned to schools in order to comply
with the constitutional requirement. United States v. Board of
Education of City of Bessemer, 396 F.2d 44, C.A. 5; Davis v.
Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 393 F.2d 690
(C.A. 5, decided March 12, 1968, Slip Op., p. 12); Kier v.
School Board of Augusta County, Virginia, 249 F. Supp. 239
10. The total absence of Negro pupils from student bodies in
regular classes at the Roosevelt, Madison, Taft and Eisenhower
schools and the existence of almost exclusively Negro student
bodies in regular classes at the Coolidge and Kennedy schools
gives rise to a presumption of unconstitutionality in the
establishment of student attendance zone boundaries, and
requires the defendants to show constitutionally permissible
bases for the attendance zones. Northcross v. Board of
Education of City of Memphis, 333 F.2d 661, 664 (C.A. 6,
1964); Evans v. Buchanan, 207 F. Supp. 820 (D.Del., 1962).
11. The intended and inevitable effect of the series of
policy decisions by the defendants and their predecessors,
made with respect to attendance zones, transportation of
pupils, school site selection and construction, and
organization of the structure of the educational program, as
described in the foregoing findings of fact, has been to
preserve racial segregation of students in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
Shawnee County, Kansas, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed.
873 (1954); Taylor v. Board of Education of City School Dist.
of City of New Rochelle, 294 F.2d 36 (C.A. 2, 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 940, 82 S.Ct. 382, 7 L.Ed.2d 339 (1961).
12. A school board may not, consistently with the Fourteenth
Amendment, maintain segregated schools or permit educational
choices to be influenced by a policy of racial segregation in
order to accommodate community sentiment or the wishes of a
majority of voters. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 13, 78 S.Ct.
1401, 3 L.Ed.2d 5, 19 (1958); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General
Assembly of State of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 736-737, 84 S.Ct.
1459, 12 L.Ed.2d 632 (1964); Hall v. St. Helena Parish School
Board, 197 F. Supp. 649, 659 (E.D.La. 1961), affirmed,
368 U.S. 515, 82 S.Ct. 529, 7 L.Ed.2d 521 (1961); Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369, 87 S.Ct. 1627, 18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1967).
13. A school board may not, consistently with the Fourteenth
Amendment, purposefully tailor the components of a
neighborhood school attendance policy so as to conform to the
racial compositions of the neighborhoods in its school
district; nor may it build upon private residential
discriminations, Taylor v. Board of Education, supra; Brewer
v. Norfolk School Board, 397 F.2d 37, C.A. 4.
14. The defendants' present constitutional obligation is to
take all appropriate affirmative steps to correct the
effects of their racially discriminatory policies and
practices with respect to allocation of faculty and staff and
assignment of students. Green v. School Board of New Kent
County, Virginia, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716;
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education,
372 F.2d 836 (C.A. 5, 1966), affirmed en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (C.A. 5,
15. In order to remedy the effects of past discrimination,
the Constitution requires the defendants to give affirmative
consideration to racial factors in allocating faculty and
staff members, assigning students, and with respect to
decisions on other pertinent matters of educational policy,
including the location and construction of schools,
transportation of pupils, and the educational structure of the
District. Dowell v. Board of Education, supra; Springfield
School Committee v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261, 266 (C.A. 1,
1965); Offerman v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22 (C.A. 2, 1967);
Wanner v. Arlington County School Board, 357 F.2d 452, 454
(C.A. 4, 1966); Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (C.A. 5, 1966);
United States v. Board of Public Instruction of Polk County,
395 F.2d 66, 5 Cir.
16. The foregoing requirement does not conflict with
Illinois law; if it did, however, State law would yield to the
requirement of the Constitution. Tometz v. Board of Education
of Waukegan, Ill., 237 N.E.2d 498; United States Constitution,
Article VI, cl. 2.
17. That provision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 which withholds
from the courts the power to require transportation of pupils
to overcome racial imbalance in public schools must be
construed to relate to so-called de facto or adventitious
segregation. It is inapplicable where, as here, the existing
segregation of pupils and teachers is inseparable from the
practices and policies of the defendants. United States v.
Jefferson County Board of Education, supra, 372 F.2d 878-886.
18. The representations of the defendants with respect to
the progress presently being made toward faculty desegregation
do not, on the facts found here, warrant withholding
injunctive relief. United States v. W.T. Grant Co.,
345 U.S. 629, 632-633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953).
19. In view of the lapse of time since the decision and
mandate of the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board
of Education, supra, and in order to enable the defendants to
undertake compliance with the requirements of the order issued
herewith as far in advance of the beginning of the 1968-69
school year as possible, the issuance of a preliminary
injunction is appropriate and necessary. Griffin v. County
School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 229, 84
S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964); Porter v. Warner Holding
Co., 328 U.S. 395, 397-398, 66 S.Ct. 1086, 90 L.Ed. 1332
20. The Clerk is hereby directed that the mandate of this
Court shall issue forthwith. A stay of the Order herewith
shall not be available from this Court. This Court retains
jurisdiction of this action for all purposes. Raney v. Board
of Education of Gould School District, 391 U.S. 443, 88 S.Ct.
1697, 20 L.Ed.2d 727.
This action having come on for hearing upon motion of the
United States for a preliminary injunction, and the Court
having heard oral testimony presented by the parties on June
19-21, 24-28, and July 1-2, 1968, and having considered
documentary evidence and depositions submitted by the parties
in lieu of affidavits, and the Court being of the opinion that
the relief sought should be granted, it is hereby:
Ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the defendants, their
agents, officers, employees and successors and all those in
active concert and participation with them, be and they are
preliminarily enjoined from discriminating on the basis of
race or color in the operation of
School District 151 and in the assignment of teachers or
students to schools in that district. As set out more
particularly in the body of this decree, the defendants shall
take affirmative action to disestablish school segregation and
eliminate the effects of prior unlawful conduct in the
operation of the school system:
I. FACULTY DESEGREGATION
1. To correct the effects of past segregated assignment of
faculties, the defendants shall forthwith begin filling
vacancies and assigning teachers to positions in schools where
their race is in the minority. The defendants shall establish
as an objective, to be fully accomplished by the commencement
of the 1969-1970 school year, that the pattern of teacher
assignment to any particular school not be identified as
tailored for a heavy concentration of either Negro or white
pupils in the school.
2. For the commencement of the 1968-1969 school year, the
defendants shall achieve not less than 50% of this ultimate
objective, measured by the number of minority-race teachers in
3. The interim and ultimate objectives referred to above
may, where possible, be achieved by new hiring and voluntary
transfers. If these measures do not produce adequate numbers
of teachers to satisfy the interim and ultimate objectives,
defendants shall reassign the additional teachers needed to
comply with these requirements.
4. The above steps shall be taken, notwithstanding that
teacher contracts for 1968-1969 or 1969-1970 may already have
been signed and approved. The tenure of teachers in the system
shall not be used as an excuse for failure to comply with the
5. Teachers and other professional staff members may not be
discriminatorily assigned, dismissed, demoted, or passed over
for retention, promotion, or rehiring on the ground of race or
II. STUDENT DESEGREGATION
1. The defendants shall promptly take steps to disestablish
the Coolidge School as a predominantly Negro school in time
for the commencement of the 1968-1969 school year.
2. The above objective may be accomplished by the
implementation of the proposal submitted by the superintendent
to the Board of Education in January and February 1968 as
"Plan `C'" or by any method which would similarly have the
effect of disestablishing the Coolidge School as a
predominantly Negro school.
3. Defendants shall submit to the Court, and serve upon the
parties, not later than July 15, 1968, the details of a plan
designed to achieve the objective specified in the above
4. The defendants shall formulate a School as a
predominantly Negro school plan for the disestablishment of
the Kennedy School as a predominantly Negro school in time for
the commencement of the 1969-1970 school year.
5. The objective of the plan required by paragraph 4 shall
be to redraw school attendance zones or reorganize attendance
patterns so as to disestablish the Kennedy School as a
predominantly Negro school.
6. Defendants shall submit to the Court, and serve upon the
parties, not later than October 15, 1968, the details of the
plan required by paragraph 4.
7. For the 1968-1969 school year, students at the Kennedy
School shall have the right to apply for transfer and be
enrolled in any school in the district where, at their grade
level, there are 33 or less students per class.
III. NEW CONSTRUCTION
1. The defendants, to the extent consistent with the proper
operation of the school system as a whole, shall locate any
new school and substantially expand any existing schools with
the objective of eradicating the effects of past segregation.
2. The defendants shall not take any action with respect to
the construction of new school facilities or the substantial
expansion of existing schools without leave of this Court,
after notice has been
served on the parties, until the formulation and submission of
the plans required by Section II of this decree.
1. The defendants shall serve upon the plaintiff and file
with the Clerk of the Court, on or before fifteen days after
the opening day of the 1968-1969 school year a report
tabulating by race the number of students in each school in
the district. The report shall also list, by name and address,
each student who applied for transfer from the Kennedy School
to other schools in the district, the grade of the student,
whether the application was granted, and, if not, the reason
for the denial.
2. The report shall also list the teachers at each school,
the grade or grades they have been assigned to teach, and
their race. It shall also list the vacancies filled by the
hiring of teachers from outside the system at each of the
The Court hereby retains jurisdiction over this case to
assure full compliance with this decree.
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