Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. BEN
SCHWARTZ, Judge, presiding. Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.
This is a personal injury action, in which plaintiff, Elvin Erkard, appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendants. Defendants' motion for summary judgment alleged that at the time of the alleged injury, plaintiff was "a loaned employee" of defendant Sears, Roebuck and Company, and Nugents-American Contractors, Inc., was "a loaning employer," and that the action was barred as to both defendants by the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act (Ill. Rev Stats 1965, c 48, §§ 138.1(a)4 and 138.5(a)).
The trial court, in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment in favor of both defendants, found there was no issue of a material fact and that the guidelines of American Stevedores Co. v. Industrial Commission, 408 Ill. 449, 97 N.E.2d 325 (1951), were applicable.
On appeal, the determinative issue is whether, under the undisputed facts here, plaintiff was "a loaned employee" of Sears as a matter of law. Plaintiff contends that there was a material issue as to whether the relationship of master and servant existed between plaintiff and Sears, because Sears did not have the power to discharge plaintiff and, also, the determination of the relationship of master and servant was a question of fact for a jury.
Nugents-American Contractors, Inc., was in the business of supplying temporary labor to various firms. On May 31, 1963, plaintiff was instructed by Nugents to report to Sears and was told to do whatever Sears personnel told him to do. At Sears, plaintiff was instructed to work with and under the direction of defendant Staunton, a Sears' employee. Staunton told plaintiff what to do, how and when to do it, his working hours, when he could eat lunch and when he could take a break. During that day, plaintiff was injured in the course of his work by a lift truck driven by defendant Staunton.
Nugents was paid under a contract by Sears and out of the contract proceeds Nugents paid the men supplied to Sears, including plaintiff, an hourly wage for the hours reported to it by Sears for work done on its premises. Nugents made income tax withholding deductions and social security deductions from the men supplied to Sears, including plaintiff. Plaintiff's work procedure with Nugents was that he would report either in person or by telephone to Nugents, and they would direct him where he was to work on that particular day.
An affidavit of Nugents' comptroller states that after plaintiff reported to Sears for work, Sears "had the direction and authority over the work of said Elvin Erkard while he was so engaged on their premises. That said Sears, Roebuck and Company had the right to direct said employee to report back to Nugent's American, in the event they deemed it necessary or desirable."
Defendants contend that the factual situation in American Stevedores Co. v. Industrial Commission, 408 Ill. 449, 97 N.E.2d 325, is similar, and the pronouncements there made apply here. In that case, American Stevedores was engaged in the business of furnishing laborers to warehouses and sent some of its men, with a straw boss, to Frigidaire Sales Corporation. There they were placed at work under his direction and subject to Frigidaire's instructions. The superintendent of Frigidaire under their arrangement had no power to discharge the men individually, but if he was dissatisfied with any man, he would indicate this to the straw boss, who would immediately telephone Stevedores and have another man sent to the job. The initiation of discharging men came from Frigidaire. Time slips were prepared by Frigidaire and delivered to Stevedores, who paid the men. One of the Stevedores, men so employed at Frigidaire was fatally injured by a mobile hoist operated by a Frigidaire employee. The Industrial Commission found that the injured man was not an employee of Frigidaire. The trial court made a finding of joint employment and ordered Stevedores and Frigidaire to each pay one-half of the amount of workmen's compensation fixed by law. In affirming the order of the trial court, the Supreme Court said (pp 453-454):
"At common law an employee in the general employment of one person may, with his consent, be loaned to another for the performance of special work and become the employee of the person to whom he is loaned while performing such special service, and this principle of law has been applied to workmen's compensation cases. . . . It is said that the test to determine whether the injured person is the employee of the general employer, or of the special employer, is whether the master has resigned control of the servant for the time being, in a work in which the servant was engaged at that time."
"There being no dispute about the facts, it becomes a question of law to be determined whether they come within the principle of loaned employees, as a matter of law and not as a matter of fact.
"Determining the question involved is not one so simple as deciding whether the employee receives his money directly from the company for which the work is being done, or through another. The question is, is he doing an essential part of the work under the control of the particular employer? The details of the manner in which it is accomplished are immaterial. In the instant case Bagdonas was requested by the operator of the hoist to assist him. While these men came to the Frigidaire plant under the directions of the straw boss, the personnel of Frigidaire told them what to do, either directly or through the straw boss, and they followed the directions thus given.
"The evidence shows the principal purpose of the straw boss was to collect the time checks, and transport the men back and forth, and relieve Frigidaire of employees whose work did not suit. We think this is a case which comes clearly within the so-called `loaned employee' rule, whereby the borrowing employer becomes liable as an employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act in case of death or injury."
Plaintiff contends that American Stevedores was overruled by Gundich v. Emerson-Comstock Co., 21 Ill.2d 117, 171 N.E.2d 60 (1961), and that the ...