There is no basis for defendants' request in item 24 for the
time of day of the conversation between Chipman and Christine
Plump, an unindicted co-conspirator, or for the substance of
the conversation, or whether it was reduced to writing. These
are patently evidentiary matters, and do not require a
response. Also evidentiary are the method of travel as alleged
in Overt Act No. 5, and whether anyone else was present during
the trip (items 25 and 26). United States v. Giramonti, 26
F.R.D. 168 (D.Conn. 1960). For the same reason item 27 is
Item 28 refers to a conversation on or about June 5, 1963,
between Pearl and an unindicted co-conspirator Guy Swadley, in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. (Overt Act No. 7). Since such
conversation was evidently an integral part and element of the
alleged conspiracy, defendants should be told if it is the
Government's contention that someone else was present at the
meeting, and if so, who. United States v. Covelli, 210 F. Supp. 589,
590 (N.D.Ill. 1962). However, the remainder of item 28 is
denied for the reasons given in connection with item 24. Item
29 is denied for the reason assigned in denying item 25. Items
30 and 31 are evidentiary and consequently not allowed.
In item 32, the Government is directed to furnish the
address of Arthur H. Kalk, whose home was allegedly fired into
by Cupp and Chipman on or about June 7, 1963 (Overt Act No.
10). Although perhaps evidentiary and not proper in this type
of motion, it would be a proper subject of discovery under
Rule 16, and so we direct the Government to supply the
The address, if known, of the place of meeting in Chicago
might be important, and should be provided in item 33, as was
directed in item 23. Item 34 is denied for the reason assigned
to item 25. Items 35 and 36 are evidentiary. Item 37 is denied
for the same reasons as items 24 and 25, and items 38 and 39
for the reason given in denying item 24. United States v.
Giramonti, supra. Items 40, 41 and 42 are evidentiary.
Giramonti also dictates denial of items 43 and 45.
In item 44, defendant Pearl should be furnished with the
name of the person with whom he telephonically communicated at
the "Toledo Blade," if such person is known, United States v.
Covelli, supra, but the remainder of the request is denied.
Items 45, 46, 47 and 48 are evidentiary. The Government
should supply the names of whoever it is alleged was present,
if anyone, at the conversation between Pearl and Cupp
mentioned in Overt Act No. 29 (item 49), United States v.
Covelli, supra, but the substance of the conversation, if
known, should not be furnished. The same direction applies to
items 51, 52 and 54, but item 50 is evidentiary. Item 53 is
denied for the reasons assigned to items 24 and 25.
Items 55 and 56 are evidentiary, and items 57 and 58 are
immaterial for the purpose of this motion. Item 75 is a
duplication of item 58.
Item 59, which asks whether there was a fire on the vessel
Howard L. Shaw, as alleged in Count II, is manifestly
improper. The office of a bill of particulars is to advise the
defendants as to the nature of the offenses charged, not as to
the exact facts, which constitute evidence subject to proof.
It should be enough, for purposes of preparing a defense, that
the indictment in fact alleges that defendants set fire or
attempted to set fire to the aforementiond vessel.
Item 60 is not only prohibited by Giramonti, supra, but is an
indirect attempt to obtain the names of witnesses, barred to
all defendants except those in capital cases. Item 62 is
evidentiary and immaterial to the functions of this motion. If
the Government knows with better approximation the dates
between June 6 and September 6, 1963, when defendants
transported explosives, it should furnish them in reply to item
64. See United States v. Tellier, 19 F.R.D. 164, 166 (S.D.N Y
1956); United States v. Lopez, 26 F.R.D. 174, 175
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). The names and addresses of those persons
alleged to have been intimidated need not be supplied. But cf.
Blumenfield v. United States, 284 F.2d 46, 49 (8th Cir. 1960);
Young v. United States, 288 F.2d 398, 400, 109 U.S.App.D.C.
414 (1961). The offenses charged here are more numerous and
complex that the ones alleged in Blumenfield (White Slave Act),
and Young (assault with intent to rob), where the government
was required to divulge the names of the alleged victims. In
the circumstances of this case, where the offenses charged are
not primarily ones directed against a single or specific
victim, we believe the policy against disclosing the names of
witnesses justifies denial of the defendants' request.
Item 65 and the first part of item 67 are evidentiary. Items
66 and 73 constitute an indirect attempt to obtain the names
of witnesses and are denied.
Item 74 which asks who placed the bombs and explosives on
the vessel Howard L. Shaw, asks for evidentiary facts and need
not be answered at this time.
Item 76 is evidentiary, and item 77 is an indirect attempt
to obtain the names of witnesses. Both are denied.
Although we have directed that the defendant be supplied the
names of all persons present at conversations specifically set
forth in the indictment, our rulings thereon are not support
for defendants' request for the "names and addresses of all
persons present during any conversations alleged or to be
offered into evidence." This is a clear attempt to obtain the
Government's evidence, the names of its possible witnesses, and
to force it to reveal minute details of its case. Disclosure of
persons present at conversations to be introduced at trial as
distinguished from those conversations mentioned in the
indictment, cannot help to make the indictment clearer or to
more fairly apprise the defendants of the offenses charged.
This request will be denied, and for the same reasons items 81
and 82 are denied.
As to item 80, we will direct the Government to supply the
approximate time and date, the places, and the nature of any
overt acts which were unknown at the time of the indictment
but which the Government has subsequently discovered. Direct
authority for such disclosure is provided by United States v.
Covelli, 210 F. Supp. 589, 590 (N.D.Ill. 1962), and United
States v. Baker, 262 F. Supp. 657, 675 (D.D.C. 1966). The names
of persons present should not be furnished. United States v.
From the above, it is obvious that the Court has expended
much needless time in providing particulars to the defense,
which under the new expanded rules, the Government counsel
should have and could have provided to defendants. The policy
seemingly current in the United States Attorney's Office, of
almost invariably denying requests for bills of particulars
and motions for discovery, in toto, needs re-examination. Even
in a situation where 82 separate requests are included in a
motion for a bill of particulars, the Government has the duty
to proffer those which are proper and appropriate, rather than
being content to argue that the bill seeks a mass of
evidentiary material, and shifting the burden to the court to
sift the wheat from the chaff. Although many of the above
requests made by the defendants were improper, which the
experienced lawyers for the defendants should have known, a
significant number asked for things which defendants should
have been given under the liberalized standards of Rule 7(f).
We think the Government should be prepared to fulfill its
duties and should tender proper information upon request in
motions like the instant one. We have made clear that this
Court intends to comply with the full letter and spirit of
amended Rule 7(f), and indeed has subscribed to its philosophy
long before it was enacted. Blanket refusals to supply
particulars or discovery without legal justification, and
compelling trial courts to sift through a series of requests
such as we have done in the case at bar, is a pure waste of
judicial manpower and hours, and is not in the best interests
of proper judicial administration. We invite the Government to
reevaluate its thinking in this area, and the same is true as
it applies to the experienced lawyers for defendants in this
case who made requests that they should have known could not
be granted under the rules, statutes, and case law. This Court
will seek to remedy this situation in the future by requiring
attorneys on both sides to confer prior to the filing of
defendants' motions for discovery and the like, and file a
statement such as Rule 12(d) of our local civil rules*fn14
7. Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained by Electronic
Pursuant to Rule 41(e), the defendants move to suppress all
evidence obtained against them by means of electronic
eavesdropping. In order for us to consider this motion at a
proper hearing under the rule, it is incumbent upon the
defendants to make a showing that the Government indulged in
wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping and that such conduct
was illegal. Nardone v. United States,