The present federal standard of due process them provides
that solicitation alone may be sufficient to support in
personam jurisdiction over a nonresident. Further, if that
solicitation be substantial and continuous, it is unnecessary
that it be related to the cause sued upon.
The states, however, need not adopt this standard. While the
states may not extend their power beyond these limits, the
states can restrict their jurisdictional power to something
less than the maximum due process allows. Arrowsmith v. United
Press International, 320 F.2d 219, 6 A.L.R.3d 1072 (2 Cir.,
It is open to question whether Illinois has adopted
jurisdictional rules which are more restrictive than allowed
by due process. Defendants urge that a recent Illinois
decision appears to follow the rule that "mere solicitation"
is insufficient to support jurisdiction over nonresidents.
Hertz Corp. v. Taylor, 15 Ill.2d 552, 155 N.E.2d 610 (1959).
But the Hertz case relied on earlier Illinois decisions which,
as discussed above, were in turn based on a now obsolete
interpretation of due process limitations. Since the "mere
solicitation" rule is merely an attempt to observe the limits
of due process imposed by the federal constitution, the rule
may be ignored if due process allows a more liberal standard
and it appears that the state wishes to extend its
jurisdictional power to the full limits allowed by due process.
That Illinois intends its jurisdictional power to extend as
far as due process permits is evident from an examination of
judicial and legislative pronouncements. Historically,
Illinois has attempted to exercise its jurisdiction
coextensively with due process. Booz v. Texas & S.P.R.R.,
supra. Jurisdiction was traditionally predicated on whether
the nonresident was "doing business" within the state. It did
not matter that the activities within the state were unrelated
to the cause of action so long as the activities were
continuous and substantial.
With the advent of International Shoe and its progeny,
particularly McGee, due process as a jurisdictional restraint
was expanded to allow the exercise of in personam jurisdiction
over persons engaged in isolated acts within the forum state if
the cause of action arose out of those acts. It was this new
area of isolated activities, not covered by prior
interpretations of due process, that section 17 of the Illinois
Civil Practice Act was designed to codify. This attempt to fill
the newly created gap between the old outer limits of due
process grounded on continuous, systematic activities and the
new expanded limits which included solitary acts stimulated the
now oft-quoted statement of the Illinois Supreme Court in
Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
Sections 16 and 17 of the Civil Practice Act
reflect a conscious purpose to assert
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the
extent permitted by the due-process clause. 143
N.E.2d at 679.
In conjunction with the singular activities tests set forth
in Section 17, it is clear that Illinois intended to retain
the multiple activities test which allowed in personam
jurisdiction over nonresidents in suits unrelated to Illinois
activities. Hertz Corp. v. Taylor, supra. Thus, Illinois has
confirmed that it wishes to exercise all possible bases of
jurisdiction which are consistent with the due process