The opinion of the court was delivered by: Campbell, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff Johns-Manville Sales Corporation predicates
jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. (28 U.S.C.A. § 1332)
Plaintiff Martin-Marietta Corporation makes a similar
jurisdictional claim, however, in specifically alleging damages
Martin-Marietta claims less ($3,298.45) than the required
jurisdictional amount — i.e. "* * * the sum or value of
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs * * *". (28 U.S.C.A. §
Martin-Marietta, by brief, urge the applicability of the
"ancillary jurisdiction" doctrine. Hurn v. Oursler,
289 U.S. 238, 53 S.Ct. 586, 77 L.Ed. 1148. Briefly restated
Martin-Marietta first argues the appropriateness of its
joinder as party plaintiff pursuant to Rule 20 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. This argument is well founded in
that plaintiff's claims concern common questions of law and
fact "* * * arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences * * *". (Rule 20(a))
From this premise the ancillary jurisdiction conclusion is
This is not a typical ancillary jurisdiction situation. We
do not have a party-plaintiff whose interest is affected by
the court's control of property. Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450,
65 U.S. 450, 16 L.Ed. 749. Plaintiff, Martin-Marietta, is not
necessary to permit the court to effectuate any judgment it
may enter herein. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble,
255 U.S. 356, 41 S.Ct. 338, 65 L.Ed. 673. Nor do we have the same
counterclaim factual situation as was present in Moore v. New
York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 46 S.Ct. 367, 70 L.Ed.
A good argument, addressed to efficient judicial
administration, could be made that in situations such as this
where one plaintiff satisfies the jurisdictional requirement
a party otherwise joinable should not be required to institute
an independent suit in the state courts. (See: The Federal
Jurisdictional Amount Requirement and Joinder of Parties Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1952, 27 Ind.L.J. 199).
This is the same argument and rationale which led to and is
the basis of the ancillary
jurisdiction decisions. See: United Mine Workers of America v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218; Hurn v.
Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 53 S.Ct. 586; Clark v. Paul Gray Inc.,
306 U.S. 583, 59 S.Ct. 744, 83 L.Ed. 1001.
To a limited extent this argument has been accepted: Orn v.
Universal Automobile Association of Indiana, D.C., 198 F. Supp. 377,
where the court found jurisdiction in the removal
statute, § 1441(c); Raybould v. Mancini-Fattore Co., D.C.,
186 F. Supp. 235, where a single plaintiff suing in a different
capacity aggregated for purposes of satisfying the
jurisdictional amount his claims against a single defendant.
Admittedly these cases do not decide the present issue. They
do, however, lend support to the efficient judicial
The weight of authority appears to be to the contrary, most
courts holding that although joinder of party-plaintiffs might
well be proper under the Rules of Civil Procedure, such a
joinder does not per se satisfy statutory jurisdictional
requirements. Hackner v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 2
Cir., 117 F.2d 95, cert. den. 313 U.S. 559, 61 S.Ct. 835, 85
L.Ed. 1520; Aetna Insurance Co. v. Chicago R.I. and P.R. Co.,
10 Cir., 229 F.2d 584; Jewell v. Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance
Co., 5 Cir., 290 F.2d 11; Diana v. Canada Dry Corp., D.C.,
189 F. Supp. 280; Diepen v. Fernow, D.C., 1 F.R.D. 378.
Joinder, governed by the Civil Rules, must necessarily be
distinguished from statutory jurisdictional requirements. It
does not follow that where joinder is proper ancillary
jurisdiction necessarily attaches. Further, it is well settled
that multipe plaintiffs cannot aggregate damage claims to
satisfy the jurisdictional amount. Thomson v. Gaskill,
315 U.S. 442, 62 S.Ct. 673, 86 L.Ed. 951.
However, this is not an aggregation situation. One plaintiff
(Johns-Manville Sales Corporation) satisfactorily pleads
federal jurisdiction without reference to its co-plaintiff.
Were the court to dismiss the remaining co-plaintiff's
claim, the co-plaintiff would be relegated to the state court.
Separate trials in separate courts involving common questions
of law and fact arising out of the same transaction and
directed against the same defendant would result. Such a
result runs contrary to the judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to litigants rationale supporting ancillary
jurisdiction decisions. On the other hand, neither the federal
jurisdictional statutes nor the prohibition against
aggregating of amounts claimed is vitiated by permitting a
properly joined co-plaintiff to remain in federal court.
Jurisdiction in such situations does not come from the joinder
Rules, but rather, as is the theory in ancillary jurisdiction
cases, from the fact that a plaintiff is, without the
necessity of joinder, properly before the court. The
jurisdictional requirements having been met by one plaintiff,
those properly joined should be permitted to litigate their
claims in the same action.
The reasons and underlying considerations behind the
jurisdictional amount requirement further indicate a
resolution of this issue in favor of permitting the joined
plaintiff's claim to remain along with the claim of the
plaintiff over whom the court's jurisdiction clearly attaches.
The jurisdictional amount requirement, as most limitations on
federal jurisdiction, was intended to reduce the burden on
federal courts and to avoid further encroachments on state
courts. These purposes are in no way disserved by retaining
the additional plaintiff in this case. This court must try
this case in its entirety, with or without the presence of the
additional plaintiff. Inclusion of the additional plaintiff's
claim could in no way substantially increase the burden of
this court in this case. Secondly, rather than being an
encroachment, the disposition of this claim would be a service
to the generally overburdened state court. The state
could would be relieved from trying the lesser of two
Basically law is common sense. Paraphrasing the late Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Edward Douglass
White, whenever a rule of law does not make common sense it
should not be followed. It is unthinkable under our present
advanced state of judicial administration to require the same
case be tried separately in two different courts. Duplicitous
expenses and an unjustifiable imposition on an already
overtaxed judicial system run contrary to ...