Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, County
Department, Chancery Division; the Hon. JOHN J. LUPE, Judge,
presiding. Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BURMAN DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.
Rehearing denied March 28, 1966.
This suit for a declaratory judgment concerns a dispute between the Illinois Bell Telephone Company and the Rosewood Corporation, the owner of a parcel of real estate in Chicago, as to which of the parties is obligated to pay the costs of removing telephone equipment from the property. The case turns on the question of whether Rosewood is bound by an agreement under which a prior owner of the property obligated itself to reimburse Bell for such expenses. It is the position of Rosewood that it is not so bound because that prior owner had registered the property under the Torrens Act, and there was no registration of the agreement either by the prior owner or by Bell. There is no issue as to any material fact, and both parties moved for summary judgment in the trial court. The motion of Rosewood was granted, and Bell appeals.
The roots of this controversy reach back over forty years. In 1922, Bell and the Commonwealth Edison Company jointly erected poles on the property. Written permission to do so was obtained at the time from the then owner of the property, and from the tenant. In 1923, the owner of the property registered it under the Torrens Act, but gave no notice of this fact either to Bell or to Commonwealth Edison. In 1925, Bell installed underground conduit across the property. In 1926, Bell and the then owner of the property entered into a written agreement which grants Bell "the right and easement to operate, maintain and renew its telephone equipment" on the property, and further provides as follows:
The said Illinois Bell Telephone Company hereby agrees that upon sixty (60) days' written notice, from the undersigned, its successors and assigns, it will rearrange or remove its equipment located and maintained as above set out; provided, only, that the undersigned, its successors and assigns, will compensate the said Illinois Bell Telephone Company upon demand at the completion of such rearrangement or removal, for such expenses as shall be incurred by the Illinois Bell Telephone Company in connection with such rearrangement or removal of said equipment.
This agreement was never registered in Torrens.
Subsequent to the agreement Rosewood acquired the property in question by deed which conveyed said lot together with six adjoining vacant lots and the Registrar of Titles issued its Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title dated September 25, 1962, showing fee simple title to said lot in plaintiff, subject only to taxes, building restrictions, etc., without notice of the existence and terms of the aforementioned agreement. In 1963, Rosewood wished to utilize the property for purposes of real estate development, and requested Bell to remove its equipment. Bell demanded payment of the costs of the removal in the amount of $3,445.43 under the terms of the agreement, but Rosewood denied that it was bound thereby. In anticipation of litigation of the issue, and to facilitate the use of the property by the owner, the parties entered into an escrow agreement pursuant to which Rosewood deposited the costs of removal and Bell removed the equipment immediately. A further provision of that 1963 escrow agreement read as follows:
7. Bell agrees that if upon termination of said proposed litigation by way of final judgment, order or decree entered in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, (or other court of general jurisdiction) it shall be found that Rosewood's title to said premises is not subject to any rights in Bell, then upon demand of Rosewood, Bell will promptly return to Rosewood said sum of $3445.43.
Rosewood brought this suit for a declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court of Cook County, and the summary judgment and this appeal followed.
Preliminarily, we are faced with a motion by Rosewood filed in this court to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that Bell waived its rights to appeal by the above language contained in the 1963 escrow agreement. The motion was taken with the case.
In support thereof, Rosewood argues it is settled law that parties to litigation may, in advance thereof, waive rights of appeal, waive errors or otherwise give up rights of appeal from a lower court. Rosewood further argues that the decision of the Circuit Court was a final judgment; that it was the intent of the parties that Bell would not appeal a final judgment of the Circuit Court against them; and that if the clause of the escrow agreement is construed otherwise, it is without any significance whatever. Bell argues that if, under Illinois law, a party can waive his right to appeal at all, it must be done by clear and unequivocal language so providing. It is suggested that the words, "final judgment" are susceptible to a variety of interpretations, and that such language is not sufficiently clear and unequivocal to justify depriving a party of his right to appeal. It is further argued that such a construction of the agreement would be unfair, because Rosewood is not similarly prohibited from appealing an adverse decision.
In our view, the use of the words "final judgment" in this agreement was intended to mean the final adjudication of the rights of the parties, which would include the exercise or expiration of the right to appeal. If a waiver of the right to appeal had been intended, the parties could have explicitly so provided; or they could have provided that Bell would pay over that amount upon the entry of "judgment" in the Circuit Court, as opposed to "final judgment." The word "final" in the agreement must have been intended to have some effect. If the parties had intended to prohibit Bell's right of appeal, they could have used language similar to that used in the agreement in the Michigan case cited by Rosewood, Hoste v. Dalton, 137 Mich. 522, 100 N.W. 750, which was: "If any question should hereafter arise between the parties hereto as to the construction and enforcement of this agreement, the same shall be submitted for decision to this court [the agreement was entitled in the circuit court for the county of Wayne] and its decision shall be final." 100 NW at 751. (Emphasis added.) We conclude that Bell did not waive its rights of appeal by virtue of the language of the escrow agreement.
Turning to the merits, we find that section 40 of the Torrens Act (Ill Rev Stats c 30, § 84 (1963)) provides in relevant part as follows:
The registered owner of any estate or interest in land brought under this Act shall, notwithstanding any rules of the common law to the contrary except in cases of fraud to which he is party, or of the person through whom he claims without valuable consideration paid in good faith, hold the same subject to the charges hereinabove set forth [not here material] and also only to such estate, mortgages, liens, charges and ...