case that there resided in the Harrison-Halsted tract two
minority groups, Negroes and Mexicans, "against whom there is,
at the present time, in Chicago, extensive discrimination in
housing; that the University site project will force these
people out of the area. This loss in minority group housing is
not being replaced elsewhere in the community." There was also
an allegation that one portion "constituted the least
deteriorated portion * * * of the area" and "most of the
remaining part is occupied by perfectly sound residential
structures." Jurisdiction in the Harrison-Halsted case was
also predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and Section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 1009). They complained
of being deprived of their property without due process of law
and they had a standing to raise the questions of federal law.
The Court of Appeals in the Harrison-Halsted case
(310 F.2d 99) made these very pertinent observations at 103-106:
"* * * [I]n spite of the outraged feelings of many people who
have interests in this area, we have in mind that questions
arising from the taking of property by condemnation for
state purposes, are ordinarily matters for determination by
the state courts. The plaintiffs in this case have sought
relief in a federal court. Whether they may properly do so
depends principally on whether they have a standing to sue
and whether a substantial federal question is involved.
"We think it is well settled that in a private suit in a
federal court, where it is claimed that a substantial federal
question is involved, it must clearly appear that defendant's
acts constituted the invasion of plaintiffs' private legal
rights. [Citing cases.] * * *
"The federal Housing Act of 1949 is a subsidy statute which
provides for federal grants of aid to local governmental
units. * * * It is obvious that none of the plaintiffs is or
was a party to the subsidy contract.
"When a subsidy application is approved by the Administrator
of the HHFA, contracts are entered into by the Agency and the
local governmental body, here, the Chicago Land Clearance
Commission. Congress did provide certain standards to guide
the Administrator in the exercise of his discretion. But,
such provisions and regulations thereunder do not confer
legal rights upon plaintiffs, as individuals, separate from
their position as members of the general public.
"The Housing Act of 1949 contains no provision for a
hearing before the HHFA. It contains no provision for a
judicial review. * *
"Plaintiffs argue that although the Housing Act says nothing
about a judicial review, Section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act * * does so provide."
"Plaintiffs, in effect, argue that Section 10(a) and (c)
confers standing upon any one who suffers economic injury as
a result of agency action regardless of whether that
person's private legal rights are violated. We do not think
that this is a permissible interpretation."
"Other courts, without specific discussion of the
Administrative Procedure Act, have dismissed complaints on
the ground the plaintiffs had shown no injury to their
private rights. * * *
"We hold plaintiffs herein do not have a right of judicial
review of the Agency action herein, pursuant to Section 10 of
the Administrative Procedure Act.
"Plaintiffs * * * argued that their interests and the
interests of the community would be better served were the
area to be redeveloped
for residental and commercial use.
"The use to which plaintiffs desired the land to be put is
undeniably a lawful public use. But, using the area acquired
as a site for the * * University * * * is likewise a lawful
public use. Courts have consistently denied the standing of
citizens to challenge the choice made by public authorities
between different and competing public uses. The legislature
* * * rather than `interested' citizens, is the guardian of
the public needs to be served by social legislation. [Citing
"Perhaps the leading case on this point is Berman et al. v.
Parker et al., 348 U.S. 26. [75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27]. * * *
In a District of Columbia slum clearance program, plaintiffs
were the owners of a department store in the area affected.
Plaintiffs claimed their property was in good condition and
should not be designated as slum property. * *
"The Supreme Court said: * * `We do not sit to determine
whether a particular housing project is or is not desirable.'
"* * * `The role of the judiciary in determining whether that
power [of eminent domain] is being exercised for a public
purpose is an extremely narrow one.'"
"On the basis of these and other authorities none of the
plaintiffs have any private legal or vested interest in the
type of public use redevelopment to be conducted in the area
after the land has been acquired and the slums have been
cleared. We so hold."
"* * * [W]e consider the motion of HHFA for dismissal of the
suit against it on the ground that it is a nonsuable agency
of the United States. We think this view is sound. This
agency is an agency of the executive branch of the United
States government. * * * `It has long been established that
such agencies are not truly juridical persons but are
strictly representatives of the government, who may not be
sued in evasion of sovereign immunity.'
"We have no right or justification to speculate that the
state courts of Illinois will not protect any rights the
plaintiffs may have. The United States Supreme Court and
other federal courts have repeatedly refused to entertain
suits in which plaintiffs' personal or private legal rights
have not been infringed and could be infringed only by an
improper judgment in a condemnation proceeding. * * *"
The Court of Appeals cited the Shapiro v. Chicago Land
Clearance Commission case (19 Ill. App.2d 461, 464-465,