The opinion of the court was delivered by: Juergens, District Judge.
William Lusk brings this action pro se, wherein, generally
stated, he alleges that the action is of a civil nature, exceeds
the sum of $10,000.00, and is founded on the existence of a
federal question. He asserts that he contracted crippling
from malnutrition and/or crowded negligent confinement from May
20, 1964 to May 30, 1964 at Cook County Jail, Chicago, Illinois,
and October 30, 1964 to November 13, 1964 in the Du Page County
Jail; that such confinement was unnecessary as the government had
not exhausted all legal remedies available to them. Plaintiff
contends that he was unjustly persecuted, apparently basing this
statement on the levy of a tax lien. He asserts that United
States Attorney Robert Maloney through fraud or condition of mind
or deceit introduced certain documents which induced the court to
grant summary judgment. He does not allege by what acts or
actions he seeks to hold liable defendants Edward V. Hanrahan or
Thomas Certoa, a/k/a Thomas Curoa.
Defendants have filed their motion to dismiss the complaint and
cause of action for the reasons that the Court lacks jurisdiction
over the subject matter; that the Court lacks jurisdiction over
the persons of the defendants; and that the complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In the heading of the complaint, following the names of the
individuals, there appears the following: "United States
Attorneys." If it is upon actions taken by the individuals
operating in the course of their duties for the United States
Government, this cause of action must fail.
Any impropriety committed by a prosecuting attorney that
interferes with an accused's constitutional right to a fair and
impartial trial may be remedied in the criminal proceeding
against the accused. Although the official may be immune to civil
tort liability, he may nevertheless be subject to discipline and
professional censure where warranted. Sauber v. Gliedman,
283 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1960).
The law of privilege as a defense by officers of government to
civil damage suits for defamation and kindred torts has in large
part been of judicial making, although the Constitution grants an
absolute privilege to members of both Houses of Congress in
respect to any speech, debate, vote, report, or action done in
session. The Supreme Court of the United States early held that
judges of courts of superior or general authority are absolutely
privileged as respects civil suits to recover for actions taken
by them in the exercise of their judicial functions, irrespective
of the motives with which those acts are alleged to have been
performed, and a like immunity extends to other officers of
government whose duties are related to the judicial process. Barr
v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959).
It is obvious, if plaintiff here seeks to hold the defendants
liable for actions performed during the course of their duties
with the United States Government, his cause of action must fall
because of the doctrine of immunity.
Aside from the question of immunity, the Court is unable to
determine the cause of action plaintiff attempts to allege.
Notwithstanding the liberality of the modern Federal Rules of
pleading, the Court is unable to find any cause of action set
forth in the complaint against any of the named defendants.
Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint and cause of action
will be granted.
Plaintiff files his motion for partial release of funds and his
motion requesting that place of hearing in this matter be
transferred to Benton, Illinois. Since the complaint and cause of
action will be dismissed, it is unnecessary that the Court rule
on plaintiff's motion for partial release of funds or his motion
It is, therefore, the order of this Court that the complaint
and cause of action be and the same are hereby dismissed.
© 1992-2003 VersusLaw ...