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City of Waukegan v. Drobnick





APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Lake County; the Hon. MINARD HULSE, Judge, presiding.


This is an appeal by certain objecting property owners from an order of the former county court of Lake County affirming a report and assessment roll filed by the city of Waukegan.

Although the defendants-objectors have appealed directly to this court, their brief contains no statement of the ground relied upon to give this court jurisdiction as required by Supreme Court Rule 39. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 110, par. 101.39.) The city of Waukegan has moved to transfer this case to the Appellate Court for the Second District for the reason that no grounds exist for direct appeal to this court. Defendants have suggested that they have a statutory right of direct appeal. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 24, par. 9-2-140.) We have taken the motion with the case, and the jurisdictional question must be determined at the outset.

The city of Waukegan filed a petition in August, 1961, in the former county court of Lake County to levy a special assessment in accordance with a city ordinance authorizing certain improvements. These defendants-appellants, owners of certain of the property sought to be assessed, filed objections to the petition. The cause was then tried before a jury which returned a verdict finding that the properties of the objectors were not assessed more than they would be benefited nor more than their proportionate share of the cost of the improvement. Judgment was entered on this verdict.

The legislature has provided for direct appeals from final judgments in special assessment proceedings since 1874. The original provision for appeals from special assessment proceedings as amended was contained in section 123 of the County Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, chap. 37, par. 295,) which was repealed by the legislature in 1963. In 1897 a procedure for direct appeal in such proceedings was incorporated in the Local Improvement Act. The present provision was enacted in 1961 as section 9-2-140 of the Local Improvement Article of the Municipal Code. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 24, par. 9-2-140.

We must first consider the effect of the Judicial Amendment effective January 1, 1964. As so amended article VI, section 5, of the Illinois constitution provides in part as follows:

"Appeals from the final judgments of circuit courts shall lie directly to the Supreme Court as a matter of right only (a) in cases involving revenue, (b) in cases involving a question arising under the Constitution of the United States or of this State, (c) in cases of habeas corpus, and (d) by the defendant from sentence in capital cases. Subject to law hereafter enacted, the Supreme Court has authority to provide by rule for appeal in other cases from the circuit courts directly to the Supreme Court."

Although the final order in this case was entered and notice of appeal was filed in the trial court prior to January 1, 1964, the appeal was not presented to us for decision until after the effective date of the Judicial Amendment. Therefore, amended article VI, section 5, governs the exercise of our jurisdiction in this case.

We consider that the amendment to the constitution limits our direct appellate jurisdiction to the class of cases set forth therein and to such other cases as we may provide for by rule. One of the primary purposes of this amendment was to repeal all inconsistent statutes providing for direct appeals to this court. (First National Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Evanston, 30 Ill.2d 479, 481.) We feel it has done so, and consequently section 9-2-140 of the Municipal Code now affords no right of direct appeal.

Since appeals from this type of proceeding have been so long governed by statute, this court has not been called upon to decide if such petitions present cases involving the revenue. It is true that this court has taken direct appellate jurisdiction of actions to enjoin the collection or extension of special assessments, (Lackey v. Pulaski Drainage District, 4 Ill.2d 72; Mushbaugh v. Village of East Peoria, 260 Ill. 27; Wilson v. Marion County, 205 Ill. 580; People ex rel. Gridley v. Hendee, 199 Ill. 55), and has held that the word "revenue" embraces special assessments. Potwin v. Johnson, 106 Ill. 532.

Nevertheless, this court has repeatedly stated that to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction on direct appeal because the cause relates to revenue, it must relate directly thereto and not incidentally or remotely. People v. Smith, 413 Ill. 382; In re Estate of Kaindl, 411 Ill. 608.

With the abolition of the statutory right of appeal, and the constitutional revision of our entire system of appellate jurisdiction it is incumbent upon us to re-examine the nature of the relationship between special assessment proceedings and the revenue.

A special assessment levied under the Local Improvement Act clearly does not affect the general revenue of either the State or any other taxing body. It has been said that special assessments differ from general taxes, "since they are not a tax at all in the constitutional sense or as taxes are ...

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