but it appears from the face of the complaint that the recital is
inaccurate. In neither count is there any allegation that
plaintiff has suffered, or that the other bondholders whom he
represents in Count III have suffered, any pecuniary loss
whatsoever from the action of defendant of which complaint is
made. In that regard, the complaint alleges only that the
plaintiff bondholders are deprived, and will be deprived, of a
degree of security which otherwise they would have had surplus
funds not been transferred to the City Treasurer. There is absent
any allegation that bonds or the interest coupons thereof have
not been paid when the same became due and payable. On the
contrary, the fair implication of the complaint is that all have
A fair appraisal of the complaint leads to the conclusion that
there is no amount in controversy between plaintiff and the
plaintiff class and this defendant. If, in fact, the transfer of
toll revenue to the City Treasurer is a violation of the federal
statutes, plaintiff's interest in that fact differs not one iota
from the interest of the public generally, namely, the common
desire that the laws of the land be respected. The requirements
of Section 1331 for federal jurisdiction of the subject matter
are not satisfied.
Plaintiff earnestly contends that his cause of action arises
under an act of Congress regulating commerce and jurisdiction
lies under Section 1337 of the Code.*fn4 I reject that
contention. The mere fact that interstate travel and
transportation is involved incidentally and that the acts of
defendant of which complaint is made may have some effect upon
interstate commerce is not sufficient basis for federal
jurisdiction under Section 1337. Toledo, P. & W.R. Co. v.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, etc., 7 Cir., 132 F.2d 265,
reversed on other grounds 321 U.S. 50, 64 S.Ct. 413, 88 L.Ed.
534; Sharp v. Barnhart, 7 Cir., 117 F.2d 604. To give rise to
federal jurisdiction under Section 1337, a cause of action must
concern the validity, enforcement or construction of an act
regulating commerce, Toledo, P. & W.R. Co. v. Brotherhood, of
Railroad Trainmen, etc., supra; Adams v. Brotherhood, 10 Cir.,
262 F.2d 835, and must involve rights of the complaining party
created by Act of Congress which are abridged or denied by
defendant's actions. Cf., e.g., Felter v. Southern Pacific Co.,
359 U.S. 326, 79 S.Ct. 847, 3 L.Ed.2d 854; A.F.L. v. Watson,
327 U.S. 582, 66 S.Ct. 761, 90 L.Ed. 873.
Public Law 446, as amended, is an enabling act permitting and
authorizing defendant to construct a bridge over the navigable
waters of the Mississippi River and to operate the bridge so
constructed pursuant to that grant of permission and authority.
Regulation of commerce is involved only incidentally, and only in
the sense that the existence or non-existence of the bridge, and
the manner of its operation, does effect the flow of commerce. We
are not here concerned with the right of the United States, or an
appropriate agency thereof, to enforce the act, but only with the
question whether the act gives a right to private persons to seek
federal court aid to the same end. I conclude that no such
private right arises under the Act or under the general bridge
statute*fn5 upon which plaintiff relies. That conclusion is
supported by the cases of Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm.
v. Miller, D.C.E.D.Pa., 147 F. Supp. 270, and Greater Hartford
Free Bridge Ass'n v. Greater Hartford Bridge Authority,
D.C.D.Conn., 172 F. Supp. 244, affirmed 2 Cir., 265 F.2d 656, and,
by analogy, by the decision in Borah v. White County Bridge
Comm., 7 Cir., 199 F.2d 213.
For the foregoing reasons defendant's motion to dismiss is
allowed, and it is ordered that the complaint, and each count
thereof, be and the same is dismissed.