be invoked by personal service of summons outside Illinois upon:
A. A publishing corporation foreign to the State of Illinois,
when said corporation:
(1) has no business contact with and engages in no business
activities within the State, either by agent or otherwise, except
that a tiny percentage of copies of its newspaper is daily
distributed to mail subscribers and/or independent news-dealers
located within the State (issue raised as to Scripps-Howard
(2) engages in selling activities within the State through its
agents and employees, and retains title to books distributed to
Illinois bookdealers on consignment, but has no other business
contact with and engages in no other business activities within
the State (issue raised as to defendant Harper & Brothers).
B. A citizen and resident of another state, when such
individual has no contact with and engages in no activities
within the State of Illinois, other than through the Illinois
(1) newspapers for which, as an employee, he has editorial or
reporting responsibilities (issue raised as to Scripps-Howard
(2) a book written by him but published and distributed by an
independent publishing corporation (issue raised as to defendants
Schlesinger and Trombley).
II. Does the Illinois one-year statute of limitations
applicable to libel actions operate to bar an action filed on
December 30, 1957, concerning an alleged libel first distributed
to the general public on October 20, 1954, from without Illinois,
but under no circumstances distributed after October, 1956 (issue
raised by Trombley defendants).
III. May a plaintiff recover for the defamation of his father,
whose name he bears (issue raised by Schlesinger and Trombley
defendants as to Counts 5 and 6 of the complaint).
IV. Can the plaintiff be defamed, or a libel be directed at
him, by a writing which does not name him by his usual name,
Samuel Insull, Jr. (issue raised by Schlesinger and Trombley
defendants as to Counts 2 and 3).
V. Should the claims asserted against the Schlesinger
defendants be severed and a separate trial ordered as to them.
Every legal issue which arises in the trial of a case in this
Court is, in a proper sense, determinable according to Federal
law. With respect to many such issues, however, Federal law
refers us to that of the state which is the situs of the dispute
or which comprehends this district. 28 U.S.C.A. (1950) § 1652;
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 1938, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82
L.Ed. 1188; Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 1941,
313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477; Palmer v. Hoffman, 1943,
318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645, rehearing denied
318 U.S. 800, 63 S.Ct. 757, 87 L.Ed. 1163; Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 1945, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079, rehearing
and modification denied 326 U.S. 806, 66 S.Ct. 7, 90 L.Ed. 491;
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 1949, 337 U.S. 535, 69 S.Ct.
1235, 93 L.Ed. 1524; DeSylva v. Ballentine, 1956, 351 U.S. 570,
76 S.Ct. 974, 100 L.Ed. 1415, rehearing denied 352 U.S. 859, 77
S.Ct. 22, 1 L.Ed.2d 69. To this extent, the Court is constantly
presented with questions involving choice of law and must apply
concepts which are in their essence conflicts of law rules. The
most generally applicable of these concepts is that which refers
this Court, at least in diversity cases removed from the State,
to the law of Illinois to determine, on the threshold, whether it
has jurisdiction over the person of a defendant.*fn11 See
Bee Machine Co., Inc., 1943, 319 U.S. 448, 63 S.Ct. 1146, 87
L.Ed. 1509, rehearing denied 320 U.S. 809, 64 S.Ct. 27, 88 L.Ed.
489; Roberts v. Evans Case Co., 7 Cir., 1955, 218 F.2d 893;
Canvas Fabricators, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 7 Cir.,
1952, 199 F.2d 485; Block v. Block, 7 Cir., 1952, 196 F.2d 930;
Consolidated Cosmetics v. D-A Pub. Co., Inc., 7 Cir., 1951,
186 F.2d 906; Olshansky v. Thyer Mfg. Corp., D.C.N.D. Ill., 1952, 13
F.R.D. 227. See, also, Rule 4(d)(7), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. (1950). Cf. Rensing v. Turner Aviation
Corp., D.C.N.D. Ill. 1958, 166 F. Supp. 790, 793.
The general principle that a foreign corporation "doing
business" within a state is, after proper service, subject to the
jurisdiction of the state courts, at least as to causes of action
arising out of such business, is well established in the law of
Illinois. Hertz Corp. v. Taylor, 1959, 15 Ill.2d 552,
155 N.E.2d 610; G.W. Bull & Co. v. Boston & M.R.R., 1931, 344 Ill. 11,
175 N.E. 837; Craig v. Sullivan Machinery Co., 1931, 344 Ill. 334,
176 N.E. 353; American Hide & Leather Co. v. Southern Ry. Co.,
1923, 310 Ill. 524, 142 N.E. 200; Pembleton v. Illinois
Commercial Men's Ass'n, 1919, 289 Ill. 99, 124 N.E. 355,
certiorari granted 251 U.S. 549, 40 S.Ct. 178, 64 L.Ed. 409,
certiorari dismissed 253 U.S. 499, 40 S.Ct. 483, 64 L.Ed. 1032;
Booz v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 1911, 250 Ill. 376, 95 N.E. 460.
See Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 7 Cir., 1936,
81 F.2d 346; 20 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 1922-1923. The decisions holding
that a publishing corporation is not "doing business" within a
state simply because its periodicals are sold in the state are
legion. Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 1957,
245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445; Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., Inc., 1945,
63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133; Deighan v. Beverage Retailer Weekly
& Trade Newspaper Corp., 1940, 16 A.2d 612, 18 N.J.Misc. 705;
Schmidt v. Esquire, Inc., 7 Cir., 1954, 210 F.2d 908, 914-916,
certiorari denied Schmidt v. Crowell-Collier Pub. Co.,
348 U.S. 819, 75 S.Ct. 31, 99 L.Ed. 646; Street & Smith Publications, Inc.
v. Spikes, 5 Cir., 1941, 120 F.2d 895, certiorari denied
314 U.S. 653, 62 S.Ct. 102, 86 L.Ed. 524; Cannon v. Time, Inc., 4 Cir.,
1940, 115 F.2d 423; Whitaker v. MacFadden Publications, Inc.,
1939, 70 App.D.C. 165, 105 F.2d 44; Brewster v. Boston
Herald-Traveler Corp., D.C.Me. 1956, 141 F. Supp. 760; Moorhead v.
Curtis Publishing Co., D.C.W.D.Ky. 1942, 43 F. Supp. 67.
In Cannon v. Time, Inc., supra, the defendant printed its
publications in Illinois and shipped them by carrier to an
independent contractor in Virginia, who, in turn, sold the
magazines to the ultimate consumer. Unlike the Scripps-Howard
corporate defendants, however, the contractor also solicited and
collected subscriptions for the publisher. Despite this
meaningful circumstance, the court squarely held that the
defendant Illinois publisher was not "doing business" in
"It is conceded that the defendants were not
present doing business within the state by reason of
the sale of magazines at the newsstands of the News
Company (see Whitaker v. MacFadden Publications, 70
App.D.C. 165, 105 F.2d 44); and we do not think that
presence and doing of business can be predicated on
the acceptance of and collection for subscriptions
upon which reliance is placed. * * *" 115 F.2d at