The opinion of the court was delivered by: Campbell, District Judge.
Plaintiff, who was born January 12, 1885, filed application
with the Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, Social
Security Administration, Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, for "old-age insurance benefits" on April 25, 1950
under Section 202(a) of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 402(a)), and was
determined to be "entitled" to such monthly payments. On August
23, 1955, plaintiff alleging he had earned only $1,192,
returned his check for the month of July 1955, stating that he
was "now employed" and requesting that no further checks be
mailed to him until further notice. He later returned his
August check for the same reason. His checks were therefore
withheld for the remainder of the year 1955. In March, 1956,
plaintiff filed with the Bureau his "Annual Report of Earnings"
for 1955 in which he stated that his total earnings in the year
had been more than $2,080. In his annual report, plaintiff also
stated that he did not expect his total earnings for the coming
year to exceed $1,200. On the basis of his annual report,
plaintiff's benefits were withheld for the first 6 months in
1956 to offset the overpayment in 1955. Since plaintiff
reported he would not have net earnings in excess of $1,200 in
1956, payments were resumed for the last half of 1956.
As before, plaintiff returned his check for July, 1956 and
August, 1956, and further payments were withheld. In February,
1957, plaintiff filed his annual report for 1956 stating that
his earnings had been more than $2,080.
Being dissatisfied with the Bureau's (Bureau of Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance, Social Security Administration)
determination that he had been overpaid for the first 6 months
of 1955 and that recovery should not be waived, plaintiff
requested a hearing before a referee of the Social Security
Administration, which hearing was held at Chicago, Illinois, on
July 11, 1957, resulting in a decision dated December 9, 1957,
in which the referee agreed with the determination of the
Bureau and found that plaintiff was overpaid $531 for the first
half of 1955, and that recovery was proper and should not be
waived. On February 26, 1958, the Appeals Council denied
plaintiff's request for review. Subsequently, he brought this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
It was and is plaintiff's contention that the Bureau misapplied
the "deductions" provisions of the Act. He argues that he has a
right to the benefits which were paid him in 1955 up to the
time his earnings had reached $1,200, and further, that he has
a right to benefits, which the bureau has withheld, for the
first half of 1956 on the same basis. Plaintiff's view as to
the proper application of the "deductions" provisions of the
Act, together with the question of whether he qualified for a
"waiver" of recovery of the overpayment which was made him in
the first half of 1955 (531.00), form the only issues presented
in this case.
Section 405(g) of the Act vests the Court with "* * * power to
enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a
rehearing". It also provides that "the findings of the
Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive." In Hobby v. Hodges, 10 Cir.,
215 F.2d 754, the rather confused procedure under the Act as well as the
jurisdiction of the courts were summarized as follows at page
757:
"The Act provides that the Administrator (now Secretary)
shall make findings of fact and decisions as to rights of any
individual applying for benefits. Whenever any such
individual makes a showing that his
or her rights may be prejudiced by a decision, then a hearing
shall be had with respect to such decision and the
Administrator may affirm, modify or reverse the decision
based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing. The
Administrator on his own motion may hold such hearings,
conduct investigations and other proceedings as he may deem
necessary or proper for the administration of the Act.
42 U.S.C. § 405 (b). When a decision becomes final after a
hearing, any individual who was a party to the hearing, may
obtain a review of the decision by commencing a civil action
in the proper United States District Court within sixty days
after the mailing to him of the notice of the decision. The
court has the power to enter, upon the pleadings and the
transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or
reversing the decision of the Administrator with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the
Administrator are conclusive upon the court as to any fact if
supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The
Act thus places the initial burden upon the Administrator to
make a decision as to claims by individuals from the
application alone. If the individual is dissatisfied with the
decision, a hearing may be demanded at which evidence is
taken for the purpose of determining the correctness of the
decision. It is only after the hearing that the individual
may obtain a court review. The review is not a trial de novo
but is limited to the pleadings and the transcript of the
proceedings at the hearing. The district court has
jurisdiction only to review the record. The statute does not
give the district court power to treat the complaint as a
mandamus action against the Administrator or to hold a
hearing and determine the merits of the claim. The
determination of claims is solely a function of the
Administrator."
At page 759, the court concludes:
"When a claimant makes an application, the Act provides a
detailed and comprehensive procedure for determining the
benefits due. It was the evident purpose of Congress that
this determination was to be the function of the Secretary
and not the courts * * *"
Thus, in this decision and many others, the plain language of
the statute has been interpreted to limit the jurisdiction of
the court to the single issue of whether the findings
complained of were supported by substantial evidence. Teder v.
Hobby, 7 Cir., 230 F.2d 385; United States v. Lalone, 9 Cir.,
152 F.2d 43; Walker v. Altmeyer, 2 Cir., 137 F.2d 531. Also see
Title 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e).
Title 42 U.S.C. § 403(b)(1) insofar as pertinent provides as
follows:
"(b) Deductions, in such amounts and at such time or times as
the Secretary shall determine, shall be made from any payment
or payments under this Title to which an individual is
entitled, until the total of such deductions equals such
individual's benefit or benefits * * * for any month —
(1) in which such individual is under the age of seventy-two
and for which month he is charged with any earnings under the
provisions of subsection (e) of this section * * *."
Section 403(e) insofar as pertinent provides as follows:
"(e) For the purposes of subsection (b) and (c) of this
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