The affidavit filed by Standard Chair Company sets forth the
same set of facts except that it is located in Union City,
Pennsylvania. Standard has an agreement with William Kauss which
is the same as that which Fancher Furniture Company has with
Service of summons upon Fancher Furniture Company and Standard
Chair Company was made on September 21, 1956, by serving George
Hildreth and William Kauss and again on January 10, 1957, by
serving C.L. Erickson, who was visiting Chicago, as president and
secretary of the two corporations.
It is unnecessary here to decide whether service upon defendant
corporations was effected by delivering copies of the summons to
George Hildreth and William Kauss. It is clear that the
subsequent delivery of the summons to C.L. Erickson was
"delivery * * * to an officer" of the defendant corporations
within the meaning of Rule 4(d)(3) Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.
Defendant corporations contend, however, that this court does
not have jurisdiction over their corporate "persons" because they
are not "doing business" within this State. They contend that, in
a diversity case, the question of personal jurisdiction of this
court must be resolved by reference to the law of this State.
While the lower Federal courts have not been in agreement on this
point (see Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, D.C., 132 F. Supp. 838), the
Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, has consistently held that
State law is applicable to this issue in such cases. Riverbank
Laboratories v. Hardwood Products Corp., 220 F.2d 465, 467;
Roberts v. Evans Case Co., 218 F.2d 893. It is true that its
decision in Riverbank Laboratories was reversed by the Supreme
Court, 350 U.S. 1003, 76 S.Ct. 648, 100 L.Ed. 866, saying "The
Court is of the opinion that the District Court correctly found
there was proper service * * *."
I do not think that, by this memorandum decision, the Supreme
Court can be taken to have overruled or distinguished Angel v.
Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 67 S.Ct. 657, 91 L.Ed. 832, and Woods
v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 69 S.Ct. 1235, 93 L.Ed.
1524, which have hitherto been relied on for the view that State
law is applicable to the question of personal jurisdiction in
diversity cases (see contra K. Shapiro, Inc., v. New York Central
Railroad Co., D.C., 152 F. Supp. 722, 726).
In this case, however, the question of applicable law is
immaterial, for the jurisdiction of this court is sustained both
by Federal and State law. It is clearly sustained by Federal law,
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Com. of Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 70
S.Ct. 927, 94 L.Ed. 1154; Scholnik v. National Airlines, 6 Cir.,
219 F.2d 115; K. Shapiro, Inc., v. New York Central Railroad Co.,
D.C., 152 F. Supp. 722. Plaintiff's affidavit filed with this
Court discloses that defendant corporations have been engaged in
the solicitation of business in this State for over ten years and
that they maintain offices in Chicago, Illinois, for this
purpose, with telephone listings under their names.
Defendant corporations refer, on the question of Illinois law,
to Bull & Co. v. Boston & Maine R.R. Co., 344 Ill. 11,
175 N.E. 837; Booz v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 250 Ill. 376, 95 N.E. 460,
and the decisions of the courts of this circuit in Roberts v.
Evans Case Co., 7 Cir., 218 F.2d 893; Canvas Fabricators, Inc.,
v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 7 Cir., 199 F.2d 485; and
Olshansky v. Thyer Mfg. Corporation, D.C., 13 F.R.D. 227. Those
cases were all decided prior to the enactment of sections 16 and
17 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, Ill.Rev.Stat. 1957, Chap.
110 par. 16 and 17.
So far as material here, section 17 provides:
"(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or
resident of this State, who in person or through an
agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated,
thereby submits said person, and, if an individual,
his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this State as to any cause of action
arising from the doing of any of said acts:
"(a) The transaction of any business within this
"(b) The commission of a tortious act within this
"(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real
estate situated in this State;
"(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or
risk located within this State at the time of
There cannot be any doubt that it was the intention of the
drafters of this section to assert the jurisdiction of the State
of Illinois over non-resident defendants to the fullest extent
permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Article II, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution,
S.H.A. It is clear from subsection (b) of Section 17 that the
drafters were attempting to implement the "minimum contact"
theory of jurisdiction first enunciated in International Shoe Co.
v. State of Washington,