accident occurred within the "territorial limits" of Illinois
must be accepted.
That being the case, the Illinois statute is operative; and
service of federal process may be made in the manner there
prescribed (Vol. 3 Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure Page 438).
Objections to its constitutionality cannot be sustained. Service
in accordance with similar statutes providing substituted service
on non-resident motorists using the state's highways have
frequently been upheld (Hess v. Pawloski, 1926, 275 U.S. 352, 47
S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091; and cases cited at Vol. 3 Cyclopedia of
Federal Procedure pages 42607); and there is no reason to
distinguish a similar provision for those who use its waterways.
The Illinois statute does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
Defendant next points out that the Jones Act provides that
(Title 46 U.S.C.A. § 688) "Jurisdiction in such actions shall be
under the court of the district in which the defendant employer
resides or in which his principal office is located", and that it
neither resides nor has its principal office in Illinois. This is
a venue provision which may be waived (United States v. Hvoslef,
1915, 237 U.S. 1, 35 S.Ct. 459, 59 L.Ed. 813), and, under the
analogous law dealing with non-residential motorists, has been
waived by the defendant's use of the waterways of Illinois
(Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 6 Cir., 1953, 201 F.2d 582).
Defendant further objects that Count II, asking damages for
maintenance and cure, is justiciable only in admiralty and should
not be joined with Count I, which is a claim for damages under
the Jones Act. This is easily cured. After a trial on the
negligence issue, the claim for cure and maintenance will be
submitted to a court as an admiralty tribunal.
Defendant's motion to dismiss is overruled.
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