charter of the Club would control over the by-laws if an
inconsistency existed between the two, the first object
enumerated in the by-laws — "Good fellowship among its members" —
is such that the latitude given the Club under its charter would
be encompassed by this provision in the by-laws.
For the reasons stated, therefore, I hold that the North Shore
Sportsman's Club of Chicago is not a corporation organized
exclusively for charitable purposes.
Having reached this conclusion, any further inquiry into the
problem would be unnecessary. However, for purposes of
completeness, I feel compelled to express my reasons why the Club
has not been operated exclusively for charitable purposes.
Of the typical programs offered at the Club's monthly meetings
prior to 1951, two of the seven examples clearly depict no
charitable purpose. These would be the classes on fly tying and
rod building and secondly the films and movies taken by various
Club members while on African safaris showing African scenes and
hunting experiences in Africa. Of some of the other typical
programs, the classes on hunting-dog training and the expert and
safe use of firearms could be said to be of as much interest to
the individual Club member from his own personal standpoint as
they would be from a conservation standpoint. In any event, on
the showing made, I am not able to say that such programs were
designed and intended for a purely conservation, and thus
charitable, purpose. Nor am I able to say, in the absence of
competent authority to the contrary, that these classes could be
termed scientific or educational as these concepts are used in
Section 812(d). The remaining typical programs, concerning
conservation work in all fields of wild life and the prevention
of cruelty to wild life, do qualify as charitable activities. But
on such a meagre showing, can I hold that the Club was operated
exclusively for charitable purposes? I think not.
While I do not consider the Club's social periods, which are
held after each meeting, to be significant, in and of themselves,
I do believe that such practices, coupled with the Club's monthly
programs which in some cases are clearly unrelated to
conservation work and which in other cases are somewhat
questionably related to such work, clearly reveal that the social
and otherwise personal objects of the Club are not merely
incidental to the Club's work in the conservation field. From the
evidence submitted, the North Shore Sportsman's Club appears to
be a club where hunters and fishermen periodically assemble to
pool their ideas and experiences for their own individual
advancement in the field of hunting and fishing while, at the
same time, promoting conservation of wild life and fish so that
such outdoor activities might be preserved for the present and
future generations. Accordingly, I am unable to hold, on the
evidence before me, that the social and purely individual
purposes of the Club were incidental to the charitable purposes.
I hold, therefore, that the North Shore Sportsman's Club has
not been operated exclusively for charitable purposes.
Counsel for the plaintiff relies, in some degree, on the fact
that the County Court of Cook County has held, on February 26,
1953, that the North Shore Sportsman's Club, and its residuary
share herein, was exempt from Illinois Inheritance Tax. Counsel
for the defendant, in the stipulation, reserved his rights to
object to this Court's consideration of this fact for any
purpose. The short answer to this issue is that the Cook County
Court was there concerned with Section 28 of the Illinois
Inheritance Tax Act, Ill.Rev.Stat. 1955, c. 120, § 401; and,
accordingly, the determination on said question could in no wise
have any bearing on the issue whether the Club would qualify
under Section 812(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.
Counsel for each party cite several cases which either advance
the rules of
law applied here or which can readily be distinguished on their
facts from the case at bar. Consequently, no useful purpose would
be served by prolonging this memorandum by a discussion of these
authorities as each case in this field must be decided on its own
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court hereby enters the
Findings of Fact
1-23. The facts stipulated in paragraphs 1 through 23,
inclusive of the stipulation of facts herein shall stand as
findings of fact 1 through 23, respectively, and the same are
hereby entered and adopted as findings of fact as provided in
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a), 28 U.S.C.
§ 24. The North Shore Sportsman's Club of Chicago was not, and is
not, organized exclusively for charitable, scientific, or
educational purposes as provided in Section 812(d), 26 U.S.C.
25. The North Shore Sportsman's Club of Chicago, during the
period from October 10, 1942 to October 17, 1950, was not
operated exclusively for charitable, educational or scientific
purposes as provided in Section 812(d), 26 U.S.C. (1952 ed.)
Conclusions of Law
1. The Court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject
2. The North Shore Sportsman's Club of Chicago is not such a
corporation as within the purview of Section 812(d), 26 U.S.C.
3. The estate of Robert S. Clarke is not entitled to an estate
tax deduction by virtue of the testator's bequest to the North
Shore Sportsman's Club of Chicago.
4. The plaintiff is not entitled to an estate tax refund.
Accordingly, judgment is hereby entered for the defendant and
against the plaintiff and the case is dismissed at plaintiff's
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