U.S.C.A. § 688 for the death of plaintiff's intestate. Deceased
was an employee of defendant, and was killed when a barge owned
by defendant, on which he was working as a seaman, sank in Lake
Michigan. Defendant, a Delaware corporation, removed the case to
this court on the grounds of diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff
now moves to remand the cause to the Circuit Court of Cook
County, and defendant resists the motion.
The issue between the parties revolves around several sections
of the United States Code. Title 28, Section 1445(a) flatly
prohibits the removal to a United States District Court of
actions against railroads under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. Title 46, Section 688 in turn
provides that in any action to recover for the death of a seaman
"all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the
right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall
The question here is whether the statutory prohibition against
the removal of suits by railroad employees is one conferring or
regulating a right of action and so applicable to a suit by a
seaman under the Jones Act. That it does so apply, and that Jones
Act cases may not be removed to the United States District Court,
has been held many times. Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 5
Cir., 1952, 193 F.2d 498, and cases there cited; Nickerson v. Am.
Dredging Co., D.C.N.Y. 1955, 129 F. Supp. 602, and cases there
cited; Rodich v. American Barge Lines, D.C.E.D.Mo.E.D. 1947,
71 F. Supp. 549; see also "Analysis of the Jones Act", 46 U.S.C.A.
preceding section 688, at page 261.
The cited cases also discuss, see particularly Rodich, supra,
the constitutional objections raised by the defendant here. While
the Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on this question,
and though these authorities are not binding on me, I agree with
their reasoning and conclusions.
The motion to remand will accordingly be allowed.
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