The opinion of the court was delivered by: Knoch, District Judge.
Plaintiff filed his complaint under Sections 4 and 16 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15, 26, to recover treble damages for
alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2, and to restrain continuing violations. He
charges that defendants acted in conspiracy to frustrate
plaintiff's attempts at promotion of specific professional boxing
matches and to prevent plaintiff from attaining the professional
standing and reputation as a championship professional boxing
promoter which he would have attained in a free competitive
The International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., a New York
corporation, moved to dismiss the action on the ground of
improper venue as to itself, as a foreign corporation not doing
business in Illinois.
One defendant, Al Weill, was never served with process.
The remaining defendants moved for summary judgment in their
favor on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint
itself, and in discovery depositions showed plaintiff not to be
injured or damaged in his business or property by reason of the
alleged unlawful acts of defendants, as it does not appear that
plaintiff was either engaged in the business of Boxing Promoter
or even that he was, as he contends, prepared to engage in that
business and intended to do so.
Plaintiff's complaint and statements on deposition do show an
intention to enter into and engage in the business of Boxing
Promoter. However, it is uncontroverted that neither plaintiff,
nor the Foundation For Boys, Inc., for whom plaintiff is alleged
to have acted as agent, had ever been licensed as a Boxing
Promoter; that the Rules of the Cincinnati Boxing and Wrestling
Commission require a license to be procured from that Commission
prior to participation in boxing; and that application was never
made for such license by plaintiff or the Foundation For Boys,
It is plaintiff's contention that he was in process of
negotiating contracts with boxers and their managers, had
exchanged preliminary telegrams and long distance telephone
calls, had made a trip to New York to discuss availability of one
boxer, had prepared contracts for signature, had prepared to
secure a passport and fly to Paris, France, for completion of
arrangements, had discussed renting and was orally promised a
baseball field for the event, had arranged to meet Walter
Winchell to publicize the affair, was orally promised sponsorship
and financing by an officer of the Foundation For Boys, Inc.
although he admits that the same officer testified otherwise on
deposition, explaining that such financing would have to be
authorized by resolution of the Trustees and that no such
authorization had been given in this case. On the contrary,
according to the officer's deposition, after contracts with the
two boxers had been made and after a sponsored television
contract had been secured, with proceeds of about $200,000, as
anticipated, the three contracts would have been presented to the
trustees for approval, and, no expenditure by the Foundation
being needed, the trustees would likely have approved sponsorship
of the match and receipt of a share in the eventual profits.
Plaintiff feels that except for the intervention of defendants,
he would have sold television and radio broadcasting rights and
thus secured the approximately $110,000 needed to be posted as
guarantees for the boxers in addition to funds for all other
promotional financing needs which he was not then himself in a
position to meet, and he would have then proceeded to stage a
boxing bout in Cincinnati, at the ball field, under the
sponsorship of the Cincinnati Foundation For Boys, Inc.
From the uncontroverted facts, it appears that plaintiff was
neither engaged in the business of Boxing Promoter, nor prepared
so to engage. The plaintiff in an action of this nature must show
actual damage and injury to his business or property by reason of
the alleged unlawful acts, as distinguished from damage and
injury suffered by the public at large. Brownlee v. Malco
Theatres, Inc., D.C.Ark. 1951, 99 F. Supp. 312; Beegle v. Thomson,
7 Cir., 1943, 138 F.2d 875; Triangle Conduit & Cable v. National
Electric Products Corp., 3 Cir., 1945, 152 F.2d 398.
There appears to be no genuine issue as to a material fact. As
a matter of law, defendants are entitled to their motion. Order
granting defendants' motion for summary judgment will be entered.
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