broader state legislation relating to intoxicants.
That the second section of the Twenty-first Amendment should
have ascribed to it the scope and meaning above set forth seems
entirely logical since it was the reasonable purpose of the
Congress, the states and the people of the United States in
connection with the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment to place
the states in position to put their respective policies relating
to intoxicants into effect by state legislation without hindrance
due to constitutional limitations applicable to ordinary articles
of commerce. To effectuate this purpose the limitations imposed
upon the power of the states by Sec. 8, Article 1, of the
Constitution to regulate commerce among the several states were
in large measure abrogated as relates to intoxicating liquor by
the same amendment which repealed the Eighteenth Amendment. This
was, in effect, a restoration of power to the states. Such
restoration gave the states no federal rights but gave back to
them certain powers they had surrendered to the federal
government through the Constitution. It restored to them the
right and power by legislation to protect themselves as relates
to intoxicating liquor. Congressional Record, Vol. 76, pt. IV, p.
4143. It also anticipated and rendered harmless a possible repeal
of the Webb-Kenyon Act or the possibility that said act be held
unconstitutional in so far as applied to interstate commerce.
The states having had their power to legislate for the
aforesaid purposes restored and having legislated to that end,
any rights accruing to the states whether in nature of a civil
remedy or criminal action have their origin not in the
Webb-Kenyon Act or in the Twenty-first Amendment that gave or
restored to them the power to legislate but in the legislation
enacted in exercise of the power. Gully v. First National Bank,
299 U.S. 109, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70.
In my opinion no legal right or cause of action of the nature
asserted in plaintiff's complaint arises or can arise under the
Webb-Kenyon Act or the Twenty-first Amendment. Neither the
amendment nor the act gives rise to any legal right which will
sustain a claim for damages by reason of the violation of the
terms of either whether by an individual or through a conspiracy.
Being of the opinion first stated I am of the further opinion
that this court is not required to retain the case to determine
the merits of plaintiff's claim under the laws of the State of
Georgia for the reason that the complaint states no federal cause
of action but relies upon a Constitutional amendment and an act
of Congress from which no cause of action can arise. Bell v.
Hood, D.C., 71 F. Supp. 813, 817-821.
The several cases relied upon by the plaintiff to support her
contention that it is the duty of this court to retain the case
to determine plaintiff's rights under the state laws are
distinguishable from the case here. An analysis of those cases
shows that nearly all were equity cases in which considerations
not recognized in a case at law often moved the court to retain
jurisdiction. I have found no case among them either at law or
equity, absent diversity of citizenship, where jurisdiction was
retained to adjudicate rights grounded solely on state laws when
the accompanying federal ground asserted to sustain the same
cause of action had no basis, as here, either in a federal
statute or in the Federal Constitution. These distinctions are
pointed out clearly by Judge Mathes in Bell v. Hood, D.C.,
71 F. Supp. 813, 817-821.
The case of Hurn v. Ousler, 289 U.S. 238, 53 S.Ct. 586, 77
L.Ed. 1148, relied upon by plaintiff well illustrates this point.
In that equity suit for injunction there was but a single cause
of action allegedly supported by a federal ground arising under
the federal copyright laws and by the ground of unfair
competition arising under state laws. Though the federal ground
failed under the facts of the case it was a ground which had an
indisputable basis in a federal statute. Under those
circumstances the court retained the case to determine the rights
of the parties
arising under the state law and thus do complete equity. Even in
that suit in equity I apprehend the court would have disposed of
the case on the federal ground alone, leaving the plaintiff to
proceed in the state courts if it had appeared that the asserted
federal ground had no foundation in any provision of the
Constitution or laws of the United States. In the case at law
before this court I entertain no doubt that it must be disposed
of on the asserted federal ground.
In view of the conclusions above stated the complaint must be
and is dismissed on its merits because no claim is stated which
arises under the Webb-Kenyon Act or the Twenty-first Amendment of
the Constitution. For reasons stated I do not consider nor rule
upon the merits of plaintiff's cause of action under state laws.
Order accordingly, dismissing the complaint.