Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

United States v. Morton Salt Co.

May 20, 1949

UNITED STATES
v.
MORTON SALT CO. UNITED STATES V. INTERNATIONAL SALT CO.



Author: Major

Before MAJOR, Chief Judge, MINTON and DUFFY, Circuit Judges.

MAJOR, Chief Judge: This action was commenced by the United States against numerous defendants, including International Salt Company and Morton Salt Company. From an adverse judgment entered August 20, 1948, the government separately appealed as to these two defendants. Only issues of law are involved in each appeal, and, being identical, they may appropriately be considered and disposed of in a single opinion.

The action, according to the complaint, was instituted by the Attorney General upon request of the Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter called the Commission) for the enforcement of a Commission order "requiring additional reports of compliance," and to recover forfeitures for failure of defendants to comply with such order. The action is predicated upon Title 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 49,*fn1 which vests the several District Courts of the United States with jurisdiction to direct a corporation to comply with an order issued by the Commission, and Sec. 50, which vests any District Court with jurisdiction of suits by the United States for the recovery of forfeitures if a corporation fails to file any report so required within the time fixed by the Commission.

The order sought to be enforced was issued by the Commission on September 2, 1947, under the authority asserted to reside in Rule XXVI, 15 U.S.C.A following section 45, promulgated by the Commission, and Sec. 46(a) and (b) of the Act. The complaint sets forth verbatim the order relied upon and the notice of default served on the defendants. There are attached to the complaint numerous exhibits, including a copy of Rule XXVI.

The court below in a well reasoned opinion held that it was without jurisdiction to entertain the cause of action. United States v. Morton Salt Co. and International Salt Co. v. United States, 80 F.Sup. 419. This holding was predicated upon the conclusion that the Commission's order of September 2, 1947 was invalid because issued without authority. It is obvious, so we think, that the right to maintain the instant action is dependent upon the validity of the order.

The issue thus presented calls for a further statement of the factual situation. On September 18, 1940, the Commission issued its complaint under Sec. 45, charging defendants and others with engaging in an unlawful conspiracy to fix prices on and to control the production of salt in connection with the sale and distribution of that commodity in interstate commerce. On November 10, 1941, the Commission issued its order to cease and desist, requiring the defendants to discontinue the conspiracy alleged in the complaint. A petition for review of the Commission's order was filed by the defendants in this court which rendered its opinion March 8, 1943. Salt Producers Association v. Federal Trade Commission, 134 F.2d 354.On April 20, 1943, this court entered its decree modifying the Commission's order in certain respects, affirming it as modified and directing compliance therewith. In effect, this court by its decree enforced the modified cease and desist order under Sec. 45 and commanded these defendants (as well as the others) to obey said decree, without prejudice to the right of the Commission to initiate contempt proceedings or penalty proceedings under Sec. 45(1), and it required the defendants to file a compliance report within ninety days and reserved to this court "jurisdiction of this cause to enter such further orders herein from time to time as may become necessary effectively to enforce compliance in every respect with this decree and to prevent evasion thereof ...." Within the time thus designated in the decree of this court, each of the defendants filed a report with the Commission showing the manner and form in which they were complying with the court's decree. In the interim, during a period of more than five years, no question has been raised by the Commission as to the form or content of such compliance reports, and during said period the defendants have not been charged with a violation of the decree of this court and no request has been made by the Commission that this court order or direct an investigation into defendants' conduct.

The government apparently senses the insecurity of its position if it be held that the order sought to be enforced was in aid of or for the purpose of enforcement either of the decree of this court or the Commission's cease and desist order modified to conform therewith. And so any such purpose on the part of the Commission is disclaimed. There was no attempt, so it is asserted, to enforce either the court's decree or the Commission's order, but "the sole purpose of the order requiring the reports was to inquire as to the manner of compliance by defendants with the Commission's modified order to cease and desist ... and this Court's decree enforcing that order." We have some difficulty in following a theory that the purpose was merely to obtain information as to whether defendants have been violating the decree of this court and at the same time denying that such purpose bears any relation to its enforcement. We are informed that if the defendants are shown to have violated the order of the Commission modified in conformity with the decree of this court, two courses are open, (1) it can certify the facts to the Attorney General under Sec. 56 of the Act, requesting that he file a civil suit seeking civil penalties under the provisions of Sec. 45(1), or (2) it can petition this court for a rule requiring defendants to show cause why they are not in contempt of court.

We, as the court below, do not agree with the government's contention that the Commission initiated a new investigation. The record plainly discloses that the controverted order was issued in connection with and as a part of the proceeding theretofore had under Sec. 45; in fact, the order itself calls for "an additional and supplemental report showing the manner and form of compliance with the modified order to cease and desist entered by the Commission on August 10, 1943, and with the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit entered on April 22, 1943." "Additional and supplemental" to what? The answer must be that such reference was to the report of compliance required by the decree of this court and that the order was only a further step in the proceeding of which this court retained jurisdiction. Any doubt in this respect is dispelled by the fact that the order of September 2, 1947 is given the same title and docket number as the Commission's original order dated November 10, 1941.

As already noted, this court retained jurisdiction "to enter such further oders ... as may become necessary effectively to enforce compliance in every respect with this decree and to prevent evasion thereof." The jurisdictional reservation thus provided was in conformity with Sec. 45 of the Act; in fact, a reading of this section discloses in unmistakable fashion that every vestige of jurisdiction over a proceeding such as that under discussion was definitely lodged with the Court of Appeals. The court is given the power to enter a decree "affirming, modifying, or setting aside the order of the Commission, and enforcing the same to the extent that such order is affirmed," and "the court shall thereupon issue its own order commanding obedience to the terms of such order of the Commission." It is also provided, "The judgment and decree of the court shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court upon certiorari." Not only was the court endowed with jurisdictional power, but by subsection (d) it was provided that such jurisdiction "shall be exclusive."

Thus, with enforcement jurisdiction so firmly and exclusively lodged in a Court of Appeals both by the statute and decree of the court, it would seem that one who asserts such jurisdiction to reside elsewhere is confronted with a heavy burden which can be met only by a rule or statutory provision, which makes clear a legislative purpose to impair or divide the jurisdictional responsibility provided in Sec. 45. Language which only confuses the situation or raises a doubt should not be accepted as sufficient.

An analysis of Sec. 46 furnishes no sound basis for the contention either that it can be utilized as an aid to a proceeding under Sec. 45 or that it was intended to impair or detract from the unambiguous and exclusive jurisdictional provision of that section.

Sec. 46, so far as relevant, empowers the Commission in paragraph (a) "To gather and compile information concerning, and to investigate ... to organization, business, conduct, practices, and management of any corporation ... and its relation to other corporations and to individuals, associations, and partnerships," and in paragraph (b) "To require, by general or special orders, corporations, ... or any class of them, or any of them ... to file with the commission ... annual or special, or both annual and special, reports or answers in writing to specific questions ...," which will inform the Commission regarding the business affairs of those corporations, and the "relation" thereof "to other corporations, partnerships, and individuals ...."

Not only does the language fail to reveal any interdependence of the two sections, but the opposite is indicated. Sec.46 is directed solely to a "corporation," while Sec. 45 refers to any "person, partnership, or corporation." Also, Sec. 46 is concerned with "annual or special, or both annual and special, reports," while Sec. 45 makes no mention of reports but leaves it to the court to "issue its own order commanding obedience to the terms of such order of the Commission."

Both sides have set forth, particularly with reference to Secs. 45 and 46, a large amount of legislative history, a discussion of which would serve no useful purpose. It can be safely said, however, that such history discloses that Secs. 45 and 46 were not intended as complementary but were designed as separate and distinct, each directed to different situations. The dual purposes embodied in the two sections were recognized in F.T.C. v. Millers' National Federation, 47 F.2d 428, 429, wherein the court stated: "The power of investigation conferred upon the Commission by section 6 is different in character from the jurisdiction conferred by section 5. Section 6 contemplates an investigation for the collection of facts for the information of Congress ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.