Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Wisconsin; Patrick T. Stone, Judge.
Before EVANS, KERNER, and MINTON, Circuit Judges.
The plaintiff-appellee on June 6, 1941 commenced suit in the Circuit Court of Dane County, Wisconsin, against the defendant-appellant, claiming that he was totally and permanently disabled from pursuing any substantially gainful occupation since June 24, 1939, notice of which disability he served on the defendant on April 22, 1940; that the defendant was liable to him for disability benefits at the rate of one hundred dollars per month from June 24, 1939; that under the policy he was entitled to a waiver of premiums from and after the same date; that because the company had threatened to lapse the policy unless the payments were continued, he had paid in quarterly payments up to and including the quarterly payment due in April, 1941, $900.50, which he was entitled to recover; and that the defendant had failed, neglected and refused to pay him one hundred dollars per month for his disability. He prayed judgment for oine hundred dollars per month from June 24, 1939, to the date of judgment, and for payment to him of the sum equal to the amount of premiums paid on the policy by him to the defendant from June 24, 1939, to the commencement of the suit; for premium payments the plaintiff may make during the litigation; that the defendant be decreed to waive all premium payments on the policy; that the policy may remain in full force and effect without the payment of premiums after June 24, 1939; and that the plaintiff have and recover of the defendant one hundred dollars per month during the remainder of the plaintiff's life.
The defendant filed a petition for removal of the said cause to the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, and alleged in its petition: "Said action is brought on an insurance policy issued by the defendant, to recover from the defendant a sum in excess of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000), and the amount involved in said action exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000)."
The cause went to trial in the District Court before the court without a jury, and the court made findings of fact and stated its conclusions of law thereon. The court found that on June 24, 1939, and continuously thereafter the plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled so as to render it impossible for him to follow a gainful occupation; that the plaintiff was at the time of trial totally and permanently disabled so as to render it impossible for him to follow a gainful occupation; that his disability is a heart condition that is reasonably certain to continue the remainder of his lifetime; that the disability existed cointinuously for more than ninety days prior to the commencement of this action; that on April 22, 1940, the plaintiff furnished to the defendant proof of his disability and asked for disability benefits; and that the defendant denied any liability to the plaintiff under the policy and advised the plaintiff that to continue his policy in force, it was necessary that he pay the premiums as they became due.
The court entered its coinclusions of law that the plaintiff was entitled to recover from the defendant $604.07, premiums paid by him to the defendant after the plaintiff furnished to the defendant proof of total and permanent disability; that he was entitled to judgment adjudging the defendant company to waive payment of future premiums that may become due on the policy during the total and permanent disability of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff was entitled to recover from the defendant $1,350, the amount that was due at the commencement of this action on June 6, 1941, with interest at six per cent per annum from that date; and that the plaintiff was entitled to the further sum of $650, which is the amount that had accrued to the plaintiff from the date of the commencement of this action to the date of the judgment, with six per cent interest; that the plaintiff was entitled to the further sum of one hundred dollars per month during the period of his total and permanent disability; that the defendant may require proof of the continuance of the total and permanent disability of the plaintiff; and that plaintiff shall, at the request of defendant, submit to a medical examination, which shall not be required by the defendant more often than once a year. The court retained jurisdiction of the action to the end that the judgment may be modified by the court if on competent evidence it is found by the court on motion of the defendant that the plaintiff's disability has ceased. Judgment was entered accordingly, and from this judgment the defendant appeals.
At the trial of this cause, there was some conflict as to whether or not the plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled, but the trial court resolved that conflict in favor of the plaintiff, and no question is raised here on that finding of the court. The defendant therefore does not deny its liability for disability payments from April 22, 1940, the date proof of disability was served upon it, up to and including the date upon which this action was commenced; nor does it deny the right of plaintiff to a waiver of premiums during said period, and the plaintiff's right to recover any such premiums paid.
The defendant challenges the right of the District Court to enter any judgment for payments beyond the date of the commencement of the suit, and as to its future liability under the policy; and the right of the court to maintian jurisdiction for the enforcement or modification of its judgment as the circumstances might require.
Although the defendant removed this cause from the Circuit Court of Dane County, Wisconsin, it now challenges the jurisdiction of this court on the ground that the amount involved is less than the jurisdictional amount of three thousand dollars.
If the plaintiff was correct in his theory that he was entitled to recvoer the disability payments from the time his disability started, June 24, 1939, to the date of judgment, together with premiums he had paid, and to have future payments waived and to recover disability payments at the rate of one hundred dollars per month as long as he should live, then obviously he had put in issue an amount in excess of three thousand dollars.
This is a removal case, and its status as to jurisdiction is determined at the very threshold by a consideration of the plaintiff's complaint. Jurisdiction is determined here without the aid of answer, hearings, findings and conclusions of law. We think the plaintiff in the case at bar tendered by his complaint in good faith and with some claim of legal right an issue within the jurisdictional amount. It is the amount or value of the thing put in issue which measures the jurisdiction, rather than the amount thereafter recovered. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Company, 303 U.S. 283, 58 S. Ct. 586, 82 L. Ed. 845; Alderman v. Elgin, etc., Ry. Co., 7 Cir., 125 F.2d 971. In our opinion, the case is not subject to remand.
Having decided that the complaint in good faith and with some show of legal right has tendererd an issue within the jurisdictional requirements, and that the case is not subject to remand, we pass to a consideration of what the plaintiff was entitled to recover by his complaint as revealed by the entire record. The complaint alleged a simple breach of the contract contained in the policy to pay disability benefits. The defendant did not renounce or repudiate the contract. The trial court did not make any finding that the defendant had done so. The defendant did not deny its liability under the policy in any event. It denied liability because it believed there was no disability. An issue upon the question of disability was formed on the trial, and the court found against the defendant. No question is raised here as to the action of the court in resolving this conflict against the defendant. However, this finding did not convict the defendant of abandonment or repudiation of the contract. It did convict it of a simple breach of the contract.
In such a state of the record, what were the limits of the plaintiff's recovery? Was he confined to the benefits in default at the commencement of the suit, as contended for by the defendant, or was he entitled to an ...