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TRAVERS v. REINHARDT

April 15, 1907

TRAVERS
v.
REINHARDT



APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, White, Peckham, Holmes, Day; Mr Justice McKenna and Mr Justice Moody did not participate in the decision of this case.

Author: Harlan

[ 205 U.S. Page 428]

 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was originally brought for the partition or sale of

[ 205 U.S. Page 429]

     certain real estate in the city of Washington devised by the will (and codicils thereto) of Nicholas Travers who died in the year 1849, leaving four sons and three daughters.

The only parts of that estate remaining in dispute are certain lots in square 291 in Washington, and the questions to be determined depend upon the construction of that will and upon the evidence touching the alleged marriage of James Travers, a son of the testator, with Sophia V. Grayson.

By the first item of the will certain lots are devised to the testator's son Elias "and his heirs and assigns forever in fee simple." By the same item other lots are devised to the same son, "which last two devises shall be subject to the general provision hereinafter made in case of any sons dying without leaving a wife or child or children."

By the second item the testator devised lot 5, in square 291, to his son "Joseph Travers and his heirs forever," and two other specified lots "to him and his heirs forever, in fee simple;" lot 5 "being subject to the general provision aforesaid hereafter made."

By the third item he devised to his son Nicholas and his heirs forever certain lots in square 291 "subject to the general provision hereinafter made;" also "to him and his heirs forever, in fee simple," other real estate in square 36, and a designated parcel of ground in square 291, "said piece or parcel of ground to be subject to the general provision hereafter made."

By the fourth item certain devises are made to the son "James Travers and his heirs forever," "all of which devises are to be subject to the general provision hereinafter made."

Here follows, at the close of the fourth item, the "general provision" referred to: "With regard to the several estates hereinbefore devised to my several sons, it is hereby declared to be my will, and I do order and direct, as a general provision, that if any of my sons should die without leaving a wife, or a child or children living at his death, then his estate herein devised to him, saving and excepting those portions thereof expressly granted and so named to be 'in fee simple,' and which they

[ 205 U.S. Page 430]

     can sell and dispose of as they think fit, shall go, and be invested in fee, to my surviving sons and the child or children of such as may be dead, such child or children representing the share of the father -- but if either of my sons shall, at his death, leave a wife either with or without a child or children, such wife shall be entitled to her dower rights and privileges."

This was followed in the will by certain devises for the benefit of the daughters, as well as by several codicils to the will, but it is not necessary to give their provisions in detail.

By a codicil, dated June 26th, 1848, the testator revoked certain parts of his will, providing: "And in lieu thereof I do hereby give and devise all of said lots or part of lots, so as aforesaid described, with the house and other improvements and appurtenances, to my son James and his heirs, subject to the express stipulations and restrictions contained in the will to which this is a codicil, wherein I declare that all and every portion of my real estate not devised by the use of the words 'in fee simple,' shall be held by such devisees for life, and then according to stipulations and restrictions as therein contained and declared by said will."

It is contended here, as it was in the courts below, that the words in the above general provision, that "if any of my sons should die without leaving a wife or child or children living at his death," should be interpreted as if it read "if any of my sons should die without leaving a wife and child or children living at his death." The court is thus asked, by interpretation, to substitute the word "and" in place of "or" in the above sentence.

Looking at all the provisions of the will, and ascertaining, as best we may, the intention of the testator, we perceive no reason for interpreting the words used by him otherwise than according to their ordinary, natural meaning.

It is insisted by appellants that the general, dominant purpose of the testator was that his real estate should descend only through his sons, and that his daughters and their descendants should have no share therein. And the doctrine is invoked

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     that "the predominant idea of a testator's mind, when discovered, is to be heeded as against all doubtful and conflicting provisions which might of themselves defeat it; and the general intent and particular intent being inconsistent, the latter (the particular) must be sacrificed to the former -- the general intent." Schouler on Wills, § 476. This general doctrine is not controverted, but there are other cardinal rules in the interpretation of wills which must be regarded. Mr. Justice Story, speaking for this court, said that effect must be given "to all the words of a will, if, by the rules of law, it can be done. And where words occur in a will their plain and ordinary sense is to be attached to them, unless the testator manifestly applies them in some other sense." Wright v. Denn, 10 Wheat. 204, 239. "The first and great rule in the exposition of wills," said Chief Justice Marshall, "to which all other rules must bend, is that the intention of the testator expressed in his will shall prevail, provided it be consistent with the rules of law." Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. 68, 75; Finlay v. King, 3 Pet. 346, 377. The same thought, in substance, was expressed by Lord Chancellor Eldon in Crooke v. De Vendes, 9 Ves. 197, 205. He said that "where words have once got a clear, settled, legal meaning, it is very dangerous to conjecture against that, upon no better foundation than simply that it is improbable, the testator could have meant to do one thing by one set of words, having done another thing, using other words, as to persons in the same degree of relation to him." It would seem clear that the words "without leaving a wife or child or children," where they first appear in the above general provision, were purposely chosen. They appear ...


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